TRIBAL decision-making involves the blind following of policies, parties and personalities based on clan affiliations. This unthinking following of a group is usually done to the detriment of the general good of the country. This is especially demonstrated in the context of voting, where the blind loyalists will exercise their franchise against a government because that authority does not reflect their stock. Leaving this to the whims and fancies of humans can be likened to leaving a child at home all alone and expecting responsible behaviour. It must be corralled and shackled with stringent constitutional arrangements, coupled with constitutional education.

Without hesitation, this documentation hereby invokes the words of Thomas Jefferson who astutely observed, ‘In questions of power, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.’ The Founding Fathers of the United States of America proceeded from the assumption that the heart of men could not be trusted in times of political decision-making and they advocated eternal monitoring by systems and rules. This approach produced what is arguably the best constitution in the world. Some have argued that this is a very negative view of human nature. I disagree with this position and wholesomely concur with their approach. Depending on the goodwill of men in the context of political power and the battle for resources can be likened to depending on a poisonous snake not to use his venom to defend itself in the face of an attack.

This concern is intensified when examining countries such as Guyana, with crystallised ethnic loyalties and scarce resources. The battle for opportunities and dominance becomes a cauldron in such circumstances. The wild tribal beast is not easily tamed. How does one explain the political survival and relevance of men who are accused of being complicit in murder, pillage and the wanton abuse of power? In homogeneous societies where people tend to vote and make political decisions based on issues, rather than kin, such men would be banished from public life. This seldom occurs in heterogeneous societies where leaders have a guarantee of support through group loyalties. This primal instinct drives the mindset which says ‘he might be a bad leader but he is one of us.’ I am afraid, this sums up a dangerous approach that is pregnant with inestimable destructive implications for any nation and must be tempered by constitutional protection. It is not the mere existence of different groups that can condemn a country to this possibility, it is the conduct of political parties and their exploitation of identity politics. You cannot leave such a precarious circumstance to the goodwill of politicians; they will invariably seek advantage in whatever forms it exists. Kenya’s 2007-2018 post-election violence revealed the consequences of playing with identity politics.

In conclusion, I will readily agree that the possibility exists where from time to time, there is the manifestation of flickers of the goodness from human beings in the context of political power, Barack Obama’s election is exhibit A in this regard. However, I will posit that the extenuating circumstances that allowed such a welcome development do not exist in societies such as Guyana. Further, the writer’s posture is fraught with full recognition that there are inestimable variables, depending on varying circumstances, that can negate this positon; but what I have mentioned occurs far more frequently. This writer is not advocating the Lijphart consociational approach to ethnic-conflict regulation, his is too stringent. I will expound on my suggestion for the best constitutional design to address the aforementioned concern in subsequent writings.