THIS week, I want to continue my engagement with what is increasingly referred to in the public domain as “The New Dispensation” in Parliament.
Let me start off by pointing out that Parliaments perform certain critical

functions in the administration of a democracy, prime among which are: The crafting and passage of legislation; representing the rights and interests of citizens; and exercising oversight over the Executive.
It is clear that our parliamentarians would have to reorient their thinking, especially those who served in the previous Parliaments over the many years. It is only after Parliamentarians from previously hostile factions reconcile to work together through the political process can they build relationship across party lines and properly fulfill these time-honoured roles, both inside and outside the walls of the National Assembly.
Australia and Canada, two Commonwealth countries, both considered to be developed, modernized countries, are two examples to look upon if Guyana is to benefit from its present parliamentary dispensation with a minority government in place.
With regard to the former, between 1989 and 2009, there have been at least ten examples of minority governments in Australia and its territories.  Many minority governments in Australia have been based on a written accord, charter or parliamentary agreement which set out the conditions under which the political arrangements are to operate.

In Australia, the first example of a written accord for cooperation between minority and majority in Parliament was the Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord, agreed to on 29 May, 1989 between Labour’s Michael Field, and five Green Independent Members (Bob Brown, Gerry Bates, Dianne Hollister, Lance Armstrong and Christine Milne). Experts have argued that the Tasmanian Accord is an example of a more policy-based agreement, with a strong environmental bias.
In comparison, the Charter of Reform (and later Memorandum of Understanding) in New South Wales between 1991 and 1995 is more of an ‘accountability’ charter, including a broad agenda for constitutional and parliamentary reform.
As a condition for their support of a minority government, minority party or independent Members of Parliament often require the inclusion of certain reform measures in the agreements or charters. Another such innovation on the theme of minority government is the inclusion, in Cabinet, of minor party or independent members in what is referred to as ‘a loose coalition’ with the majority party.
Under the First Past the Post system, Canada’s politicians view minorities as incentives to engineer defeat, and precipitate an early election, with a view to restoring a majority government.
Canada’s minorities usually negotiate with other parties on an issue-by- issue basis to pass legislation, and survive confidence votes. In all fairness, it should be noted that there is a view that Canada’s minority governments are short in their duration, since those in Government always seek an early election to try and secure the majority government, or those in opposition try to exploit favourable terms to engineer the minority government’s defeat.
That said, it does not always have to be a battle between or among the parties, but an exercise in demonstrating negotiating prowess and compromise to arrive at positions to which all would be amenable.
Our own Parliament must consider -– and this is clear, considering the rhetoric and failed attempts at forming consensus between the parties – that confidence-building measures between the Government and the Opposition is critical, and should be pursue with urgency.
This level of confidence can be boosted by ensuring that there is transparency in decision-making by greater importance being placed on the committee structure, and by ensuring that all parliamentarians participate in parliamentary business, rather than sidelining certain groups or members.
For that trust to be developed, procedures for parliamentary debates should be transparent, well-defined and closely adhered to by members.
If there is to be an open line for dialogue, then the discussion of Bills in the National Assembly should not be blocked by the parties with the majority in the House, neither should legislation be passed without debate, or without being referred to a committee, in Guyana’s case, a special select committee, if the complexity or importance of the piece of legislation demands it.
Concerns about fairness of the debate always arise when one political party, or combination of political parties, commands a clear majority, hence dialogue must be open, and available, as an option.
Additionally, in refining a parliamentary culture in a society like Guyana, one must consider how Parliamentarians respond to the needs of the community. I believe that there is tremendous merit in the suggestion there be Parliamentary outreaches in the same way that there are Cabinet outreaches.
It is also my view that if Parliament wants to enhance accountability and transparency, then it must be seen as being proactive in communicationwith the various constituencies represented by its members.
Another way to engage the citizenry would be televise, live, all of the sittings of the National Assembly, with perhaps even a special channel dedicated to Parliament, similar to the way C-SPAN (short for Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network) covers the United States Congress.
Granted, there is the practical issue of content versus time allotted, since Parliamentary sittings are once a week, but with creativity and programme rotation/repetition — Parliamentarian interviews, educational programmes on Parliament and various issues, select committee meetings, citizen viewpoints — content can be created.
In closing, our new Parliament has experienced its first real test: The 2013 Budget. It is clear, from public perception, that our parliamentarians have a long way to go in gaining the confidence and trust of the Guyanese People, and must adopt a new approach to legislation and oversight of the affairs of all Guyana.