THERE were two powerful class formations from the 1940s in this country. The Portuguese petite bourgeoisie (PPB) and the educated, status-saturated Mulatto/Creole class (MCC). In terms of economic status, there were two differing class formations.
The PPB had money but it did not conform to the traditional Marxist typology of classes because of the lack of capital accumulation. Using Walter Rodney’s special modification and application of Marxian class analysis to Guyana, the Portuguese mercantile class was a petite bourgeois entity.
The MCC did not have money, therefore Marxian class analysis would not assign petite bourgeois status to them. The West Indian middle-class stratum applied to the Guyanese MCC. Which of the two social classes were more powerful in British Guiana – the one with money or the one with penetrating societal reach?
I would contest that the MCC had more permeating influence in British Guiana. Three reasons explain this: the MCC, descendants of the house slaves, were in fact the colonial administration of the colony with huge influence on the local governor.
Secondly, state administration was controlled by the MCC, therefore, there were things money couldn’t buy in Guyana but status could. It was not as easy for the money of the PPB to get their kids into Queen’s College as the status MCC could. Thirdly, the PPB conceded to the MCC that the MCC had special power and therefore, the PPB would not confront the political hegemony of the MCC.
The PPB tested the water by forming its own political party, the United Force (UF) and it sought not to anger the MCC by bringing on board many MCC personalities. There were tensions between the PBB and the MCC when the UF was born, because the MCC saw the PPB as moving into its (the MCC, that is) traditional territory — state administration – should it win power in 1964.
That is what happened in 1964 and from there on, the nascent suspicion of the MCC never evaporated. The colour issue was never a problem between the PPB and MCC because the PPB saw the MCC as being close to white complexion and the MCC with its inferiority complex accepted the PPB as a cultural partner in British Guiana. They both felt their roles coincided – keep the “C-people” out of mainstream life in the colony.
From 1964 to 1968, the PPB and the MCC ran the colony and sought to diminish the rising role of Cheddi Jagan and what they consider, his people, who were unfit to get the franchise. After 1968, when the PNC rigged the election and the PPB was finished as a political force then migrated in large numbers, the MCC took hold of Guyana.
This was a class of people who were very elitist and powerful. They were the custodians of Anglo-Saxon culture in Guyana. They succeeded the white colonists in the local Masonic lodges. They controlled who got jobs in both private sector and state-sector employment. This social and bureaucratic hegemony existed alongside the rule of the PNC.
One of the reasons why the MCC still had power even though the PNC was solely in government was because from the 1950s, the MCC had an alliance with the PNC and never sought to alienate the PNC. This took the form of the MCC parties — the National Democratic Party, the People’s National Party, the United Guianese Party and the elitist civil society group, the League of Coloured People, forging an alliance with the PNC.
The graphic reality is that the role of the MCC held steadily after the fall of the UF in 1968 because the MCC always had a substantial presence in the PNC. From 1968 onwards, the MCC continued its cultural, bureaucratic, educational and political ubiquity in Guyana.
From 1973, fissures began to develop between the MCC and Prime Minister Forbes Burnham. The 1973 time span had absolutely nothing to do with the rigged election of that year. That was unrelated to the emergence of the schism. This remains an esoteric factor in Guyanese history.
There are two competent books on Burnham and none of them offer analytical elaboration on what exactly happened between the MCC and Burnham after 1973. They are Tyron Ferguson, “To survive sensibly or to court heroic death: Management of Guyana’s political economy, 1965 -1985,” and Linden Lewis, “Forbes Burnham: The life and times of the Comrade Leader.”
Over the decades, I have tried to explain what caused the spilt, but I don’t think a dozen newspaper columns will suffice. You need a book-length manuscript.
This column will perhaps have three parts; the second on the MCC content of the WPA, another on the MCC content in the AFC, so there is no scope for analysing the fight between the MCC and Burnham from 1973 onwards.
DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Guyana National Newspapers Limited.
