A perspective on piracy and the security response

TWO reasons catapulted me in the direction of addressing this issue. Most important is my historical connections to fishermen which evolved and developed in Rosignol.
Two of my brothers were boat captains. My mother was a fish vendor. Through her sweat and tears selling fish we were educated, one at Queen’s College, another at Bushlot Secondary and myself at Rosignol Secondary. The other reason is a more mundane one, perhaps bordering on humour. It has to do with the utterings of a former Commissioner of Police who has returned to his political home.
Appearing on a television programme, he lambasted the government on its security policies in almost every conceivable, specialised field. If however, he was a keen observer, he would have seen how many fingers were pointing at him while he was pointing at the performance of others.
Either he did not seek the opportunity to educate himself on some of the issues he was expected to speak on, especially piracy, or, in true political style, he was just cashing in on the opportunity to gain cheap publicity.
Untruths, half-truths, deliberate distortions and fabrications are always the refuge of mediocrity, irrespective of how it attempts to don the garb of intelligence and respectability. Let us criticise – but let it be based on facts and not political subjectivism. Let criticism be the baptismal fire from which we emerge collectively refreshed and educated. Put Guyana first. Is this too much to ask of ‘wannabe’ politicians and politicians?
Articles 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea-1982) describes piracy as:-

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed—

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

While piracy is here limited to an act on the “high seas,” by the UN Convention, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) describes it as “the act of boarding any vessel with an intent to commit theft or any other crime, and with an intent or capacity to use force in furtherance of that act,” irrespective of the vessel being in national or international waters.

Common elements in definitions of piracy include boarding; extortion; hostage taking; kidnapping people for ransom; murder; sabotage resulting in the sinking of the ship; seizure of items on the ship;and shipwrecking done intentionally to a ship.
In the case of Guyana, the majority of piratical acts occur within our territorial waters. After committing their illegal acts, the pirates may dispose of their ill begotten gains presumably by (a) selling to mother ships anchored in deep sea, or, (b) sell to their controls in Suriname, Venezuela or Guyana. They escape to hidden locations inside Guyana, Venezuela or Suriname.
In most cases pirates are able to go free due to the lack of resources needed to intercept and engage them or to adequately monitor the borders along the Atlantic coastline.

What can be deduced from their operations?

(a)  these acts of piracy are well planned and are not haphazard, illegal capers.
(b)  they appear to be intelligence driven – location, time – which may point to some form of information networking (land to land and land to sea).
(c)  pirates are well equipped for the rigours of sea operation – high speed boats with multiple High-powered engines.
(d)  to date, reports are indicating that pirates are armed with small arms or shotguns and rudimentary weapons such as cutlasses and perhaps knives. The shotgun may be the weapon of choice because of the element of fear and the discharge pattern capacity to hit more than one person with one shot, which is meant not to kill as a first option. This however, does not rule out the possibility that they may have other high-powered weapons at their disposal, ready to use should the necessity arise.
(e)  collusion between fishermen and pirates (some of whom may very well be fishermen themselves.
(f)   the existence of a ready market (middle men) willing to take off stolen catch.
(g)   willingness on the part of the pirates to use force (excessive) and intimidation as may be necessary to facilitate their illegal acts.
(h) the existence of safe discharge areas (of loot) – whether in Guyana, Venezuela or Suriname – along the coastline which means the involvement of other means of transportation and a wider support network– canters, refrigerated trucks- drivers who may be families, or friends of those involved in piracy, middlemen or controls and market/s.
(i)  a ready market for the buying of stolen outboard engines exists, either as a whole or in parts.
Who would purchase these engines or parts? People who would have ready use for them -fishermen, farmers in riverine areas, miners, those in the river transportation business, wild life exporters and even sports fishermen and hunters.
(j)  like everything else, when greed overcomes fear or morality, even legitimate and well established fishing houses may succumb to the temptation of maximising their profits by mixing their legitimate catch with that purchased from pirates.

Perceptions, Decisions and Dilemma.
Over the years, the approach to dealing with acts of piracy has been one replete with measures highly publicised in the press, political rhetoric, a scurry of meetings between politicians and members of the disciplined forces and intentions of bilateral/multilateral arrangements with neighbouring countries, all of which have not produced the desired outcome to date.

The strategy employed, seemed to be one of marking time hoping it will die a natural death, or, because of its sporadic nature was not given an urgent spot on the political agenda. If the intention is to put an item on the political agenda when it becomes explosive, then there will only be reaction. When we react, it shows lack of control: when we respond, it shows an understanding of the myriad of complex issues involved and signals an intention and ability to deal with them.

Simply put, those tasked with responsibilities must ensure they deliver, whether they be ministers of the government or security personnel. The approach should be not what is expended (finance and resources alone) but what is achieved with effective and efficient use of resources provided (deliverables/outcomes); in other words, getting the bang for your buck.

There will always remain the paradigm of infinite needs; so too there will always be limited resources. Failure to act and or failure to achieve on the basis of what is provided in many instances are just a reaction to not having what was expected in the first case, an ingrained resistance (or inability) to apply creative solutions and an excuse for deliberate non- performance.

It means therefore, prioritising, supervising and most of all holding people accountable for their actions or inaction. All this is premised in the first case, on putting people into positions based on the adamantine rock of performance and professionalism.

Whether perception or reality, the following will have to be addressed if there is to be movement in the direction of having a lasting (or permanent) solution to the scourge of piracy:-

(a)  Despite all the talk and pronouncements, the government is yet to come to grips with the impact of piracy on the livelihoods of those who are affected and those who are dependent on them.

(b)  Deep feeling of distrust of the security forces, in particular some members of the Guyana Police Force, whom it is suspected are arms in gloves with pirates and who act as fence for stolen engines or engine parts.

(c)  The impression that once given the resources (shotguns), fishermen can better protect themselves at sea since maritime patrols if any, are few and ineffective due to the vastness of the area to be monitored. They therefore, serve the purpose more of rescue than prevention.

(d)   Distrust of fishermen by the security forces, since there is the perception that some of the very fishermen who are clamouring for weapons are hand in gloves with pirates or are themselves pirates.

(e)   A marine section that is not re-capitalised and does not have the necessary resources – manpower and materiel – yet, it is being given greater and greater responsibility in an areas that leaves little scope for success and more for failures.

(f)   A perception that no matter what resources are invested in the re-capitalisation of the marine section,   it will not perform in accordance with expectations.

(g)   Limited capacity of the state to invest in a sustained, full-time sea/air operation aimed at eradicating the scourge of piracy.

What presents itself here is an amalgam of competing and conflicting interests, each steeped in a reality of its own that is dictated by personal interest and self-preservation, irrespective of the niceties of official jargon, all of which will have to be harnessed and forged into a menu of measures which will (a) adequately address the negative perceptions which may serve to establish barriers (b) eradicate lingering fears and suspicions and at the same time paving the way for confidence building and trust, and(c) produce well defined and workable long-term solutions that will not only be binding on all but which will also need their total involvement and commitment.

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