Unsworn evidence of a child

Cannot corroborate sworn evidence, Appellate Court ruled

IN 1967, a Judge led a Demerara Assize jury to believe that the unsworn evidence of a nine-year-old girl could corroborate the sworn testimony of her mother who had testified that she (mother) was raped by a burglar.
As a consequence of the misdirection by the judge, the jury found the alleged burglar and rapist Boodram Lall, guilty of burglary and rape, resulting in the judge sentencing him to concurrent terms of imprisonment for seven years.
Lall, represented by lawyer, Mr. J.O.F. Haynes, Q.C., appealed. The Guyana Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the convictions and sentences.
The facts of the case disclosed that the appellant, Lall, was indicted on two counts, firstly, for ‘burglary with intent to commit rape’ and secondly, ‘rape’ on K, the mother of K.R., a nine year old girl.
The trial judge questioned the child and recorded his opinion that she was not of sufficient competent understanding to give evidence, but he did not permit her to be sworn as he did not think she understood the nature of an oath and, as a result, she gave unsworn evidence.
Her testimony , if admissible and if believed, afforded strong corroboration of her mother’s evidence, the trial judge had said..
The jury were directed that the rule of practice was to look for corroboration of the mother’s evidence. He told the jury that they could convict on the uncorroborated evidence of the mother, and he also told them over and over again that K.R.’s unsworn evidence corroborated the mother’s testimony.
The Appellate Court held – (i) the unsworn evidence of a child could not be used to corroborate the sworn testimony of another person;
(ii) the directions were of such a nature that it was impossible to say whether the jury relied for their verdict of “guilty” on the uncorroborated evidence of the mother alone coupled with the warning that they were so entitled to do, or, on the evidence as corroborative of the mother’s testimony.
The Appellate Court, constituted by Chancellor Kenneth Stoby, and Justices of Appeal, Percival Cummings and Victor Crane, allowed the appeal and quashed the convictions and sentences.
Queen’s Counsel Mr. J.O.F. Haynes appeared for the appellant while Mr. Neville Graham, Senior Crown Counsel, appeared for the respondent.
Delivering the judgment, Chancellor Stoby noted that the trial of the appellant took place at the Demerara Assizes on the 10th of April, 1967. He was arraigned on an indictment containing two counts, the first charging, ’burglary with intent to commit the felony of rape,’ and the second ‘committing rape’ on K., the mother of K.R.
After a trial lasting two days, he was convicted on both counts and sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of seven years.
Continuing the Chancellor had said, “At his trial, a nine-year old girl, K.R, was called by the Crown as a witness. The Judge questioned the child and at the conclusion of his questioning recorded that in his opinion she was of sufficient competent understanding to give evidence.
“The Judge did not permit her to be sworn as he did not think she understood the nature of the oath, and in the result she gave unsworn evidence. Her evidence, if admissible, and if believed, afforded strong corroboration of her mother’s evidence.
“The main ground of appeal is whether the trial judge was correct in directing the jury that the unsworn evidence of the child could corroborate sworn evidence.
“The manner in which the law developed to permit the unsworn testimony of witnesses is not without interest . In early times all evidence had to be given on oath and on the Gospel; no one but a Christian could testify.
“Competency to testify depended upon acceptance of the witness belief in the Gospel. Non-Christians and children of tender years were deemed to be ignorant of the nature and obligation of an oath ; they were not allowed to be sworn and so could not testify. Such was the state of the law until the celebrated case of Omychund v. Barker,(1744) “
The Chancellor went on to say that in this country in1894 , the Legislature passed an Evidence Ordinance by which a child and certain other categories of people who were ignorant of the nature and obligation of an oath could give evidence without oath provided the judge considered the child or other persons were of competent understanding.
Pointing out that there were many similar directions that were given to the jury, Chancellor Stoby in his judgment declared that there was clearly no direction in the light of the proviso to section 71 but the alternative situations on either of which it was suggested to them they could act were put in the manner : (a) they might either return a verdict on the uncorroborated evidence of the mother K. alone , though it would be dangerous for them to do so: (b) if theywere not so minded and desired corroboration of it , they might choose to find in her child’s evidence, providedly they could safely on it.
If, however, they found that they could not reely on the child’s, they would be left only with the mother’s evidence, on which it would be dangerous to act.
The Chancellor added, “Such being the directions of the learne judge, it is impossible for us to say which of these two alternative situations the jury accepted – whether they relied for their verdict of ”Guilty” on the uncorroborated evidence alone, coupled with the warning as they were entitled to do, or on the evidence of the child as corroborative of the mother’s.
“Indeed, the jury having been told it would be dangerous for them to act on the uncorroborative evidence of K. alone may very well, it is contemplated , have heeded the judge’s warning and convicted with the help of the evidence of the child which was repeatedly suggested to them ( the jury) as being capable of corroborating the mother’s.
“It seems to us that the likelihood of a verdict of “Guilty” returned in such circumstances, without the proviso (14) being explained to them is unsafe, and founded as it is on a non-direction which amounted to a mis-direction in law , ought to be set aside in the interests of justice,” the Chancellor declared as he allowed the appeal and quashed the convictions and sentences.

 

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