.jpg)
IN 1960, the Appellant, Singh allegedly used his private motor car to take a passenger from Mahaica to Georgetown and back. For this alleged offence he was convicted by a magistrate. Dissatisfied with the decision of the magistrate Singh appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of judicature.The Full Court after taking evidence, affirmed the magistrate’s decision.As a consequence , Appellant Singh appealed to the Federal Supreme Court.That Court was constituted by Chief Justice Hallinan, Justice A.M. Lewis and Justice J.F. Marnan.The Federal Supreme Court eventually set aside the conviction and sentence and allowed the appeal.
According to the Criminal Law …Road Traffic… Private motor car used for carriage of passenger for reward from one place to another and back –
The Federal Court has to determine whether offence committed under Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance Chapter 280 [B.G.] ss. 20 (2) and (23)
By s. 2 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance, Chapter 280 [B.G.], “hire car” means a motor car used or intended to be used for carrying not more than seven passengers for hire or reward under a contract express or implied for the use of the vehicle as a whole; and “motor bus “ means a motor vehicle constructed and used for carrying not less than eight passengers for hire or reward at separate fares stage by stage stopping to pick up or set down passengers along the line of route.
Section 20 (2) provides that where a motor vehicle has been licensed solely for a certain purpose but is used for another purpose, an offence is deemed to have been committed under s. 28 if the fee chargeable in respect of a vehicle used for that other purpose is higher than the fee chargeable in respect of the licence taken out.
The appellant , whose motor vehicle was licensed for private use, took a passenger for reward from Mahaica to Georgetown and back. He was convicted by a magistrate who held that the vehicle had been used as a hire car.
Upon appeal to the Full Court, that Court upheld the conviction ,but upon the ground that the vehicle had been used as a motor bus .
The Federal Supreme Court Held: that the evidence that the motor car had been used as either a hire car or a motor bus was insufficient to support a conviction and that although the vehicle appeared to have been used for reward that user did not fall into any category of licence for which a fee higher than the fee for a private motor car licence is chargeable.
Appeal allowed.
It was an appeal against a decision of a Full Court of the Supreme Court of British Guiana affirming a conviction by a magistrate for using an unlicensed motor vehicle.
Dr.F. H. W. Ramsahoye represented the appellant.
Mr. E. A. Ramao Acting Senior Crown Counsel, for the Crown.
Chief Justice Hallinan who delivered the judgment of the court said: “The appellant was convicted under s. 23 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance, Chapter 280 [B.G.], of using an unlicensed motor vehicle.
The appellant’s motor car was in fact licensed as a private car, but the prosecution alleged that under the provisions of s. 20 he has, nevertheless, committed an offence under s. 23. Section 20 (2) provides as follows:
“(2) Where a licence has been taken out as for a motor vehicle to be used solely for a certain purpose and the vehicle is at any time during the period for which the licence is in force used for some other purpose , the person so using the vehicle shall, if the fee chargeable in respect of a licence for a vehicle used for that purpose is higher than the fee chargeable in respect of the licence held by him, be deemed to be guilty of an offence under section 23 of this Ordinance, and the provisions of that section shall apply accordingly.”
The prosecution established that the appellant had taken one Shivran; for reward from Mahaica to Georgetown and back. The magistrate held that the appellant had used his vehicle for hire or reward and that he should, therefore, have had a licence for as hired car. Since a licence for a hired car has to pay a higher fee than for a private car, he held that the provisions of s.20 (2) applied and that the appellant was guilty of an offence under s. 23.
Upon appeal to the Full Court it was held that the magistrate’s finding that the car had been used as a hired car was wrong as, according to the definition of “hire car” in s. 2 of the Ordinance , there must be a contract for the use of the vehicle as a whole , and there was no evidence of any such contract.
However, the Full Court held that there was sufficient evidence that the appellant had carried passengers for hire or reward at separate fares and stage by stage.
The vehicle should, therefore, have been licensed as a “motor bus” as defined by s. 2 of the Ordinance , and should have paid a higher fee than that payable for a private car.
The Full Court accordingly affirmed the conviction but on this appeal, in our view, narrows down to this on a different ground to that of the magistrate.
The point which fails to be decided on this appeal, in our view, narrows down to this: can it be said that by taking a passenger for reward from Mahaica to Georgetown and back the appellant had used the vehicle for reward “at separate fares stage by stage”? The definition of “motor bus”speaks of the vehicle being used “for hire or reward at separate fares stage by stage or stopping to pick up or set down passengers along the line of route”.
The words appear to indicate that the legislature had in mind a vehicle plying for hire between two points and stopping to pick up passengers at fixed intermediate bus stops or whenever requested.
It would be straining the natural interpretation of the words “stage by stage” in the context to treat the journey from Mahaica to Georgetown as a stage and the return journey as another stage.
