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ON June 4, l960, a woman complained to the police that a man named Adams had robbed her of a gold ring and 25 cents.
But the appellant, Adams, denied the allegation of robbery, and claimed that the woman with whom he had had an affair that night was reacting to his failure to meet her demand that they have sexual intercourse. In support of his claim, he told the investigating policeman he even knew the colour of the underwear she was wearing on the night in question.
At this stage, the woman changed her complaint to one of rape, and Adams was charged .for the offence of rape and was convicted by the jury.
Adams appealed against the conviction and sentence.
The Federal Supreme Court, which heard the appeal, was constituted by Sir Alfred Rennie, and Justices C.V. Archer and C. Wylie.
After considering the appeal, the Court noted that while it was not their policy to interfere with a jury’s verdict, except in exceptional circumstances, they found that the matter at hand was an exceptional one, in which the verdict was unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. As such, the appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and the sentence set aside.
The facts of the case disclosed that the woman complained to the police that the appellant had snatched a gold ring and 25 cents from her that night.
The Appellant denied the robbery allegation and declared that he had known her for six months and that he had had an affair with her that night, and that her allegations were made because of his failure to fulfill certain promises to her in respect to the sexual exercise.
Upon hearing this, the woman, known as J., who, having denied having a sexual affair with the appellant before, changed her report to a complaint of rape, after the appellant told the police that he could tell them the colour and description of the underwear she was wearing that night. J. then, for the first time, told of having been raped The appellant, having been charged and convicted of rape, appealed.
The Appellate Court held that:
(i) J’s statement that she was raped was by way of face saving and was not a complaint that could be taken into account to show that she was consistent in her conduct or to negative consent .
(ii) Save in exceptional circumstances a Court of Appeal will not upset the verdict of a jury, but the conviction could not safely be allowed to stand.
The appeal was allowed.
Mr. C. Weithers appeared for the appellant, and Mr. E. A. Romao, Senior Crown Counsel, for the Crown.
Justice Rennie, who delivered the Judgment of the Court, said:
“This appeal is from a conviction for rape. On the 4th June, 1960, Special Reserve Constable Newton Albert was cycling along Sussex Street, and came upon Vinton Jarvis and the appellant. Jarvis was holding the appellant’s bicycle.
“She called out to Special Reserve Constable Albert, and reported to him that the appellant had snatched a ring and 25 cents from her.
“Albert took them to the Ruimveldt Police Station, and reported to Corporal Dundas what Jarvis had told him on Sussex Street. Corporal Dundas then asked the appellant if he heard what the Special Reserve Constable had said, whereupon the appellant said he had known Jarvis for six months; they had an appointment on that night, and he took her to the back of Alexander Village, and had an affair with her; and it is because he did not fulfill certain promises he made to her that she made the allegations against him.
“Jarvis denied knowing the appellant before that night; she said that she never went to the back of Alexander Village with him. The appellant met this denial by telling Corporal Dundas that he could tell him the kind of underwear she was wearing.
“Confronted with such a challenge, Jarvis, for the first time, told of having been raped. It is in that setting that the jury had to decide whether or not Jarvis consented to the intercourse with the appellant. It does not appear anywhere in that setting that Jarvis made a complaint to Special Reserve Constable Albert, or to Corporal Dundas, or to anyone else, that she was raped.
“Her answer to the appellant’s challenge is clearly not a complaint; if she had complained, that fact could be taken into account to show that she was consistent in her conduct, and it could also be taken into account to negative consent. But, as we have already pointed out, she did not complain; what she did was by way of face saving, and could not in any way negative consent.
“The only other evidence that deals with the question of consent is that of the medical witness who examined Jarvis, and found slight generalised tenderness of her vagina, and expressed the opinion that such tenderness is never caused by intercourse by consent.
“On the other hand, another medical witness, called by the prosecution, disagreed with the opinion expressed by the other doctor.
“The question now arises, ‘What this court should do in a case of that kind?’ Except in exceptional circumstances, a Court of Appeal will not upset the verdict of a jury for the simple reason that the jury had the opportunity of hearing and seeing the witnesses when giving their testimony.
“We consider this an exceptional case, and one coming within the provision of S. 16 (i) of the Federal Supreme Court (Appeals) Ordinance,1958, which provides:
‘The Federal Supreme Court on any such appeal against conviction shall allow the appeal if they think that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.’
Concluding his argument, Justice Rennie said:
“This is a conviction that we think cannot safely be allowed to stand. The appeal is accordingly allowed; the conviction quashed; and the sentence set aside.”
