IN 1976, twelve-year old Sursattie Ramnauth complained to the magistrate of the East Demerara that the respondent Vishnu Ramdas had threatened to kill her.
But she had to prove that the offence took place within the magistrate’s jurisdiction.
Sursattie had replied to a leading question from the police prosecutor that the incident “took place at Strathspey, East Coast, Demerara , in the East Demerara Magisterial District.”
It was however clear from questions put to her in cross-examination, that she did not understand what magisterial meant, nor did she know the place where offenders were tried when charged for committing offences at Strathspey.

At the close of the case for the prosecution, counsel for the defence submitted that there was no evidence to show that the alleged offence was committed within the jurisdiction, but the learned magistrate overruled the submission.
He considered that there was no evidence that Strathspey was anywhere else than in the East Demerara Magisterial District, and that the inference was compelling that the offence took place within that district because, “the witness was unshaken that Strathspey is on the East Coast of Demerara.” The defendant was accordingly convicted and fined $100 with an alternative of two months’ imprisonment for having made use of threatening language to Sursattie where a breach of the peace might be occasioned.

On appeal, the Full Court did not agree with the magistrate’s reasons and set aside the conviction and sentence. The Police Prosecutor appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal was constituted by Chancellor J. O. F. Haynes and Justices of Appeal Guya Persaud and Victor Crane.
That Court HELD: (1) That proof of locality to found jurisdiction has always been the same as it is in England and continues to be the practice in the Magistrate’s Courts in Guyana.

(2) That there is no set formula of words to be used in so doing , but proof may be simply established, either by a direct statement that the locality is within the magisterial jurisdiction or inferentially within it.

But whatever accompanying words are used , it will always be a question of fact whether proof has been established to the magistrate’s satisfaction so that he can safely infer from the description of the place given that the complainant or plaintiff has brought the offence or suit within his magisterial district.

(3) That in the instant appeal, the magistrate had no right to allow vitally essential words of proof to be put in the mouth of the witness and at the close of the case for the prosecution he ought to have acceded to the submission of learned counsel that jurisdiction had not been proved and dismissed the complaint.

(4) That the magistrate ought not to be permitted the leading question in the first place , but then, having admitted it, he could not properly reject the direct part of it and accept the indirect or descriptive part of the statement.

(5) That the vice in the question which “led” the witness to give the answer desired by the prosecutor must have vitiated the whole and not a part of her answer.
Appeal dismissed with costs. . Decision of the Full Court affirmed.
G.H.R. Jackman, Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions for the appellant.
R. Ramkarran, for the respondent.
Justice of Appeal Crane delivered the judgment of the Court.

Justice Crane said: The point for decision in this appeal is a matter of everyday importance to magistrates and to all those who practice before them.
Shortly put , it is: In what circumstances can a magistrate be justified in inferring from the facts of a case before him, that the matter has been proved to be within his jurisdiction?
In the administration of justice a magistrate is statutorily enjoined to have regard in the law which invests him with both civil and criminal jurisdiction. That law is to be found in ss.31 and 32 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Magistrates) Act Cap. 3: 05 and insofar as relevant to the question under consideration.