THE Guyana Government recently rejected the USAID-funded $300 million democracy project because of the U.S. Government’s possibly limited consultation with the Donald Ramotar Administration. And notwithstanding the Guyana Government’s stance on this matter, the U.S. Embassy subsequently declared that it will proceed with the project. The U.S. democracy project is couched within the framework of the U.S. Foreign and Defence policy of overseas state-building activities geared toward failing countries. Perhaps, the U.S. Government perceives Guyana as a failing country. Let me explain further.

Given this new political dispensation, the U.S. use of a failed state as a criterion for overseas state-building activities is totally false. It, therefore, should wake up and smell the coffee. There is a new brew, a new political dispensation awaiting the U.S. overseas!”

The Cold War is over. Yet the U.S. today remains wedded to Cold War sentiments that encourage the belief that weak and failing countries pose a danger to the U.S.; these dangers include terrorism, regional chaos, crime, disease, and environmental hazards (1). Within this context, the U.S. believes there is good reason to develop a dominant national security narrative to address these concerns. This security narrative took the view that the U.S. had to stabilise failing countries through state-building activities; these activities gained momentum around 1994 with the CIA funding of a state-failure agency, the Presidential Decision Directive 56, and then the 9/11 catastrophe encouraged a sharper radar on failing states (1). We see such U.S. efforts at state building in Iraq and Afghanistan. But after more than a decade and trillions of dollars spent, the U.S. has done little to stabilise Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, the U.S. overseas state-building activities are now waning, as the U.S. fixation with failing states was more mania rather than any comprehensive foreign policy strategy (1).
The U.S. foreign and defence policy of stabilising failing countries through state-building activities is a failure in many parts of the world. Most recent examples of such failures are Afghanistan and Iraq.
Consistent failure as an outcome, indeed, is an improper model to emulate. So the report that the Ramotar Administration only had limited input in the USAID-funded $300 million democracy project as a state-building activity for Guyana should be of concern to the Guyana populace. Not having been afforded the opportunity to input the project is one thing and which certainly would raise a red flag. But the alarm bells must be constantly ringing as well when you consider that USAID would be a major force in this project. Consider Paul Collier’s comments on a USAID project in Africa: congressional commercial lobbies had some control over USAID, producing benefits to certain American exporters, and in that instance the benefits had nothing to do with African needs (2).
Commercial lobbyists’ attachment to and penetration of the U.S. Congress, USAID and other U.S. Government aid agencies cannot be discounted in their influence on the quality of outcomes for overseas countries. For instance, the influence of a large non-denominational Christian lobbying group Bread for the World (BFTW) on Congress for increased international funding for health. Around 1984, the United States House of Representatives’ (part of Congress) Select Committee on Hunger hired two BFTW members as staff (3). How objective and fair would these two staff members be in relation to advancing their former organisation’s cause when compared to furthering the overall terms of reference of the Select Committee on Hunger? What, if any congressional commercial lobbying interest drives the USAID-funded $300 million democracy project in Guyana? Under these circumstances, the Guyana Government may want to engage the U.S. authorities in a holistic discussion on the democracy project, if only to eliminate any conflict of interest and to ensure that the project is related to Guyanese needs.
It is possible, too, that the USAID sees Guyana as a failing state vis-à-vis its state-building democracy project. Should that be the case, then the premise for the project is wrong because the concept of a ‘failed state’ points to the presence of many problems, where all are to be resolved by one huge solution; the ‘failed state’ concept is wrong because these many problems realistically would require tailor-made solutions and not ‘the one size fits all’ approach (4).
As a resource-constrained society, Guyana needs international developmental assistance, but where that assistance clearly outlines considerations compatible with the needs and interests of the society. The Cold War is over. And so the former U.S. state-building activities in failing overseas countries to expand its regional geopolitical significance, in order to shore up its own national security interests, is no longer an acceptable dispensation. Given this new political dispensation, the U.S. use of a failed state as a criterion for overseas state-building activities is totally false. It, therefore, should wake up and smell the coffee. There is a new brew, a new political dispensation awaiting the U.S. overseas!

References:
1. Mazarr MJ. The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm: Requiem for a Decade of Distraction. Foreign Affairs. 2014;93(1):113-+.
2. Paul C. The bottom billion: Why the Poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; 2007.
3. Quinley JC, Baker TD. Lobbying for international health: the link between good ideas and funded programs: Bread for the World and the Agency for International Development. American journal of public health. 1986;76(7):793-6.
4. Call CT. The fallacy of the ‘Failed State’. Third World Quarterly. 2008;29(8):1491-507.
*This article, with some modifications, was previously published in the Sunday Chronicle at the time when the Government of Guyana rejected the USAID democracy project.

(By Dr. Prem Misir)