EVIDENCE of tampering of the ship’s record by the bridge team of the MV Tradewinds Passion, were unearthed in the Board of Inquiry (BOI) investigation into the circumstances surrounding a fuel tanker’s allision with the Demerara Harbour Bridge (DHB) on October 8.
In the report released on Tuesday, the BOI noted that the vessel’s Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) hardware was removed, and crew members initially refused to hand over information to the members of the BOI.
The vessel’s Safety Management System (SMS) required a bridge team/pilot exchange prior to each voyage which needed to be documented by a signed master/pilot exchange card.
“The pilot card was created during the Board Members’ visit to the vessel on Monday, October 9, 2022 and the pilot card was not signed by the pilot. The vessel later sent to the Board another format of the pilot card on October 13, 2022, and this one was signed by master and pilot,” the report declared.
“The ship’s Bell Book records for October 8, 2022, are at variance to the VDR retrieved from the ship’s bridge. The second officer indicated that a scrap was kept on board the ship during transit which is later transcribed into the Bell Book. This strongly suggests that there was tampering of the records.”
In the report released on Tuesday, the BOI determined that the cause of the hit to the DHB was due to a number of reasons including the bridge team’s exclusive reliance on the contract pilot’s incorrect navigational direction, the bridge team’s total reliance on looking at the Harbour Bridge and disregarding the alarms of the electronic equipment on the vessel as the vessel approached the bridge, and the bridge team’s failure to use all available navigation tools to verify the safety of the vessel’s course.
“Had the captain looked at the equipment (or the second mate informed him of his observation) it could have provided ample information about the Demerara Harbour Bridge’s proximity and the vessel’s position in the waterway relative to the transit channel,” the report said.
“The contract pilot and Captain failed to effectively utilise all navigation tools, for the safe manoeuvrability of the vessel. The Tradewind Passion Safety Management System (SMS), although implemented, was not effectively managed on board the vessel to safely navigate the vessel, and avoid the allision,” the report continued.
That was notwithstanding the ship being repeatedly warned by the DHBC that it should “turn around” and not “come through” the cluster piles, since the ship was coming at the Bridge from the wrong angle.
At the time and date of the allision, the vessel was manned by an 18-member crew led by Captain Freddy Olarte Mendoza, the Master.
All crew members are of Filipino nationality. A Guyanese contract pilot, 66-year-old Kenneth Cort was also named.
Cort was administered alcohol, vision and hearing tests. All of which came back with positive results.
However, the “arrogant disposition” of the contract pilot and the Master of the Tradewind Passion, which affected the ability of the crew to communicate with them, is also said to have contributed to the resulting situation.
The Second Officer was tasked with care of the navigation equipment, maintaining a portfolio of charts, and preparing passage plans, his duties as watch officer when a pilot was on board also included checking the vessel’s position, and making sure navigation equipment operated satisfactorily.
He stated that he observed that the vessel was not in the correct position but “he cannot tell the Master that as that is the captain and he cannot tell captain that the vessel is not in the right position.”
The investigation also found that the vessel had a defective bow/manoeuvring thruster which had not been operational for nearly three years. It was noted that the vessel’s owners were notified.
“An operational bow thruster could have avoided the impact or lessen the impact of the allision with the Demerara Harbour Bridge,” the report explained.
“The final cost of the damages is estimated at $US5million and continuing,” the report established
The BOI made 21 recommendations, including the suspension of Captain Cort for at least 24 months. Another proposal was made for the River Pilotage Service to be placed under the Maritime Administration Department (MARAD) with immediate effect.
Additionally, the investigating body recommended that staff at the Light House support with monitoring vessels approaching the bridge