The woman was seeking damages for wrongful and unlawful dismissal from public office allegedly without reasonable cause.
She had served the GPF for 23 years, but was incarcerated for one week at East La Penitence Police Station and, subsequently, charged before a court with the offence of negligently permitting prisoners to escape.
On July 31, 2009, she was discharged at the time when her salary was $47,497 per month as a corporal. She made efforts to secure other employment but was unsuccessful.
The Chief Justice said it is clear, from the magisterial case jackets, that the criminal indictable charge against Chichester was filed on July 31, 2009 and the discharge letter was dated the same day.
Therefore, the decision to charge her for an indictable offence and the decision to discharge her from the Force appear to be related and made simultaneously, the judge held.
He said the Commissioner must have taken the position that it was not in the public interest to retain, within the membership of the Force, the plaintiff whom the Force saw fit to charge criminally with an indictable offence.
Unhealthy position
Justice Chang said the decision of the Commissioner to discharge rather than dismiss was motivated not by a desire to punish the plaintiff for wrongdoing, but by considerations which had to do with the unhealthy position of the plaintiff being charged with such an offence while still being in the membership of the Force.
“This Court cannot interfere with the decision of the Commissioner, except on the ground of irrationality, illegality, procedural irregularity, and is not entitled to substitute its own discretion for that of the statutory discretion of the Commissioner.
“The Court finds no ground for judicial interference with the exercise of the Commissioner’s statutory discretionary power. As such, the court declines to interfere with the decision of the Commissioner to discharge the plaintiff.
“It is clear, to the Court,that the plaintiff was afforded an opportunity of being heard before the Commissioner made his decision to discharge. She exercised her right to take advantage of that opportunity when she wrote and submitted her statement on July 30, 2009.
“But superannuation benefits are payable to the plaintiff despite her discharge under Section 35 of the Police Act, by virtue of the proviso to that section and Section 8 of the Pensions Act.
“Indeed, she could not have been deprived of those benefits unless the Police Service Commission had made a decision not to grant her such benefits or to withhold, reduce in amount or suspend them.
“Since no evidence was adduced that the Police Service Commission had made such a negative decision, the Court must act on the assumption that no such decision was made by the said Commission.
“Accordingly, this Court upholds that the plaintiff is entitled to whatever superannuation benefits had accrued to her up until July 31, 2009.
“Having regard to what has been stated above, the Court sees it fit to order that the defendant do pay to the plaintiff whatever superannuation benefit became due to her as at July 31, 2009, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum from the time of the filing of the action on August 16, 2009, to the date of rendering of this decision and, thereafter, at the rate of 4 percent per annum until payment,” the judgement said.
The Chief Justice also awarded the plaintiff $25,000 costs to be paid by the Attorney General who was named defendant.