AG appealed Ruling – Appeal dismissed by Court
ACTING CHANCELLOR of the Judiciary, Mr. Carl Singh, yesterday held that the ruling of Acting Chief Justice, Mr. Ian Chang, that murder accused Hemchand Persaud was entitled to bail, was logical and well-reasoned. The Acting Chancellor, the Head of the Guyana Court of Appeal, was delivering a judgment of the Court relating to an appeal by the Attorney General, Mr. Charles Ramson, S.C., who had described Chang’s decision as unreasonable, misconceived and unsupported in law.
But the Chancellor noted that the murder accused, who had spent eight years in custody and had been subjected to a number of preliminary inquiries that were found invalid by the High Court, was entitled to a fair hearing within  a reasonable time.
He noted that the orders made by the CJ could not be said to be unreasonable since no injury was done to the public interest.
Representing the appellant yesterday was Miss Damone Younge  from the DPP Chambers.
Attorneys-at-Law Mr. Sandil Kissoon and Miss. Prabha Persaud-Kissoon appeared for the Respondent.  Counsel for the Respondent were commended for the research they had undertaken.
In his  judgment, the Chancellor said that the principal complaint of the Attorney General was that the Acting Chief Justice did not follow the guidelines set out in Barker Wingo, an American decision in the determination with the respondent’s right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time.
According to the Chancellor, it was argued on behalf of the AG that regard had to be paid to the American  decision.
The Chancellor declared however that the Court of Appeal of Guyana was only prepared to accord due weight and respect to decisions of the American Supreme Court, but did not feel that it was bound by such decisions.
The Chancellor made it clear that it should not be understood as disapproving of the guidelines set out in the American case.
It was noted by the Chancellor  in his decision that the CJ did refer to Barker and Wingo and had identified criteria which assisted in the determination whether the constitutional right to trial within a reasonable time had been breached.
The Court found that from a distillation of the CJ’s decision, while he did not specifically identify the four criteria set out in the American case, they were nevertheless discussed.
The Chancellor pointed out that such a contention by the AG was a preposterous one since there was a failure by the AG to recognise and appreciate the supremacy of the law of the Constitution and that of the land.
The Chancellor noted that the CJ, finding a breach of the respondent’s entitlement to a fair trial within a reasonable time, was enjoined by the provisions of article 139(4) which provided in such circumstances for a person before the court to be released either unconditionally or upon condition.
The constitution had to be obeyed. The CJ declared the Chancellor had no discretion in the matter.
The Chancellor rejected the AG’s description of the decision of the CJ as unreasonable, misconceived and unsupported in law and declared that the decision was logical and well reasoned and that the orders he made could not be said to be unreasonable since no injury was done to the public interest.
However the Chancellor  warned that the decision of the Court of Appeal in dismissing the Appeal by the AG ought not to be considered a general precedent to the granting of bail to persons charged with the offence of murder, contrary to common-law practice. The case, he observed, was attended with peculiar facts and circumstances and he declared that each case must be considered on its merits.