THE Appellant, Somerset, was employed in the Respondents’ factory at a certain rate of payment per hour.
He agreed to have his wages computed according to the time shown on a card which he used for recording, by machine, his hours of attendance in the factory.
He failed to record his hour of departure from the factory in the afternoon of a certain day and was not paid for that afternoon’s work.
He was unsuccessful in an action which he brought to recover payment.
On appeal, he contended (a) that non-payment of the amount sued for was a deduction from wages not authorised by the Labour Ordinance, Chapter 108 [BG] and was therefore illegal; (b) that the contract had been repudiated by the Respondent and in circumstances giving only the right to a claim for damages.
It was held that (i) the wages earned had been calculated in accordance with the contract and there had been no deduction from wages; (ii) there had been no repudiation of the contract but payment according to the terms of contract.

It was an appeal from the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of British Guiana, dated April 29, 1960, setting aside an order for payment of wages made by a magistrate in favour of the appellant.
F. R. Wills appeared for the Appellant and J. H. S. Elliot, Q.C., and A. Sankar for the Respondents.
Justice of the Federal Supreme Court C.V. H. Archer delivered the judgment.
He said the appeal concerned the proper interpretation to be placed upon a term in a contract of employment. The sum at stake was small, but the principle involved is of some importance.
The appellant was a workman employed in the factory of the Respondent.
He was under an oral contract and his wages were computed on an hourly basis, but were paid weekly.

In 1953, the company instituted a system of time recording by machine but on individual cards; workmen manipulated the machine to record the time of their arrival at, and departure from, the factory and wages were calculated in accordance with the hours of attendance in the factory which these cards showed .
The system proved, however, not to be entirely satisfactory for claims were sometimes made in respect of work done during hours of attendance not shown on time cards, and, in 1955 , the company published a notice from which the Appellant admitted the term of his contract of employment, which was the subject of dispute in the appeal, was to be extracted.
Justice Archer concluded:
“I consider, therefore, that the authorities on substantial performances of a contract on which counsel for the Appellant relied, are not in point. In my judgment, the Full Court came to the right conclusion and I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

Rennie, J. said: “I agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs and as Archer, J., has dealt fully with the matter, I need only indicate briefly the reason for my concurrence.
“In my view, when the Appellant agreed to work in accordance in the terms of the notice, he not only agreed to continue to work as he had been accustomed to do, but he also agreed to clock in and out of the factory, and he further agreed that he must fully perform his part of the agreement – he must work and clock in and clock out – before he can become entitled to the payment of wages.

“In other words, he made the entire performance of his part a condition precedent to the payment of wages.
He did not clock out on the day in question and, accordingly, was not entitled to any wages.
“Now, this is not such a case where it could be said that the respondents, by taking the benefit of the work, waived the condition.
“In Hoenig v. Isaacs (1) it was held that even entire performance was a condition precedent to payment under the contract, in taking the benefit of the work by using the defective furniture, the defendant had waived the condition and must pay the contract price, subject to the appropriate deductions.
“No waiver can arrive in the instant case for the simple reason that there is nothing to show that the respondents could have, but did not return any product of the appellant’s labour to him.”

Wylie, J. said: “I also agree that this appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given in the judgment of Rennie,J.
“I only wish to add that this appeal was argued before the court on behalf of both appellant and respondents on the basis that the terms introduced by the publication of the notice of March 21, 1955, did form part of the contract of employment of the appellant who had accepted them by continuing in the respondents’ employment.
“It was not argued on this appeal either that these terms did not form part of the contract, or that they were, for any reason, unenforceable.”