Federal Supreme Court frees rape accused

BECAUSE the alleged victim at a rape trial failed to negate consent, rape accused Adams was freed by the Federal Supreme Court in 1961.
The appellant was convicted of rape. The defence was consent.
The woman first accused the appellant before a constable of having snatched a ring and money from her.
She repeated that accusation at the police station and made the accusation of rape only after the appellant had said that he had had intercourse with her with her consent.
The only other evidence relevant to the issue of consent was that of the medical witnesses who were in conflict with each other.
Held: the conviction could not safely be allowed to stand and the provisions of s. 16 (1) of the Federal Supreme Court (Appeals) Ordinance, 1958 [1958] should be applied.
Appeal allowed.

Editorial Note: Section 16 (1)m of the Federal Supreme Court (Appeals) Ordinance, 1958 [B.G.], provides as follows:
“The Federal Supreme Court on any such appeal against conviction shall allow the appeal if they think that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.”
Appeal against conviction of rape by the Supreme Court of British Guiana.
C. Weithers for the appellant.
E. A. Ramao for the Crown.
Justice of Appeal Rennie of FSC (Criminal Appeal Jurisdiction) delivered the judgment of the court. He said: This appeal is from a conviction of rape. On June 4, 1960, Special Reserve Constable, Newton Albert, was cycling along Sussex Street and came upon Vinton Jarvis and the appellant.

Jarvis was holding the appellant’s bicycle. She called out to S.R. C. Albert and reported to him that the appellant had snatched a ring and 25 cents, from her.
Albert took them to the Ruimveldt Police Station and reported to Corporal Dundas what Jarvis had told him on Sussex Street. Corporal Dundas then asked the appellant if he had heard what the Special Reserve Constable had said, whereupon the appellant said he had known Jarvis for six months; they had an appointment on that night and he took her to the back of Alexander Village and had an affair with her and, it is because he did not fulfill certain promises he made to her that she made the allegations against him.

Jarvis denied knowing the appellant before that night. The appellant met this denial by telling Corporal Dundas that he could tell him the kind of underwear she was wearing. Confronted with such a challenge, Jarvis for the first time told of having been raped. It is in that setting that the jury had to decide whether or not Jarvis consented to the intercourse with the appellant.
It does not appear anywhere in that setting that Jarvis made a complaint to S.R.C. Albert or to Corporal Dundas or to anyone else that she was raped.
Her answer to the appellant’s challenge is clearly not a complaint. If she had complained, that fact could be taken into account to negative consent.

But as we have already pointed out she did not complain; what she did was by way of face- saving and could not, in any way, negative consent.
The only other evidence that deals with the question of consent is that of a medical witness who examined Jarvis and found slight generalised tenderness of her vagina and, expressed the opinion that such tenderness was never caused by intercourse by consent.
On the other hand, another medical witness by the prosecution disagreed with the opinion expressed by the other doctor.

The question now arises what this court should do in a case of that kind.
Except in exceptional circumstances, a Court of Appeal will not upset the verdict of a jury for the simple reason that the jury had the opportunity of hearing and seeing the witnesses when giving their testimony.
We consider that an exceptional case and one coming within the provisions of s. 16 (1) of the Federal Supreme Court (Appeals) Ordinance, 1958, which provides:
“The Federal Supreme Court or any such appeal against conviction shall allow the appeal if they think that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable, or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.”
This is a conviction that we think cannot safely be allowed to stand. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the