Judge erroneously found murder accused had no case to answer

IN 1987, a man charged with murder on the basis of circumstantial evidence was freed by a trial judge simply because that judge thought there was no case to answer.On appeal, the Guyana Court of Appeal shuddered at what happened and held that the trial judge erred in entering a ruling of no case to answer.

In the case of the State versus Cecil Levine, the facts disclosed that Levine was seen committing the act.
The evidence of the State, it was contended, was entirely circumstantial because there was no direct evidence that Levine did the stabbing or was otherwise liable for his death. The trial judge ruled that a prima facie case had not been established, and therefore that no defence was necessary.
The issue facing the Court was whether the trial judge erred in entering a ruling of no case to answer.
The Appellate Court was constituted by Chancellor Keith Massiah and Justices of Appeal Aubrey Bishop and Rudolph Harper.
It was held that the case presented by the State was sufficient for the jury to determine whether the guilt of the accused could be inferred of the circumstantial evidence. The trial judge erred in not putting the case to the jury, with appropriate guidance as to the legal principles applicable, it was decided by the Court of Appeal.
About the case, Chancellor Massiah said: I confess to disquietude over the fact that the judicial approach to be taken for the determination of a submission of ‘no case to answer’ appears to be still misunderstood.
“This question was addressed and definitively settled by this court three years ago in Alvin Michell, although the old court of Crown Cases Reserved had charted the proper juristic course nearly a century ago in R. v- Hookoomchand and Sagur [1897] LRBG 12, on a case stated Mr. Justice Sheriff.
“In the instant matter, the learned trial judge did not give attention to the principles enunciated in those Guyanese cases and others of a kindred nature, nor was regard paid to their English counter parts which culminate with R. v- Galbrath [ 198 ] 2 All E. R. 1060.
“In the result, the trial judge fell into fundamental error, and sought to determine issues of fact which clearly fell within the realm of the jury. What eventuated was a manifest miscarriage of justice as a situation where the evidence for the prosecution was crystalline, comprehensive, and compulsively cogent.
“I have had the advantage of reading in advance the opinion prepared by my learned brother Bishop, J. A., and I agree with the conclusions, at which he has arrived . In my considered judgment the submission ‘no case” ought to have been rejected.
“Bishop, J. A. : Thee years ago a question, similar to the one raised now, and also requiring an examination of circumstantial evidence , was considered by this Court (Massiah, C., Fung-a-Fatt and Vieira , JJA.) in the State v- Mitchell [1984] 39 WIR 185, by virtue of section 32A of the Court of Appeal Act, Chapter 3:01.
The response given then is appropriate in the instant discussion, and it is to be regretted that the wise words of His Honour, the Chancellor, who gave the leading judgment of the Court, were not considered, at the trial of Cecil Levine to guide the arguments and influence the trial judge’s ruling. As in Mitchell’s case, so here, the no-case submission of defence Counsel should not have been upheld.”

In the present case, the facts provided by the State at the trial were many and relevant. Levine had been openly associating with the deceased’s wife, and minutes before the man was killed, Levine was seen escorting his wife.
When the two went their separate ways, the man approached Levine for a conversation, which he declined and soon after the men were seen facing each other; Levine’s hands on the man’s abdomen and the man’s bare hands on the shoulders of the accused.
Immediately before the encounter with Levine, the man had been physical well and without any injury, yet in “the twinkling of an eye” he was seen to disengage himself from Levine, say something, stagger across the road and fall there . His intestines were protruding through a wound in his abdomen. That was one version.
“All that remained to be done was the given of pertinent directions to the jury concerning the law to be applied to the facts found by them, since the State had already satisfied the criterian of relevancy and sufficiency, thereby rendering intervention by the trial judge and the imposition of a directed verdict both inopportune and inappropriate.
“Ultimately, the special defences , which should have been adjudged by the jury were given finite weight by the trial judge , whose office was not imbued with that power . As Haynes, J. A., as he then was, stated in The State v- Doris [1975] 23 WIR at p. 220:
‘( The jury ) had to be convinced that the conclusion of guilt was so strong that it was the only reasonable explanation of the facts found to be proved involving peradventure, consideration of the probabilities on the evidence in the light of human experience.’
“That pronouncement extends to the two special defences which Levine had canvassed at the trial.
“It would appear that instead of examining the evidence, with a view to ascertaining whether a sufficient case had been established, the trial judge embarked on an exercise while employing a higher standard of proof than was necessary at that stage, and which, in any event, was not lawfully within the province of the judge to pursue.
“The result is that the point of law raised here, under section 32A of the Court of the Court of AppeaL Act Chapter 3:01, as to whether the trial judge was correct in ruling that a prima facie case had not been established, thereby requiring a defence not to be led is meritorious.
“In fact, there could hardly be many cases, based on circumstantial evidence, whose attributes congeal to produce such an irresistible presumption of guilt, as in the case presented against Cecil Levine.
“There was no mystery here: the narrative of events was too plain to titillate the mind.
Harper, J. A.: “I too agree that the no-case submission should not have been upheld by the
Trial judge.”