ATTORNEY General and Minister of Legal Affairs, Anil Nandlall, yesterday weighed in on the ruling of the Speaker of the National Assembly, Mr Raphael Trotman, regarding two motions to refer Alliance For Change (AFC) Members of Parliament (MPs) Khemraj Ramjattan and Cathy Hughes to a Parliamentary Privileges Committee.

The AG contends that Trotman pre-empted — if not usurped — the function of the Privileges Committee when he rejected the complaints on the ground of lack of evidence.

“The complaint was…sufficiently grave for the Speaker to have found a prima facie case, which necessitated him transmitting the same to the Privileges Committee for their consideration and deliberation. It is in that Committee that the evidence to which the Speaker made reference is to be adduced.

“In my respectful view, the Speaker has pre-empted – if not usurped – the function of the Privileges Committee when he rejected the said complaints on the ground of lack of evidence,” Nandlall said.

GROUNDS FOR REFERRAL
The AG noted that Ramjattan has publicly admitted in the press, on more than one occasion, that he is the attorney-at-law representing Fedders-Lloyd, a bidder who lost out on a bid in relation to the construction of the Specialty Hospital.

“He has also publicly admitted that the owner of the Le Meriden Pegasus is a supporter and a financier of The Alliance For Change; and finally, in his ruling, the Speaker alluded to the fact that Mrs. Catherine Hughes was the Public Relations Officer to Mr. Fip Motilall in relation to the Amaila Falls Hydro Project, a fact that, according to the Speaker, was ‘widely known,’” the AG said.

The AG said these facts made it obligatory for Ramjattan and Hughes to disclose their interests in and to the National Assembly when matters relating to these companies were being considered in the House. Instead, both AFC MPs “failed, neglected and omitted” to do so.

“That is what I understand the gravamen of the complaint addressed,” the AG said.

The AG said, “The Standing Orders regarding full and frank disclosures of the pecuniary interests were clearly designed to ensure that members of Parliament frankly and fully disclose to the House any pecuniary interests which they may have in relation to any matter occupying the attention of the House.

“The clear mischief which was intended to be addressed was to avoid a conflict of interest situation, and to ensure that the rule of natural justice, which prohibits a person (from being) a judge in his own cause, is observed.”

Nandlall also referred to the primary basis on which the complaints against the AFC MPs were rejected — the complaints were delayed in being made – and he underscored the fact that there is no limitation within which a complaint must be made.

He said, “The other main ground upon which the Speaker rejected the complaints was that the complainant was guilty of delay in preferring the said complaints. The fact is, however, that the Standing Orders create no limitation period for the lodging of complaints of this type; and therefore, the Speaker fell into grave error when he read and imposed into the Standing Orders such a requirement.

“In other words, he has unilaterally imposed a requirement for the bringing of these types of Motion, which is not provided for and contemplated by the Standing Orders. It is therefore not a mere act of coincidence that the Speaker cannot find a precedent anywhere, as he said in his ruling, to support such a position. Out of a vacuous situation he has created a requirement.”

ERROR IN RULING
The reasoning of the Speaker in this case was also likened to his ruling to refer Finance Minister, Dr. Ashni Singh to a Privileges Committee after a motion had been brought by A Partnership for National Unity (APNU) MP Carl Greenidge, the AG said.

Nandlall said, “The Speaker committed a similar error in his ruling in relation to the Motion seeking to put the Minister of Finance before the Privileges Committee.

“In that ruling, he said — and I quote — ‘Article 218 (3) (b) appears to contemplate a situation so grave and critical that it was not contemplated and provided for in the annual budgetary estimates; a situation which, in my considered opinion, would be akin to an outbreak of war or the occurrence of some unimaginable natural disaster.”

The AG stressed that Article 218 (3) is written in very clear and unambiguous language. “It is therefore quite a quantum leap for the Speaker to interpret that the said article contemplated before its utilisation ‘an outbreak of war or the occurrence of some imaginary disaster,’” he said.

The AG said that each word must be given its ordinary literal and grammatical meaning. “I am flummoxed at how the Speaker arrived at the conclusion that the said article contemplated such grave eventualities when there is absolutely not a single word in that article which remotely lends to such an inference. The cannons of interpretation are very clear. Each word must be given (its) ordinary literal and grammatical meaning.

“Therefore, I am unaware which cannon of constructions would justify such ingenious interpretation of Article 218 (3). Certainly it cannot be one known for the interpretation of Statutes and Constitution,” the AG concluded.

(By Vanessa Narine)