But the appellant, Adams, denied the allegation of robbery, and claimed that the woman with whom he had had an affair that night was reacting to his failure to meet her demand that they have sexual intercourse. In support of his claim, he told the investigating policeman he even knew the colour of the underwear she was wearing on the night in question.
At this stage, the woman changed her complaint to one of rape, and Adams was charged .for the offence of rape and was convicted by the jury.
Adams appealed against the conviction and sentence.
The Federal Supreme Court, which heard the appeal, was constituted by Sir Alfred Rennie, and Justices C.V. Archer and C. Wylie.
After considering the appeal, the Court noted that while it was not their policy to interfere with a jury’s verdict, except in exceptional circumstances, they found that the matter at hand was an exceptional one, in which the verdict was unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. As such, the appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and the sentence set aside.
The facts of the case disclosed that the woman complained to the police that the appellant had snatched a gold ring and 25 cents from her that night.
The Appellant denied the robbery allegation and declared that he had known her for six months and that he had had an affair with her that night, and that her allegations were made because of his failure to fulfill certain promises to her in respect to the sexual exercise.
Upon hearing this, the woman, known as J., who, having denied having a sexual affair with the appellant before, changed her report to a complaint of rape, after the appellant told the police that he could tell them the colour and description of the underwear she was wearing that night. J. then, for the first time, told of having been raped The appellant, having been charged and convicted of rape, appealed.
The Appellate Court held that:
(i) J’s statement that she was raped was by way of face saving and was not a complaint that could be taken into account to show that she was consistent in her conduct or to negative consent .
(ii) Save in exceptional circumstances a Court of Appeal will not upset the verdict of a jury, but the conviction could not safely be allowed to stand.
The appeal was allowed.
Mr. C. Weithers appeared for the appellant, and Mr. E. A. Romao, Senior Crown Counsel, for the Crown.
Justice Rennie, who delivered the Judgment of the Court, said:
“This appeal is from a conviction for rape. On the 4th June, 1960, Special Reserve Constable Newton Albert was cycling along Sussex Street, and came upon Vinton Jarvis and the appellant. Jarvis was holding the appellant’s bicycle.
“She called out to Special Reserve Constable Albert, and reported to him that the appellant had snatched a ring and 25 cents from her.
“Albert took them to the Ruimveldt Police Station, and reported to Corporal Dundas what Jarvis had told him on Sussex Street. Corporal Dundas then asked the appellant if he heard what the Special Reserve Constable had said, whereupon the appellant said he had known Jarvis for six months; they had an appointment on that night, and he took her to the back of Alexander Village, and had an affair with her; and it is because he did not fulfill certain promises he made to her that she made the allegations against him.
“Jarvis denied knowing the appellant before that night; she said that she never went to the back of Alexander Village with him. The appellant met this denial by telling Corporal Dundas that he could tell him the kind of underwear she was wearing.
“Confronted with such a challenge, Jarvis, for the first time, told of having been raped. It is in that setting that the jury had to decide whether or not Jarvis consented to the intercourse with the appellant. It does not appear anywhere in that setting that Jarvis made a complaint to Special Reserve Constable Albert, or to Corporal Dundas, or to anyone else, that she was raped.
“Her answer to the appellant’s challenge is clearly not a complaint; if she had complained, that fact could be taken into account to show that she was consistent in her conduct, and it could also be taken into account to negative consent. But, as we have already pointed out, she did not complain; what she did was by way of face saving, and could not in any way negative consent.
“The only other evidence that deals with the question of consent is that of the medical witness who examined Jarvis, and found slight generalised tenderness of her vagina, and expressed the opinion that such tenderness is never caused by intercourse by consent.
“On the other hand, another medical witness, called by the prosecution, disagreed with the opinion expressed by the other doctor.
“The question now arises, ‘What this court should do in a case of that kind?’ Except in exceptional circumstances, a Court of Appeal will not upset the verdict of a jury for the simple reason that the jury had the opportunity of hearing and seeing the witnesses when giving their testimony.
“We consider this an exceptional case, and one coming within the provision of S. 16 (i) of the Federal Supreme Court (Appeals) Ordinance,1958, which provides:
‘The Federal Supreme Court on any such appeal against conviction shall allow the appeal if they think that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.’
Concluding his argument, Justice Rennie said:
“This is a conviction that we think cannot safely be allowed to stand. The appeal is accordingly allowed; the conviction quashed; and the sentence set aside.”
