A vote for APNU-AFC (PNC-AFC) is a vote for the PNC. How so? The AFC has not learnt well from history. The AFC fails to acknowledge, whether intentionally or not, that the PNC’s (PNC and APNU are pretty much the same entity) track record on the notion of ‘coalition’ is one that is manipulative and despicable; indeed, with superb support from former and perhaps existing ‘imperial’ masters.Reviewing historical records in the 1960s vis-à-vis exchange of letters (Dabydeen, 2004) between Premier of British Guiana (now Guyana) Dr. Cheddi Jagan and Leader of the PNC Mr. Forbes Burnham would substantiate this description of the PNC’s track record on the PPP offer of a PPP-PNC coalition.
Nowadays and fairly often to score cut-rate political points, the AFC component of APNU-AFC coalition proudly repeats its slogan that if the coalition for national unity was right under Premier Dr. Cheddi Jagan’s leadership in the 1960s, then it is right now. The AFC is correct in so far as Jagan wanted the PPP and the PNC to form a coalition government in the 1960s.
But the AFC is wrong in its slogan and that slogan also is misleading because the PNC leader Burnham rebuffed Jagan’s coalition plea; and so the AFC should tell the Guyanese people about the incorrectness and disingenuousness of its slogan. Dr. Jagan might have thought that it was right then, but Mr. Burnham did not share Dr. Jagan’s view on a PPP-PNC coalition, as the letter exchanges in the 1960s between the two leaders evidenced. In a parallel way to the 1960s, as the AFC today claims that APNU-AFC coalition is right, does the PNC standard bearer Mr. David Granger share the strategic ‘coalition’ views of the AFC?
In a letter to Burnham of December 11, 1962, Jagan advocated for a coalition government between the PPP and the PNC, and called on Burnham to say whether he agreed with a coalition of the two parties. Burnham in his letter of January 10, 1963 expressed an intention to resolve tensions in the country, and so invited Jagan to have exploratory and preliminary dialouge at a neutral terrain. Burnham did not say in his letter whether he and his party accepted the notion of a PPP-PNC coalition.
Jagan in response on January 18, 1963 called on Burnham to say clearly whether the PNC accepted the proposal of a coalition, as he felt that Burnham’s reply was ambiguous; and if the PNC accepted the coalition proposal, Jagan intimated his intention to dialouge with Burnham at the site that he (Burnham) proposed.
In another exchange on January 24, 1963, Burnham noted that his suggestion was not ambiguous and that the PNC believed that a coalition was not the only channel for reducing tensions and reaching national unity; and so, Burnham claimed that he was willing to dialouge not only on the matter of coalition, but also on exploring alternative options.
Even though Burnham and the PNC dodged on the acceptance of a PPP-PNC coalition, Jagan in his note of February 26, 1963, indicated that he would still like to have dialouge quickly to produce a ‘coalition’ agenda, utilising three members from each party; for his party, Jagan proposed three persons – Ashton Chase, Ranji Chandisingh, and Moses Bhagwan. After months of waiting for the names of the PNC’s members, Jagan in a letter to Burnham on July 3, 1963 persisted in his request for the PNC’s nominees.
Burnham responded on the same day, this time shifting the goal posts. Instead of providing his nominees, Burnham called on Jagan and the PPP to adopt three proposals to end the political impasse; these were: holding a referendum to identify a new electoral system; restarting the Independence Conference in Guyana; and dissolving the legislature to have elections under a new electoral system. Burnham asked Jagan for his reactions and gave Jagan a 48-hour ultimatum for his response. In response on July 8, 1963, Jagan felt that bilateral talks as he had proposed could address these matters, but that he still did not receive Burnham’s response on his offer of a PPP-PNC coalition.
Then about a year later in a letter of June 6, 1964, Jagan proposed a PPP-PNC coalition with the following conditions, among others, as follows: PPP and PNC should each have five ministries, with the PPP Leader as Premier and the PNC Leader as Deputy Premier and that this coalition government should function until August 1965, the term of office of the then PPP Government. Burnham provided no response on this matter, as shown in Jagan’s letter of June 10, 1964.
Jagan again wrote to Burnham on June 15, 1964, where he pointed out to Burnham that in his letter of June 6, 1964 he had asked him to participate in a national government, but pleaded for Burnham’s response to that matter; Burnham then wrote to Jagan three times, on June 10, 1964 and issued two letters of the same date on June 11, 1964. None of Burnham’s three letters had a response to Jagan’s proposal for a national government. And Burnham in his note of June 16, 1964, indicated his intention to close off all communications on the matter of a national government.
Burnham’s hee-haw with Jagan’s proposal for a coalition and a national government was disingenuous, despicable and manipulative, aided and abetted by the U.S. and British Administrations of the 1960s. Burnham and the PNC had no interest in a PPP-PNC coalition or a national government in the 1960s, unless such permutations would have catapulted it into achieving total political power. And it did not need the PPP for gaining power; it had the assistance then of the U.S. and British administrations; and subsequently, assistance from the United Force which the PNC unceremoniously dumped in 1968 after illegally fortifying its own power base.
Here is an example of British and American talk of assistance to remove the PPP from office and thereby install a PNC government; based on U.S. declassified documents, the U.S. Department of State telegraphed the U.S. Embassy in London on June 21, 1963, saying, “…Our fundamental position is that the UK must not leave behind in the Western Hemisphere a country with a Communist government in control. Independence of British Guiana with government led by PPP is unacceptable to US. Our objective in London is to get HMG to take effective action to remove Jagan Government prior to Independence…”
Another example: again, based on U.S. declassified documents, on June 30, 1963, Mr. Duncan Sandys discussed with the U.S. Secretary of State the need for a Burnham-D’Aguiar government. After the December 1964 elections, the Burnham-D’Aguiar coalition emerged; the coalition was the British colonial government ploy in harmony with U.S. foreign policy, and indeed having Burnham’s total support, to do away with the Jagan Government. And so, is the APNU (PNC)-AFC coalition a situation of history repeating itself?
If history is repeating itself with all the aforementioned ramifications of the colonial period, then a vote for APNU-AFC is a vote for the PNC; if history is not repeating itself, then AFC is a mere opportunistic appendage to thrust APNU into power and not to promote national interest, and so a vote for APNU-AFC is again a vote for the PNC.
By Dr. Prem Misir