We consider that the evidence that the motor car was used either as a hire car or as a motor bus is insufficient to support the conviction. The vehicle appears to have been used for reward but that user does not fall into any category of licence for which a fee is chargeable higher than the fee for a private motor car licence.
The conviction and sentence is therefore set aside and the appeal allowed.
According to the Criminal Law …Road Traffic… Private motor car used for carriage of passenger for reward from one place to another and back –
The Federal Court has to determine whether offence committed under Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance Chapter 280 [B.G.] ss. 20 (2) and (23)
By s. 2 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance, Chapter 280 [B.G.], “hire car” means a motor car used or intended to be used for carrying not more than seven passengers for hire or reward under a contract express or implied for the use of the vehicle as a whole; and “motor bus “ means a motor vehicle constructed and used for carrying not less than eight passengers for hire or reward at separate fares stage by stage stopping to pick up or set down passengers along the line of route.
Section 20 (2) provides that where a motor vehicle has been licensed solely for a certain purpose but is used for another purpose, an offence is deemed to have been committed under s. 28 if the fee chargeable in respect of a vehicle used for that other purpose is higher than the fee chargeable in respect of the licence taken out.
The appellant , whose motor vehicle was licensed for private use, took a passenger for reward from Mahaica to Georgetown and back. He was convicted by a magistrate who held that the vehicle had been used as a hire car.
Upon appeal to the Full Court, that Court upheld the conviction ,but upon the ground that the vehicle had been used as a motor bus .
The Federal Supreme Court Held: that the evidence that the motor car had been used as either a hire car or a motor bus was insufficient to support a conviction and that although the vehicle appeared to have been used for reward that user did not fall into any category of licence for which a fee higher than the fee for a private motor car licence is chargeable.
Appeal allowed.
It was an appeal against a decision of a Full Court of the Supreme Court of British Guiana affirming a conviction by a magistrate for using an unlicensed motor vehicle.
Dr.F. H. W. Ramsahoye represented the appellant.
Mr. E. A. Ramao Acting Senior Crown Counsel, for the Crown.
Chief Justice Hallinan who delivered the judgment of the court said: “The appellant was convicted under s. 23 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance, Chapter 280 [B.G.], of using an unlicensed motor vehicle.
The appellant’s motor car was in fact licensed as a private car, but the prosecution alleged that under the provisions of s. 20 he has, nevertheless, committed an offence under s. 23. Section 20 (2) provides as follows:
“(2) Where a licence has been taken out as for a motor vehicle to be used solely for a certain purpose and the vehicle is at any time during the period for which the licence is in force used for some other purpose , the person so using the vehicle shall, if the fee chargeable in respect of a licence for a vehicle used for that purpose is higher than the fee chargeable in respect of the licence held by him, be deemed to be guilty of an offence under section 23 of this Ordinance, and the provisions of that section shall apply accordingly.”
The prosecution established that the appellant had taken one Shivran; for reward from Mahaica to Georgetown and back. The magistrate held that the appellant had used his vehicle for hire or reward and that he should, therefore, have had a licence for as hired car. Since a licence for a hired car has to pay a higher fee than for a private car, he held that the provisions of s.20 (2) applied and that the appellant was guilty of an offence under s. 23.
Upon appeal to the Full Court it was held that the magistrate’s finding that the car had been used as a hired car was wrong as, according to the definition of “hire car” in s. 2 of the Ordinance , there must be a contract for the use of the vehicle as a whole , and there was no evidence of any such contract.
However, the Full Court held that there was sufficient evidence that the appellant had carried passengers for hire or reward at separate fares and stage by stage.
The vehicle should, therefore, have been licensed as a “motor bus” as defined by s. 2 of the Ordinance , and should have paid a higher fee than that payable for a private car.
The Full Court accordingly affirmed the conviction but on this appeal, in our view, narrows down to this on a different ground to that of the magistrate.
The point which fails to be decided on this appeal, in our view, narrows down to this: can it be said that by taking a passenger for reward from Mahaica to Georgetown and back the appellant had used the vehicle for reward “at separate fares stage by stage”? The definition of “motor bus”speaks of the vehicle being used “for hire or reward at separate fares stage by stage or stopping to pick up or set down passengers along the line of route”.
The words appear to indicate that the legislature had in mind a vehicle plying for hire between two points and stopping to pick up passengers at fixed intermediate bus stops or whenever requested.
It would be straining the natural interpretation of the words “stage by stage” in the context to treat the journey from Mahaica to Georgetown as a stage and the return journey as another stage.
We consider that the evidence that the motor car was used either as a hire car or as a motor bus is insufficient to support the conviction. The vehicle appears to have been used for reward but that user does not fall into any category of licence for which a fee is chargeable higher than the fee for a private motor car licence.
The conviction and sentence is therefore set aside and the appeal allowed.
