-handsomely compensated for false imprisonment
IN 1988, constable Orwin Williams, who was unlawfully dismissed by the Commissioner of Police in the Public interest, challenged the latter’s decision in two courts.
The first court awarded him $100, 000.00 as damages for false imprisonment, and six months salary as damages for wrongful dismissal.  He was told that reinstatement was not of right. Dissatisfied with certain aspects of the judgment, Williams turned to the Guyana Court of Appeal in relation to damages and reinstatement.
That court, constituted by Justices of Appeal Miss Claudette Singh, Mr. Nandram  Kissoon and Mr. Ian Chang, SC,  allowed the appeal. The damages granted by the trial judge of six months salary were varied to nine months salary.
In relation to reinstatement, the appellant was told that the law did not allow  for specific performance of a contract for personal services.
Attorney-at-law, Mr. Benjamin Gibson represented the appellant, while Senior Counsel, Mr.  Doodnauth Singh appeared for the respondent.
The facts of the case disclosed that the appellant served in the Guyana Police Force as a constable for three years and four months.   He was discharged by the Commissioner of Police.  The letter of discharge read that the appellant’s discharge was desirable in the public interests in accordance with Section  35 (1) of the Police Act,  Chapter 16:01.
The appellant challenged his removal on the grounds that, inter alia, it was wrong in law, and claimed compensation and damages for loss of office.   He also sought an order for reinstatement.
The trial judge awarded him six months’ salary as damages for wrongful dismissal.   The appellant appealed.
The Court of Appeal held that:  
(1)   In the instant case, the Commissioner of Police had not afforded the constable an opportunity to offer an explanation, neither was he charged, and the appellant had not known the reason which had prompted the Commissioner to terminate his service.
Natural justice would require that the constable should have been aware of the evidence on which the Commissioner had acted.
Although Section 35 of the Police Act did not specifically state that a hearing was required, the justice of the Common Law would supply the omission  in the section, and it would be implied as a deprivation of office by discharge of dismissal would result in loss of property .
(2)   Whilst there was a duty to mitigate loss, in the special circumstances of the instant case, the trial judge’s order would be varied in awarding the appellant salary for a period of nine months, as that time would be ample for a person with the background of the appellant to have secured suitable employment.
(3)   Reinstatement was not as of right, in that the law did not allow for the granting of specific performance of a contract for personal services.  It followed that the appeal would be allowed, and the order of the trial judge varied in relation to the question of damages.
The appellant, Orwin Williams, appealed from that part of the order of the trial judge awarding him six months’ salary as damages for wrongful dismissal by the Commissioner of Police.
Delivering the verdict of the Court of Appeal, Justice Singh noted that Williams served in the police force as a constable from October 15, 1984 to February 19, 1988, a period of three years and four months.
He was discharged by the Commissioner of Police, purporting to act  under  Section 35 (1)  of the Police Act, Chapter 16:01.  The letter of discharge, dated February 17,1988, reads as follows:
“You are hereby notified that you are discharged  from the Guyana Police Force with effect  from January 19,  1988 on the grounds  that having regard to the conditions  of the Force and its usefulness  thereto, your discharge is desirable in the public interests in accordance with Section 35 (1) of the Police Act,  Chapter 16:01.  Please hand in all Government property issued to you.”
According to the judgment, the Attorney General had also appealed, on the grounds that the award of $100, 000 for false imprisonment was excessive.  However, he’d advanced no argument against the award, and in the circumstances, the award was allowed to stand.   The cross-appeal was accordingly dismissed, Justice Singh said.     
She explained that in the present circumstances, the Commissioner had undoubtedly  discharged  the constable  for cause, since dismissal at pleasure had long  ceased to  exist in this country .
Section 35, she said, provides the circumstances under which a constable can be discharged, but that the Commissioner of Police did not afford  the constable  an opportunity  to proffer  an explanation  neither was he charged.
“It is obvious that even if he had been given such an opportunity, he might not have been in a position to offer an explanation, when he did not know the reasons which prompted the Commissioner  to so act,” she said, adding: “Natural justice would require that the constable should be aware of the evidence  on which the Commissioner acted.”
The learned trial judge, she went on to say, “was quite correct in finding not only that the appellant  was unlawfully dismissed but also that he had a duty  to mitigate his loses.   The appellant testified that he earned as a barber during the first three years, that is from 1988 to 1991. But there is no evidence  on record in relation to the earnings.
“The appellant was able to obtain employment as a guard in the Linmine Constabulary, where his experience and background  in the police force would have stood him in good stead.
“There is no legal reason for me to differ from holding as the trial judge that the respondent had a duty to mitigate.
“However, in the special circumstances of this case,  I would vary the trial judge’s  order  in awarding the appellant salary  for a period of nine months, as I am of the view  that this would be ample time  for a person  with the background of the appellant to secure suitable employment.  As regards the appellant’s eligibility to be awarded a pension, Section 55  of the Police Act makes it pellucidly  clear  that  a person can only be paid in accordance with the provisions of the Pensions Act.
“It is important to mention that the appellant was not discharged in the public interest, but for cause, and therefore is not eligible to receive a pension, since he is not qualified under Section  8 of the Act, in that he did not attain the age of 55 years, and neither did he have a minimum of ten years’ pensionable service to his credit.”