Motion to quash indictment dismissed

MURDER accused Compton Alfred was committed by a magistrate to stand trial for murder

and was indicted by the Director of Public Communications for murder.

At the trial, counsel for the accused moved the Court to quash the indictment on the ground that the D.P.P. had no authority to prefer an indictment because, on the evidence as shown in the deposition, the offence of murder was not disclosed as there was no evidence of the cause of death and, further, the only evidence upon which the committal was based was the unsworn and uncorroborated evidence of a child, and, under s. 71 of the Criminal Law (Procedure) Act,Cap.10:01), the accused could only have been properly convicted of murder if the evidence established a case of murder.

HELD:- that the D.P.P. was acting within his jurisdiction when he indicted the accused for the same offence for which the magistrate had committed and it was not competent for a Court to go beyond the indictment and look at the evidence in the deposition to see whether in fact the evidence had established a case of murder.

Motion to quash indictment dismissed.
G.A.G. Pompey Senior Crown Counsel, for the Crown.
C.A. Massiah for the accused.
Delivering his judgment Justice Arthur Chung said: In the present case the accused has been committed by the magistrate to stand trial for the offence of murder, and has been indicted by the Director of Public Prosecutions for the offence of murder.

Counsel for the accused now moves to the Court to quash the indictment on the ground that the Director of Public Prosecutions has no authority to prefer an indictment against the accused for murder , as under section 71 , Chapter 11, the accused could only have been properly committed for murder if the evidence establishes a case of murder.
He is alleging that the evidence as shown in the deposition does not disclose the offence of murder as there is no evidence of the cause of death. Therefore, the committal was improper.

He also contends that the only evidence upon which the committal was based was the evidence of an unsworn witness – Grace Alfred, and that under Cap 25 as amended by Ordinance 29 of 1961 s. 5 (b), no person can be convicted upon the uncorroborated and unsworn evidence of a child.
He argues that if there was no evidence to commit for murder, then the Director of Public Prosecutions has no jurisdiction to prefer an indictment, as Cap. 11,s. 113(1) reads –
“On receipt of the documents relating to the preliminary inquiry, the Director of Public Prosecutions, if he sees fit to do so, shall at any time institute those criminal proceedings in the court against the accused person which to him seem legal and proper.”

He submitted that the words “if he sees fit to do so” and “which to him seem legal and proper” means that the Director of Public Prosecutions must exercise a judicial mind.
Counsel for the Crown in answer to the motion says that the court cannot go beyond the indictment and look at the evidence in the deposition to see if the evidence in the deposition supports the charge where a person has been indicted for the same offence for which he has been committed. He admits that where the person has been indicted for another offence other than that for which he has been committed the Court can look at the deposition to see whether the evidence establishes the offence for which he has not been committed.

In conclusion, Justice Chung declared “ the arguments put forward by counsel for the accused seem impressive but in view of the above I have no doubt that once a magistrate has exercised his discretion in committing a person to stand trial for an offence and the Director of Public Prosecutions has indicted a person for the same offence of which he has been committed , the Director of Public Prosecutions is acting within his jurisdiction and the court cannot go beyond the indictment and look at the evidence in the deposition to see if an offence has been established.

The motion is therefore dismissed.
Motion to quash indictment dismissed.