THE attempt to compare OFAC sanctions on China Railway Construction Corporation with those imposed on Mohamed’s Enterprise represents a fundamental misunderstanding of how US sanctions actually work, and threatens to mislead the Guyanese public about the gravity of corruption in their own backyard.

Financial analyst Joel Bhagwandin deserves credit for setting the record straight, but his technical explanation deserves amplification, with a more forceful critique of this false equivalence.
The comparison between these two sanction regimes isn’t just flawed. It’s intellectually dishonest, and potentially dangerous to Guyana’s democratic institutions and international standing.
The Chinese construction giant faces what amounts to a narrow investment restriction under Executive Order 13959, which prohibits US persons from purchasing securities in companies deemed part of China’s military-industrial complex.

This is essentially a capital markets sanction, serious for investors, but allowing the company to continue operating globally, including on infrastructure projects like Guyana’s Harbour Bridge.
The company remains fully functional in international commerce outside the US securities markets.
In stark contrast, the Mohamed family and their enterprises face the full weight of Global Magnitsky sanctions, a designation reserved for the world’s most serious human rights violators and corrupt actors.

These comprehensive asset-blocking sanctions freeze all US-accessible property, prohibit all transactions with US persons, and effectively excommunicate the sanctioned parties from the international financial system.

The crimes cited—gold smuggling, tax evasion exceeding $50 million, bribery of government officials, and systematic corruption—strike at the heart of Guyana’s governance and economic integrity.

The distinction matters enormously for Guyana’s future. As US Ambassador Nicole Theriot warned, having an OFAC-sanctioned individual in parliament could trigger a cascade of consequences: Reduced American private sector investment, potential “derisking” by international banks, and strained diplomatic relations at a time when Guyana desperately needs US support to defend it against Venezuela’s territorial claims.

This isn’t mere diplomatic posturing; it’s a realistic assessment of how international finance and geopolitics intersect in an interconnected world.
Those who perpetuate this false comparison do Guyana no favours. They minimise genuine corruption, while creating confusion about international law and sanctions regimes.

The Guyanese people deserve leaders who understand these distinctions and the stakes involved; not those who would obscure the difference between narrow investment restrictions and sanctions for criminal conduct that defrauds their own government of tens of millions in revenues.