Landlord approached wrong Court to claim damages from tenant

IN the case of Evelyne v. Latchmansingh, the plaintiff was the tenant and the defendant, the landlord.The rental agreement was subject to the provisions of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, Chapter 186 (British Guiana).
The defendant served the plaintiff a notice to quit and subsequently brought proceedings before the Rent Assessor for possession.
The proceedings were terminated in favour of the plaintiff.
Thereafter, the defendant and his servant removed the walls , roof, and the front and back steps of the premises. The plaintiff was forced to seek shelter elsewhere and her furniture and personal effects were damaged by rain.
It was held that: (i) if it is necessary for a plaintiff to rely on any provision of the Rent Restriction Ordinance in order to establish his claim, the claim is one arising out of the Ordinance.
(ii) in the action, the plaintiff’s claim was wholly dependent upon the question whether or not she was protected by the Ordinance and that being so the claim should have been instituted in the Magistrate’s court and could not validly be brought in the Supreme Court , the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court having been ousted by the provisions of s. 26 (1) of the Ordinance.
Action by a tenant against the landlord for breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment , eviction , trespass by unlawful entry into the plaintiff’s dwelling house and the dismantling of the walls , etc., and breach of the contract of tenancy.
C.V. Wight appeared for the plaintiff and F. w. H. Ramsahoye for the defendant.
Delivering his ruling Chief Justice J. A. Luckhoo said:
“In this action, the plaintiff claims the sum of $15, 000, as damages and pecuniary compensation against the defendant for breach of covenant and quiet enjoyment , eviction and trespass by unlawful entry into the plaintiff’s dwelling house and the dismantling of the walls, roof and floor thereof and breach of contract of tenancy relating to premises situate at 130 Regent Street, Bourda, in the City of Georgetown.
“The allegation of the plaintiff, as set out in her statement of claim and as supplied by the evidence, was to the effect was that she was for some 14 years , prior to the month of May 1958, the tenant of the premises in question paying a weekly rental and that the defendant was her landlord for some time prior to material times subject to the provisions of the Rent Restriction Ordinance.
“The defendant wished to get possession of the premises from the plaintiff and as the plaintiff was not agreeable to quit the premises the defendant served on the plaintiff a notice to quit. Thereafter the plaintiff became a statutory tenant protected by the Rent Restriction Ordinance.
“The defendant in December , 1957 ,brought proceedings before the Rent Assessor in the Georgetown Magistrate’s Court for possession on the ground that he required the premises for the purpose of reconstruction.
“These proceedings terminated in favour of the plaintiff on February 18, 1958, the defendant withdrawing the application. Thereafter, on May 6 and 7 , 1958 the defendant by himself and his servant removed the front and back steps giving ingress and egress into and from the premises and also removed the walls and roof. The plaintiff was forced to seek shelter elsewhere and her furniture and personal effects were damaged by rain as a result of the roof being taken off the premises by the defendant’s carpenters under the defendant’s directions.
“The defendant sought to show that at the material time, he had ceased to be the plaintiff’s landlord and that one Chand was instead the landlord . “In this attempt the defendant failed , and it is clear that the acts complained of by the plaintiff were done by and at the direction of the defendant himself and that Chand was sought to be used as a red herring..
“Counsel for the defendant has submitted that this court is without jurisdiction in this matter as it is a claim or other proceeding arising out of the Rent Restriction Ordinance.”
Winding up his ruling Chief Justice Luckhoo added: “In the present action the plaintiff’s claim is wholly dependent upon the question whether or not she was protected by the Rent Restriction Ordinance and that being so, the claim should have been instituted in the magistrate’s court and cannot validly be brought in the Supreme Court , the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court having been ousted by provisions of s. 26 (1) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, Cap. 186 (B. G.)
“The plaintiff’s claim must therefore be struck out.”