IN 1970, Frank Sookram, who went on trial for wounding with intent and offered a reasonable defence of self-defense, was convicted and sentenced to prison because the trial judge had misunderstood the defence.
But on appeal, the Court of Appeal, presided over by Chancellor Edward Luckhoo, found that the trial judge had left the case for the jury to decide without giving them full directions.
As a consequence, the Court of Appeal held that whether there was sufficient evidence to support an issue of self-defense was within the province of the judge and not the jury to decide; and that conversely, it was for the jury to decide whether the accused acted in self-defense.
The appeal was allowed.  Conviction and sentence were set aside, but in the interest of justice, the Appellate Court ordered a retrial.
The facts of the case disclosed that the appellant, Sookram, was charged with wounding with intent. The substance of his defence was that he was attacked with a knife by the virtual complainant, and that he blocked the blows which were being aimed at him with a cutlass, as he was unable to run away.
It was pointed out that the trial judge, in summing up to the jury, dealt with the defence on two bases, the first of which was that the appellant did not admit that he had inflicted the wounds, and secondly, that he did commit the act but in self-defense.  In dealing with the latter issue, the judge left it to the jury to find whether that defense had arisen.
In his judgment, Chancellor Luckhoo noted that the appellant had stood trial for the felony of unlawfully and maliciously wounding one Chatarpaul Panchu with intent to cause him grievous bodily harm, or to maim, disfigure or disable him on the November 10, 1970,  for which he was liable  to penal servitude for life, and to whipping or flogging. {s.57 (a) of Chapter 10}.
But according to accepted practice, the Chancellor explained that where the facts so permit, a jury is allowed to consider the alternative of convicting for the lesser offence of unlawful wounding, on the basis that:
“Every count shall be deemed divisible; and [that] if the commission of the offence charged, as is described in the enactment creating the offence, or as charged in the count, includes the commission of any other offence, the accused person may be convicted of any offence so included which is proved, although the whole offence charged is not proved, or he may be convicted of an attempt to commit any offence so included.”

According to the Chancellor, the appellant and the injured man, Panchu, were not on speaking terms because of some family dispute about land. They came into conflict with each other on the day in question when, apparently, no one was around, as a result of which Panchu suffered the following injuries:
1. A lacerated wound about two (2) inches long on the front portion of the scalp.
2. A lacerated wound two (2) inches long over the right elbow region.
3. A lacerated wound over the right palm about three (3) inches long, with nearly amputated third, fourth and fifth right fingers.
4. A lacerated wound about two (2) inches long over the right axillary region, left arm and left forearm.
These injuries, the Chancellor said, could have caused disability and disfigurement and were thought by the medical officer to be dangerous to life because of the severe bleeding at the time.

Panchu, the star witness for the prosecution, was quoted as saying at the trial:
“I saw the accused walking coming towards me; he was about five (5) rods from me. When we were about four (4) feet apart, he brought his hand forward. He had a cutlass and he said he would chop off my neck.  He had the cutlass in his right hand.
“He made a chop at me and I raised my left hand which had a handbag.  The handbag was chopped off and fell to the ground.
“He made a second chop and I received a blow on my left elbow region.
“He made a third chop and I received a wound on my left upper arm.
“I then rushed him and the two of us fell into the trench.  I fell inside the trench and I braced a little on the road.
“The accused then chopped me on my head and I became unconscious.
“When I regained consciousness, the accused’s brother spoke to me. I then walked out of the trench and I went and sat under a sapodilla tree.
“When I regained consciousness,  I found I had other wounds, including one on the back of my right elbow, right hand, upper left shoulder and one under my left arm.”
The Chancellor’s judgment went on to point out that Panchu denied any such suggestion that he was the aggressor, and that he was armed with an ‘Eddie Polo’ knife with which he had attacked the appellant.
At the close of the case for the prosecution, therefore, a case of wounding with intent was made out and the trial judge’s direction on the effect of Panchu’s evidence could not be seriously questioned.
On the other hand, the appellant elected to make a statement from the dock and had said: “Sir, Chatarpaul attack me with an ‘Eddie Polo’ knife and threw me in the trench, and started to choke me.  Then I scramble out the trench.  He bore me with the knife in my hand. My cutlass was on the ground and I picked it up. He started firing blows at me, and me barring off the blows with my cutlass.  All the time, me shouting for help and I could not see no one and I not able to run away.  Sir, I have nothing more to say.”

After highlighting the shortcomings in the summing-up of the evidence by the trial judge, which must of necessity constitute a miscarriage of justice, the Chancellor said:
“The case for the defence was not properly put in the matters which were essential to a fair assessment of the issues.
“In view of the serious omissions and express misdirection, it would be impossible to say whether a reasonable jury, properly directed, would have inevitably come to the same conclusion, as that would depend so much on how they weighed the evidence etc.
“The summing-up was of such a character as to deprive the appellant of the substance of a fair trial for reasons already given.  An opportunity should be given  to have the case properly put to the jury.”
Chancellor Luckhoo then proposed that the conviction and sentence be set aside, and that a new trial be ordered in order to allow the defence to be put in its proper perspective, and to give the jury an opportunity of assessing what arises naturally therefrom.