At the beginning of the 1960s, it became public knowledge that Britain was committed to giving her Caribbean colonies their independence. Venezuela, actuated by Cold War considerations that Guyana would become another Cuba with an alleged communist government and because she had some concerns about the validity of the 1899 Award, opposed the granting of independence. This opposition to Guyana’s independence was a betrayal of the life and philosophy of Simon Bolivar, who had struggled for the independence and self-determination of all South American nations.

However, independence could not be delayed because the self-determination principle had become part of International Law. To resolve Venezuela’s newly found dispute over the validity of the Arbitral Tribunal Award, the Geneva Agreement of 1966 was enacted. This lifted Venezuela’s opposition, allowed Guyana to be granted independence, and provided a forum under the Geneva Agreement for the parties to resolve the dispute. If they were unable to resolve the dispute between themselves, it would fall to the Secretary General of the United Nations to determine how the dispute would be finally settled.

By 1970, it was clear that the dispute could not be resolved under the Geneva Agreement, but instead of immediately referring it to the UN Secretary General, the parties, Venezuela and Guyana, decided to use the Good Offices methodology, which went on for nearly three decades without results. Eventually, both parties decided to abandon it. It should be observed that during the years of the Good Offices, Venezuela would sporadically erupt into serious threats with sabre-rattling against Guyana.

Guyana, as specified in the Geneva Agreement, referred the dispute to the UN Secretary General who advised the parties to have recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which Guyana did. On the other hand, Venezuela claimed that the UN Secretary General and the ICJ had no authority to be involved in the dispute, but their opposition and contentions were disallowed. The ICJ is expected to hear the substantive case within a year.

The situation has ballooned into very dangerous proportions where the very existence of Guyana as a state is threatened: (i) The military/political lobby in Venezuela, who have always greedily felt that they should seize Guyana’s territory, are sharpened in their greed now that Guyana has become an oil-rich country. (ii) There are elements in the Venezuelan government who feel that the ICJ’s decision will go in Guyana’s favour and that they should take lawless, pre-emptive action. (iii) The Venezuelan government has failed in its social, economic and political policies, resulting in seven million economic migrants fleeing the country and, as a result, will lose the approaching elections.

It is felt that by militarily attacking Guyana, an oil-producing country and seizing its territory, the government would be able to rouse up nationalism and win electoral support. These interests have manifested themselves in five motions being brought to the Venezuelan Parliament, which would, in effect, direct Venezuela to seize 70% of Guyana’s territory and immediately absorb it into Venezuela and deploy its army to invade Guyana. Guyana, as a state, would cease to exist.
To meet these dangerous threats, Guyana has been taking counter-action, mostly of a diplomatic nature and is committed to the view that Venezuela should not be allowed to covet one square inch of its territory.

It is apposite to now review Guyana /Venezuela relations from the 19th century to the present with a focus on the Tribunal of Arbitration and its Award of 1899, which is the core of the dispute between Venezuela and Guyana:-

There is one part of South America the Spanish conquistadors did not visit: the “Wild Coast of Guiana” – the territory between the Orinoco and the Essequibo Rivers. The Dutch occupied this area in the 17th century, and their ownership was recognised by the Treaty of Munster in 1648. The Dutch kept developing this region, especially Essequibo. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, by the Peace of Paris in 1814, the Dutch ceded Essequibo -Demerara and Berbice to the British while they kept Suriname.

In 1831, the British unified Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice into British Guiana, and in 1840, they engaged the German geographer Robert Schomburgk to demarcate the colony’s boundaries. Venezuela, at this time, had gained its independence from Spain and began to think of possessing the territory beyond the mouth of the Orinoco and as the century progressed, Venezuela secured an ally in the USA since the US government in the last decade of the 19th century had revived the Munroe Doctrine which it was using to become the paramount power of the Americas.

By the Munroe Doctrine, America would resist any European power owning new colonies in the continent. Venezuela complained that the British were making a new colony, and the anti-British President of the US, Cleveland, took up Venezuela’s case and forced the British to negotiate. Britain and the US agreed to arbitrate the claim, and Venezuela insisted that the Arbitration be Treaty-based.

As Venezuela desired, the Arbitration of theTreaty of Washington of 1897 was Treaty-based and Article XIII reads, “The High Contracting Parties engage to consider the result of the proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration as a full, perfect and final settlement of all the questions referred to the Arbitrators. This Treaty of Washington was signed by Senor Jose Andrade on behalf of the President of Venezuela and was ratified by the Venezuelan Congress when its President Joaquin Crespo commended the Treaty as “an effort of intelligence and goodwill worthy of praises and thanks from us.”

Venezuela appointed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States as its member of the Tribunal, and the other three members were equally distinguished American and British lawyers. The chairman of the Tribunal was F. de Martens, a world-famous Russian International lawyer. The Tribunal consisted of the most renowned lawyers of the time. The Archives of Spain, Holland and Britain were searched for all relevant documentation, and these were later published in several large volumes of the proceedings. The National Archives have copies of these proceedings.

The Award of the Tribunal was unanimous and was presented by the Chairman on 3rd October, 1899. Venezuela received as much as seven times more territory than Britain. There was much rejoicing in Caracas and postage stamps were issued commemorating the “victory” and the Venezuelan Ambassador to Britain described the Award as “Greatly indeed, did justice shine forth.’ As late as 1949, the law firm which represented Venezuela wrote in the American Journal of International Law: “The Award secured to Venezuela the mouth of the Orinoco and control of the Orinoco basin, these being the most important questions at issue.”

Venezuela insisted that the boundary be demarcated as early as possible, and a joint Commission of Venezuelan and British surveyors demarcated the boundary in accordance with the Award of the Tribunal (1900- 1905). In 1931, Venezuela, Brazil and British Guiana marked out the trijunction boundary point on the summit of Mount Roraima and reaffirmed the border. The story of the Arbitral Tribunal and the demarcation of the Guyana/Venezuela boundary dovetails into the first segment.

Four points to note for those further studying the dispute:
(i) More on the various aspects of Guyana/Venezuela relations could be found on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs online sites and written material from the ministry
(ii) In the Venezuelan narratives, they always try to omit or disguise their role in the Treaty of Washington, involvement in the Tribunal, demarcating the boundaries and their full and unequivocal acceptance of the Award.
(iii) In the Venezuelan narratives, they sometimes give misleading or false statements, e.g., that Exxon pays Guyana’s legal fees at the ICJ.
(iv) There is a call in some circles that Guyana should abandon the ICJ and engage in talks with President Maduro. The ICJ is now adjudicating the issue because of failure of talks in the Good Offices methodology and Venezuela’s eruptions into threats and hostility during these talks.