-Full Court overturns ruling
IN 1957, Matilda Mentore, whose reputed husband, John Mentore, died in the course of employment  at a timber plant, Tamaca, Berbice River, applied for workman’s compensation, but was denied it by a Magistrate.
As a consequence, she applied to the Full Court, constituted by Justices J.A. Luckhoo and Ronald Jailall, who, after hearing the matter, allowed the appeal, set aside the Magistrate’s ruling and  remitted the matter to the Magistrate  of the Berbice Judicial District  for judgment to be entered  for the  appellant, with compensation.
In the Full Court, on appeal from the magistrate’s court for the Berbice Judicial Disrict (Luckhoo, J., and Jailal, J.,  December 16. 1958. and March 13, 1959), it was noted that the question was about Workmen’s Compensation dependants – and questioned whether a workman’s  reputed wife  can be a dependant of the workman- under the Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance, Chapter III,  Section 2.

The Full Court ruled Section 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance, Chapter III provides that “dependants mean such of the members of a workman’s family  as were wholly or mainly dependant  upon the wages of the  workman  at the time of his death… and further that “member of a family means wife or husband…. and such other person  as was at the time of his injury  living in the household of the worker,  and was wholly or mainly dependent on his earnings.”
Allowing the appeal, the Full Court held that “A workman’s reputed wife can be a dependant of the workman.”
Mr. Ashton Chase, S.C., appeared for the appellant, while Attorney-at-Law, Mr. Hugh Hanoman, represented the Respondent.
Delivering the Judgment of the Court, Chief Justice Luckhoo said: “This is an  appeal from the decision of a  magistrate of the Berbice Judicial District, dismissing  an application brought by the appellant  for the payment to her by the respondent of compensation under the provisions of  the Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance,  Chapter III, in respect of the death  of one John Mentore.”
The judgment went on to say that the evidence discloses that the deceased Mentore  was at the time of his death, on October 27, 1957 and for a number of years prior  thereto,  a workman employed by the respondent  at his Timber Grant  at Tacama, Berbice River.
It was admitted by the  respondent  that the accident causing the death  of the deceased  arose  out of, and  in the course of, the deceased employment.  The magistrate found that the notices  of claim and of  accident  required  by the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance, Chapter III, to be given to the respondent were duly given.
The appellant’s evidence  before the magistrate was to the effect that since 1935, and up to date of the death of the deceased, she had been the deceased’s reputed wife, and at the time of his injury, she was living in the household  of the worker  and  was wholly dependent on his earnings.
In the course of her evidence before the magistrate the appellant had said:
“I am the reputed wife of the deceased, from the year 1935 to the time of his death. The deceased was living at 100 Laing Avenue, West Ruimveldt, East Bank, Demerara at the time of his death.  I was living in his house at that time.  The deceased paid the rent for the house in which he lived.  
“During the year 1957, the deceased used to send me money every month, about $40 per month, and sometimes he would send an extra ten dollars.   With the money sent to me, I used to buy food and also pay the rent of the house.
“During the year 1957, I never used to do any work of my own.  During 1937, I was not maintained by any other person. The deceased had no wife or children when he died. The furniture in the house in which I live belong to deceased.   The deceased kept his clothes there also.  I used to send up to the deceased at Tacama boxes and clothes. The deceased usually comes home during August and December in every year at 100 Laing Avenue.”
The applicant called two witnesses, Amelia Skellikee and R. Bennett, who both gave evidence to the effect that the deceased and applicant had been living together since1935.   The learned magistrate, in his Memorandum of Reasons for decision, stated that he was not impressed with the manner in which the witnesses gave their evidence, and concluded  that they were not speaking the truth.
Counsel for the respondent however submitted that a reputed wife of a deceased worker is not a dependant within the contemplation of the Ordinance, even though she was in fact  living in the deceased’s household, and was in fact wholly or mainly dependent  on his earnings.
In this connection, the Full Court declared in its judgment, “reference  must be made to the definition of the term ‘dependants’ and  the expression  ‘members of a family’ in Section 2 of the Ordinance, whereby ‘dependants’ means such of the members of a workman’s family  as were wholly or mainly dependent upon the wages of the workman at the time of his death, or would, but for the incapacity due to the accident,  have been so dependent, and where the workman, being the parent or grandparent of an illegitimate child, leaves such a child so dependent  upon his wages or, being an illegitimate child, leaves a parent or grandparent so dependent  upon his wages, shall include such an illegitimate child and parent  respectively: Provided  that a person shall not be deemed to be mainly dependent on the wages of another person  unless he was dependently mainly on  contributions from that  other person for the provision  of the ordinary  necessaries of life suitable for persons  in his class and position.”
As their Lordships observed in their judgment: “We are also satisfied  that  the appellant  was  wholly or at least dependent on the contributions from the deceased  for the provision of ordinary necessaries of life suitable for persons of her class and position.
“The appellant is therefore allowed.  The order of the magistrate is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the magistrate of the Berbice  Judicial District  for Judgment  to be entered for the appellant, who is to be awarded compensation.”