Dear Editor,
THERE is an old saying that those who live in glass houses should not throw stones. How I wish persons would pay heed to that old proverb. I am a retired warrant officer of the Guyana Defence Force. During a career that spanned more than three decades I served with both President Granger and Joe Singh. I found Major-General Singh’s letter to be quite unfortunate and totally disrespectful to the current Commander in Chief and President David Granger.

Further, for the major-general to talk about the ‘dogs of war’ was really going a cliché too far. I think that sometimes we get caught up reading our own press clippings that we forget who we really are and this might have been the case with Major-General Joe Singh. The fact is that his career was not blemish-free and when he served as Chief of Staff, he was the one who unleashed the ‘dogs of war.’.Twenty years ago on February 8th 2000, I was a serving member of the GDF, Major-General Singh was the Chief of Staff of the GDF. On that day the Guyana Police Force had cornered Linden ‘Blackie’ London in the ‘Toucan Suites’ apartment hotel at Eccles on the East Bank of Demerara. A firefight ensued and the Guyana Police Force requested support from the Guyana Defence Force.

Elements of the Special Forces of the GDF were deployed in support of the GPF. That night, ranks from the 31SF Battalion arrived at the scene of the siege and we joined forces with the police ranks. Editor, in his letter to the Commander-in-Chief, the major-general dares to question the President’s judgement and motives and in a self -righteous manner gives himself a God-like omnipotence. I would have preferred the humble approach or better yet a private phone call to the President who is his “squaddie.” The major-general may want to step back and take a long hard look in the mirror for there are questions surrounding the decision he made 20 years ago when he (not Granger) unleashed “the dogs of war”; questions that he has never answered.

I take you back to the siege at Eccles on the 8-9th February,2002 for it was the command decisions that were made on the night of February 8th and the morning of the February 9th 2000 that are troubling. On the night of the siege, the officer commanding the Infantry Support Company at Camp Stephenson was ordered to mobilise an 82 mm anti-tank gun crew and place it on standby to move to the scene of the siege at Eccles. At around 0200hrs on February 9th the 82mm anti- tank gun team was ordered to move to Eccles. In the GDF, the order to deploy such a high-powered battle field weapon in a populated area can only come from one person– the chief himself.

The officer commanding the team was met on arrival by none other than the Chief of Staff of the GDF Major-General Joe Singh. The major-general’s words to that officer on that morning, February 9th 2000, was the order that let loose the real “dogs of war”; Singh said, “this has gone on long enough, lets finish it.” With those orders, the anti-tank gun team set -up and fired a total of four bombs into the building, a move that brought the siege to an end and facilitated the extra-judicial killing of Linden “Blackie” London on live TV. Yes, that was the unleashing of the real dogs of war and Joe Singh gave the order that saw the GDF firing a battlefield weapon on civilians in an urban area. This was never done before and has never happened again. In his last High Court sitting before his retirement, Justice Jainarayan Singh called the actions of the Joint Services on the days in question (February 8 and 9, 2000) “improper and impatient.” Justice Singh said there were clear indications in the matter that serious damage was done to the property at Eccles, East Bank Demerara by the Guyana Police Force (GPF) and the Guyana Defence Force (GDF). According to him, the Joint Services were too hasty to unleash missiles and later explosives into the building. Yes, the judge found that the order by Joe Singh to unleash those “dogs of war” were improper and hasty. What is even more troubling is that the major- general has never seen it fit to explain what was his role, if any, in the extra-judicial killing of Linden London. It is clear that Captain Wycliffe McAllister had gone forward and secured London’s surrender. Under oath, testifying at the inquest into the death of Rhonda Forde who died from gunshot wounds at the same place as London, several witnesses testified that Linden London came out with his hands on his head- (The witness said he heard Captain Warde telling London: “I have you in my sight.”

I can kill you if I want” and, moments later, London ventured out of the building with his hands on his head but was greeted with a hail of gunshots while McAllister was shouting…don’t shoot; hold your fire, to prevent the shooting from different directions). Editor, Major-General Singh was the most senior military officer on site, his brave young Captain, McAllister, had gone forward quite heroically, under the most dangerous, life-threatening of circumstances, negotiated and secured the surrender of “Blackie,” who by then was outwaited and outgunned. The question must be asked: who gave the order to fire? Why did the major-general risk the life of his brave young captain when a hail of bullets cut down the surrendering Linden London? Was this reckless endangerment, poor judgement or a preoccupation with excessive force? In military circles questions of tactical appreciation and judgement still linger to this day, for while the commissioner of police and the deputy chief of staff of the GDF stayed properly (as required) in the rear (in their headquarters), the chief of staff of the GDF and Chairman of the Joint Services Committee, Major-General Singh, inserted himself into the tactical line management of a firefight.

There were several on-site commanders and the scene of the siege was a dangerous environment and was no place for a major-general, much more the Chairman of the Joint Services Committee. What was he doing there? Why did he order an anti-tank gun to be used in a built-up area where there were civilians? Why was he in such a hurry to, in his words, “finish it?” On the morning in question the major-general was there with his son (the son- a civilian- was armed with two weapons), what was the reason for father and son being out there? Did they have a vested interest in the final outcome? Why did Joe Singh on that fateful day unleash “the dogs of war”?

Regards
Retired Warrant Officer (name withheld)