Magistrate’s dismissal of complaints against Argosy overturned by Appellate Court

 

FOLLOWING the dismissal of the complaints brought by Labour Commissioner J. Ramphal by a magistrate, the Commissioner appealed the decision.

The Full Court constituted by Acting Chief Justice, J. A. Luckhoo and Justice Sydney Miller heard the appeal which lasted two days, and decided in favour of the Commissioner.
The appellant had brought four complaints against the respondent, the Argosy Company Limited, for failing to pay wages at the rate prescribed by Section 29(4) of the Factories Ordinance , Cap. 115. The rubric and the body of the complaints as well as the rubric of an authorisation to “prosecute” given by the appellant referred to the complainant as “J. Ramphal, Commissioner of Labour,“ but the complaints and authorisation were all signed “Jas. Ramphal” without the addition of the words “Commissioner of Labour.”
“Section 37 of the Factories Ordinance, Cap. 115 provides as follows:-
“(1) No prosecution under this Ordinance shall be intituled except by or with the previous sanction of the Commissioner.
(2) An inspector if so authorised in writing by the Commissioner , may, although he is not a barrister nor a solicitor, prosecute, conduct, or defend before any court having jurisdiction any information, complaint or other proceeding arising under this Ordinance, or in the discharge of his duty as an inspector.”
“The magistrate held that the complaints and the authorisation were invalid. He further held that in any case the authorisation to “prosecute” did not include authority to conduct the case, and dismissed the complaints because of the Commissioner’s absence from Court.
“On appeal, the Full Court held: (1) The complaints were instituted and the authorisation was signed by the Commissioner of Labour in conformity with Section 37(1) and (2) respectively of the
Factories Ordinance, Cap. 115
(ii) It was clear that the word “prosecute” included the conduct of a case. Appeal allowed.”
G.L.B Persaud Solicitor-General (ag.) appeared for the appellant, while
C. V. Wight represented the respondent.
Delivering the reasons for the decision, the Acting Chief Justice Luckhoo said: “There are four appeals against the decision of a magistrate of the Georgetown Judicial Dist., who dismissed the four complaints brought by the appellant against the respondent company for failure by the company to pay one O. Hopkinson who was employed by the company in a factory at the rate provided by Section 29(4) of the Factories Ordinance, Cap. 115.
“The complaints were brought by the appellant in his capacity as Commissioner of Labour and that is so stated in all four of the complaints. The appellant signed his name ”Jas Ramphal” thereon without the addition of the words “Commissioner of Labour.” It is provided by Section 37 (1) of the Factories Ordinance ,Cap 115 that no prosecution under that Ordinance shall be instituted except by or with the previous sanction of the Commissioner. The rubric of each complaint states the complaint to be “J. I. Ramphal, Commissioner of Labour”, and each complaint commences with the words “J.I., Ramphal comes before me the undersigned magistrate and complaints against the Argosy Company Ltd.” Each complaint concludes with the words “and the said J. I. Ramphal, Commissioner of Labour prays that the said defendant, the Argosy Co. Ltd. may be summoned to answer the said complaint.” Even though the signature of the complainant which follows hereafter is “Jas Ramphal” without the addition of the words “Commissioner of Labour.” It is abundantly clear that all of the complaints were instituted by the Commissioner of Labour. The argument of counsel for the respondent to the contrary is clearly erroneous.”
“In the present case the complainant himself did not appear but gave a written authorisation.”
“In respect of each charge to Oscar L. Henry, Assistant Inspector of Labour, to prosecute for and on his behalf. Each authorisation is dated 12th May, 1959, the same date on which each complainant was exhibited before the magistrate”
“The magistrate appeared to have some difficulty in construing the meaning of the word “prosecute” used in Section 35 (2) of the Ordinance .
It is clear that the word “prosecute’ includes the conduct of a case and we are unable to appreciate the magistrate’s reasoning that Mr. Henry could not by virtue of the authorisation conduct the cases.”
“The appeals are allowed and the order of the magistrate set aside in each case.”
“The matters are remitted to a magistrate of the Georgetown Judicial District to be reheard and determined.”

(By George Barclay)

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