THE Full Court in 1968 concluded that a Magistrate was correct in deciding that canecutter Ivan Jack should receive compensation for injuries received in a fall in the course of his employment.
And that Court, constituted by Chief Justice Harold Bollers and Justice Horace Mitchell, commended a magistrate who found that the canecutter was in the course of his employment when he fell off a bridge. That Court also dismissed the appeal by the Blairmont Estates, Ltd.
The respondent was a cane-cutter employed by the appellants on their estate. On his way to work, the respondent who was riding a cycle crossed a bridge , the property of the appellants , when a board slipped off a beam of the bridge.
In so doing, the respondent fell from his cycle into a trench below the bridge, and suffered injuries, as a result of which he filed an application for the payment of workmen’s compensation based on temporary partial incapacity. The appellants did not traverse or deny the allegation relating to the incapacity, even though it was argued in the court below, but contended that the accident did not arise out of, and in the course of, the respondent’s employment.
HELD, agreeing with Bennett v. Etwarie (1): that the allegation as to the incapacity not having been specially traversed and denied in the pleadings, it must be taken to have been admitted; and that the accident arose out of and in the course of the workman’s employment , as at the time of the accident the workman was in a place. Which formed part of his employers’ premises where he would not have been entitled to be but for his contract of employment.
Appealed dismissed.
11 cases referred to.
Appeal from a decision of a magistrate, The facts appear fully set out in the judgment of the court.
M. Churaman, for the appellants.
S. Mohabir for the respondent.
Chief Justice Bollers, delivered the judgment of the court:
:On October 28, 1967, the respondent a cane cutter employed by the appellant company , was riding his cycle on his way to work when he came to a bridge on the Bath Estate , the property of the company, which he had to cross in order to get to his place of work.
As he was cycling over the bridge,a board on the bridge slipped off the beam of the bridge and caused him to fall from his cycle into the trench.
Unfortunately, there was a pile in the trench and the respondent’s head struck the pile and as a result he sustained injuries. He received a cut on the chin, a blow on the face, and one of his teeth was knocked out . He bled from both ears. The respondent, on the instructions from the overseer, was sent to the estate dispensary where he received first aid treatment, and then later was sent to the New Amsterdam Hospital where he was admitted as a patient for two days.
After his discharge from hospital the respondent was treated by the estate dispenser and then referred to Dr. Persaud, the estate doctor. After an examination by Dr. Persaud, the respondent was served with a document which purported to be signed by Dr. Persaud and dated December 1, 1967.
This was a document issued in accordance with Form 16 of the Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance , Cap. 111 [G].
On that same day the respondent was served with another document by the appellant company which purported to be a notice in accordance with s. 12 of the Ordinance ,that as a result of the medical report received, as from December 2 ,1967, compensation payments in respect of an injury sustained by him on October 28,1967, in the course of his employment should cease .
Also on December 1, 1967 , the respondent was handed a letter by the personnel manager of the company, addressed to the field manager of the estate where the respondent was employed by the company, stating that the bearer was fit to resume work as from December 2, 1967. it must be made clear that the spot where the accident took place was about 2 1/2 miles from the respondent’s workplace and the dam on which the respondent rode on the bridge , and the bridge were both the property of the company and under their control.
The company provided a railway locomotive to convey workers to their workplace but the respondent and other estate workers assigned to a particular section were permitted to use the dam and the bridge to get to their place of work , and indeed, the respondent was informed by the Field Foreman of the gang in which he worked that he could use the dam for the purpose of getting to his workplace.
In his application for compensation brought under the Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance , the respondent claimed compensation for temporary, partial incapacity for the period from October 23, 1967 (when the accident occurred) up to December 1, 1967, when he was served with the letter signed by the personnel manager which stated that he was fit to resume work.
The appellants, in their answer , inter alia, denied that the respondent had suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, but did not traverse specifically the respondent’s claim that he had suffered any temporary, partial incapacity.
In these circumstances, the learned magistrate in his memorandum of reasons stated that from the evidence the only question the court had to determine was whether the injuries sustained by the workman arose out of and in the course of his employment. He found as a fact that the dam and bridge on which the workman travelled to work were owned and maintained by the appellant company and that all employees working at that section of the estate were instructed to use the dam to get to their workplace.
In this latter finding we take the view that there was no evidence to support it , and the true position was that the respondent and other workers were permitted to use the dam and the bridge to get at their work place.
The learned magistrate then proceeded to enter judgment in favour o the respondent and to make an award for the sum $97.82 in respect of the sum claimed , obviously on the basis that the respondent had suffered a temporary , partial incapacity as the result of injuries received in an accident which arose out and in the course of his employment .
The respondent’s claim for compensation under the Ordinance, Cap. 111 must therefore succeed. The appeal is dismissed and the order of the Magistrate affirmed with costs to the respondent.
Appeal dismissed.
