Two pay ultimate penalty for wealthy old man’s murder

— had the gall to appeal, but lost
STANUEL and Alexander had been convicted for the murder of Sookhraj, a wealthy old man, between the 20th and 21st April, 1953. They appealed, lost their appeals at the Court of Appeal, and had their applications for leave to appeal to the Privy Council rejected by that body.
They eventually suffered death by hanging.
The facts reveal that the appellants were found guilty of murdering a wealthy old man.  Three others who were tried at the same time were acquitted.
Originally, eleven or twelve persons were charged with the murder, and all were committed for trial by the magistrate; but the Attorney General entered a nolle prosequi in favour of six or seven of them.
Some of those in whose favour the nolle prosequi had been entered had made oral and written confession statements, but there was no other evidence against them, because the trial judge, in absence of the jury, had ruled that the statements had not been freely and voluntarily made, and those statements had not been tendered in evidence.
Counsel for the appellants sought at the trial to get the statements of the persons not on trial tendered in evidence, to show that those others had confessed to the crime.  The judge ruled those statements inadmissible, as being hearsay evidence.
The main ground of appeal was that the statements should have been admitted, as they were favourable to the appellants.
But it was held that statements made in the absence of an accused person are not admissible, either against him or for him.
An Editor’s note disclosed that after the appellants had lost their appeals, they applied to the Privy Council for leave to appeal to that body, but were refused.
At the trial before the Court of Appeal, constituted by Chief Justice Frederick Malcolm Boland Justices Harold Hughes and Kenneth Sievewright Stoby, the appeals were dismissed.
Attorney-at-law CER Debidin represented Stanuel, while Mr. N J Bissember appeared for Alexander.
Mr. A M Edun, acting Crown Counsel, appeared for the Crown.
Chief Justice Boland, who delivered the judgment, said:
“This is a case in which two appellants were found guilty by the jury of the murder of an old man named Sookhraj between the night of the 20th and the morning of 21st of April, 1953, at a place at Canal Polder, on the West Bank of Demerara.
“The evidence against the appellants was in the nature of circumstantial evidence.
There was no particular eye witness to the actual murder. The evidence disclosed that the old man was in his home that night with his wife and daughter, and was aroused by the barking of the dogs. He had a torchlight, which he took up and shone in the direction of the yard. Seeing nothing, he went back to bed, where he was soon after strangled and given a blow on the head (which resulted in his death).
“His wife also received certain injuries. She saw a number of men in the room, but could not identify them.
“The case against the two appellants comprised evidence of witnesses who testified that, on the Saturday before the fatal Monday night, they were seen round and about that particular district, which is on the left  bank of the Demerara River.  They both belonged to Georgetown, which is on the right bank of the Demerara River.
“There was some evidence,   too, that on the Monday night, they were seen on that side of the river. The appellants, in statements from the dock, denied that they were either on the Saturday or on the Monday at the Wes Bank of Demerara, where the killing took place. They did not give evidence on oath, but elected to make statements from the dock, and did not subject themselves to cross-examination.
“The deceased man, who was a money-lender, had in his room a safe in which he had a lot of money and jewellery. The safe was found open and the money and jewellery missing. Police, in the course of their investigations, detained and charged other persons besides the appellants; but certain articles of the missing jewellery were found at a room in Georgetown where the appellant Stanuel lived.
“He may not have been the actual tenant of the room, but the police went there and found, buried in a hole under the floor of the room, articles of jewellery in a bag. Some of the articles were tied up in a piece of cloth, part of a pair of pyjama trouses which the police established to be the property of Stanuel.
“The conduct of Stanuel immediately before the discovery of the articles under the floor of the room caused the police to draw the inference that Stanuel had control of the jewellery which was secreted there. He had made an attempt to get the police away from the room by telling them that some aricles of jewellery had been brought to him there, but that he would have nothing to do with them.
“This information was given by Stanuel to get the police away from the scene, but he was seen soon afterwards throwing a mattress on the floor. This aroused the suspicion of the police, and caused them to investigate further. They looked at the floor and found that it had been tampered with at that spot.
“On removing the piece of the flooring at that spot, they saw, not far away under the floor, buried in the earth, a bag containing articles of jewellery.
“There was also a large sum of money in notes found in a coat in the room.  On a shirt in the room, there was a stain of blood.   The bloodstained shirt, which was admitted by the appellant Stanuel to be his, was analysed by the Government Bacteriologist, and (the stain) found to be human blood. There was evidence from which the jury could have come to the conclusion that that coat hanging in the room was used by Stanuel to secrete the money. I do not think that there is any need to go into the whole of the evidence…
“This was a long trial, and the jury arrived at their conclusion on all the facts which came out in the evidence.
“The appellant Stanuel had the advantage of Counsel, who made submissions against the admissibility of some of the evidence tendered at the trial.  These submissions were upheld by the learned trial judge. The jury came to their conclusion on the facts of the case, and we see no reason to disturb their findings.
“There were a few points raised at the trial by counsel for the appellants. One point raised at the trial was that, jointly with the accused, some other persons had been committed for trial by the magistrate at the preliminary inquiry, but the Attorney General had entered a nolle prosequi in their favour.
“It was admitted by the police witnesses that, in the course of the investigations, those same persons had given statements to the police. Counsel for both appellants had sought to get their statements admitted when cross-examining the police witnesses who took the statements.
“The learned trial judge, after hearing the submissions of counsel, ruled that the statements were inadmissible.    In this court, Counsel for the appellants urged that those statements were wrongly rejected by the trial judge, and that the appellants were entitled to have the statements put in at the trial.
“We have consulted the authorities on this point which  was cited at the trial, especially the case of R. v. Thompson decided in 1912 (7 C.A.R. p. 276), and we find that the learned trial judge acted  correctly in refusing the applications by Counsel to have the statements admitted.
“It is now well established that statements made in the absence of an accused person are not admissible, either against or for him.
“Mr. Debidin put forward 11 grounds of appeal on behalf of Stanuel. In the course of the argument, we expressed the view that there was no substance in any of them. The only one that merited our attention was the one dealing with the rejection of the statements made to the police by those persons in whose favour the Attorney General entered a nolle prosequi (withdrawal of charge).
“So far as the appellant Joseph Alexander is concerned, the evidence against him was not as strong as the evidence against Stanuel; but there was evidence of a substantial character from which the jury was entitled to draw the inference that he was on the scene, and if he did not actually and physically strangle the old man and caused to be inflictd on him the injuries which resulted in his death, he was there acting in concert with the person or persons who did so…
“There was evidence that Alexander was round and about the Canal Polder on the Monday. He had some conservation with a witness who testified before the jury, from which it could be said that he and Stanuel were making plans to break into the deceased man’s premises. The jury heard that evidence.
“The jury also had evidence that a torchlight was missing from the old man’s premises. That torchlight was traced to the possession of Alexander… He had passed it on to somebody in the market.
“Asst. Supt. of Police Austin testified that Alexander had admitted that he was the person who sold the torchlight, which was amply identified by the widow of the deceased man as the one which her husband had in his house. The torchlight had certain features by which it was identified to be the property of Sookhraj.
“There were other bits of circumstantial evidence forging links in the chain tending to connect Alexander with the crime.      The jury heard all the facts. The main point which they had to consider was whether or not Alexander committed any act which led to the death of the old man.   They came to a conclusion against him, and we see no reason to disturb their findings,” Chief Justice Boland said on behalf of the Court of Appeal. He affirmed the convictions and death sentences.

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