Dead Meat, Dominic Gaskin and a major reason for the failed Coalition experiment

EARLY 2014, David Granger publicly discussed his desire to invite the AFC to become part of APNU. In the run up to the AFC’s December 6, 2014 National Conference, Khemraj Ramjattan publicly exclaimed that AFC will become “Dead-meat” if it ever joined forces with the PNC, in whatever format or under whatever appellation. This was Ramjattan’s way of saying that political trust and support for the AFC will wither, resulting in little to no electoral returns, especially among Indo-Guyanese.

This simple concept is at the heart of the failure of the coalition. A deeper understanding of “Dead-meat” is necessary to unlock the foundations of why Granger presided over a one-term government from the very moment he was sworn in.

“Dead-meat” can be dissected using three main conceptual considerations. First, the healthy East Indian support the AFC received will be lost to the PPP/C, given that the AFC’s own analysis showed that Indo-Guyanese held strong non-convertible electoral resentment for the PNC. Besides that, the greater part of the AFC’s support base came from those who subscribed to the original promise that it will not team up with either of the two big parties. Second, an APNU partnership will hand-deliver Afro-Guyanese, many of whom harboured deep resentment for the PPP, back to the PNC, on a platter. Third, if AFC is subsumed as another party in APNU, it will lose its “third-force” identity and its very brand, its stock in trade, contained in its name. Change!
The back story of the genesis of the Coalition is long and may need several chapters of a book. The major catalyst came through the AFC’s October 2014 No Confidence Motion against the Donald Ramotar presidency. This required coordination, consultation and frequent cooperation talks between high-level players in APNU and the AFC. By the time the AFC’s National Conference rolled around in December, Ramjattan’s firm and set position was a bit softer. Other leaders were cozy to the idea and a resolution to empower the National Executive to discuss coalition possibilities was passed.

Items in the Coalition agreement were largely developed to prevent “dead-meat.” I will mention some of them briefly. In an attempt to mitigate Indian attrition, Ministries of Agriculture and Home Affairs went to the AFC to address some major political concerns near and dear to East Indians. Next, the AFC decided its own lists and specified exactly who it wanted to fit whichever portfolio or function. This, together with the Leader of the List being a neutral person, in a way, gave AFC greater control and manoeuvrability over its own membership. Lastly, using the name APNU+AFC attempted to maintain the AFC’s identity and brand words. The agreement also required regular interparty political dialogue.

Here is where Dominic Gaskin comes in. On the Gildarie-Kissoon show about two weeks ago, Gaskin said that there were several administrative and conceptual issues that the AFC did not agree with, but the AFC wanted to protect APNU, it wanted to do everything to ensure that the coalition experiment worked. Gaskin further admitted that, in so doing, the AFC allowed its own principles and those contained in the Accord to be compromised. One major item being the lack of interparty dialogue at the political level. In Gaskin’s opinion there was no single earth-shaking issue that should’ve caused the AFC to walk away from the partnership. Gaskin also believed that if the AFC walked away, APNU would’ve ruled alone.

There is a lot to unpack from Gaskin’s postulations. His analysis is shallow and reflects the manifest lack of depth and political wits that existed within the top tier of the AFC’s leadership. I wish to state categorically, that this posture was almost exclusively held by those with ministerial portfolios and was, for the most part, at odds with other executives, members and financiers. This is at the heart of why Nigel Hughes resigned as party Chairman. That said, due to space considerations, I will deal with only one issue.

The moment Granger was sworn in he set about to dismantle all forms of party-to-party dialogue. He substituted it with executive power, in that, weighty matters were dealt with through the Cabinet mechanism. Granger rebuffed every effort to convene interparty summits. Not a single one was held. That was the beginning of the slide towards a one-term existence. This singular action effectively negated the terms of the entire Cummingsburg Accord; it dismantled the AFC’s negotiated guardrails. This meant that, in practice, the AFC was essentially another party in APNU, ruled by one Ayatollah. That is why Gaskin and his cabinet colleagues could’ve only envisioned a singular outcome to challenging Granger to maintain the canons of the Accord.

It would have broken up the coalition and the PNC would rule alone, so they fell in line. They were unperturbed, even though the major tenets of the Accord were being dismantled before their very eyes, just for the taste of power. One example will suffice: when the Accord was negotiated, the Ministry of Home Affairs, as existed at that time, was to be administered by the AFC. Granger’s first action as president was to strip the ministry of several functions without any utterance of dissent from the AFC. In essence, they consented to dupe the electorate that the Accord was functional when it was not.

Executive action was substituted for real hardcore politics. As a result of the over reliance on administrative process, the government as a whole, and the AFC in particular, became detached from the electorate and its support base. Their political antennae were lowered, their political senses deadened, their community feelers numbed.

By the very nature of the political relations established by Granger, coupled with the tacit collusion of the AFC, it is not surprising that the experiment ended in failure.