Federal Supreme Court rules ability to plead is not sufficient proof of fitness to stand trial

IN 1961, Chief Justice Sir Eric Hallinan and Justices A.M. Lewis & Marnan castigated a High Court judge for giving the wrong impression that the ability to plead to an indictment constituted sufficient proof of a defendant’s fitness to stand trial.

Sir Eric added: “Looking at both the evidence and the summing up in the trial of the first preliminary issue as a whole, this court has reached the conclusion that the question to be determined was not clearly explained to the jury, and may have been misunderstood by the learned judge himself.
“The verdict on the preliminary issue must therefore be set aside,
This conclusion necessarily vitiates the subsequent proceedings, so that the findings and sentence on the second preliminary issue and on the general issue must also be set aside.

“Since the appeal has been decided on a matter affecting a preliminary issue only, this is a proper case to send back to the Supreme Court for re-trial, and we so order. Appeal allowed; new trial ordered”.

According to the Federal Supreme Court (FCC), at the beginning of the judge’s summing-up, he said, “Is the accused, James Reid, now suffering from disease of the mind which rendered him unfit to stand trial, and therefore unable to plead to the indictment? That is the question which is before you for consideration.”

Delivering the FCC Judgment, Chief Justice Hallinan said, “In this case, there can be no doubt that the appellant killed the boy Geoffrey Dover, aged seven, on 10th November l960. The child went for a walk with the appellant, who strangled him, cut off the scalp with a trowel, and buried the body.

“Two preliminary issues were tried before the general issue. First, the appellant was tried on the issue of whether he was sane and fit to take his trial. When that was decided in the affirmative, the accused remained mute, and the issue as to whether he was mute of malice was then tried.

“The jury decided he was. It was never seriously in issue whether the appellant was deaf or dumb. If he did not talk, this was due either to malice or to a disordered or deficient mind. The first preliminary issue therefore was the more important.

“The leading case on the trial of such an issue as this is R.vs. Pritchard, 7C &P. 303. The case is important in the determination of the present appeal, and it is necessary to cite from the report at some length.

“The jury found that Pritchard was mute by the visitation of God. The report then proceeds: The jury was sworn to inquire whether the prisoner was able to plead to the indictment. It was proven that the prisoner was able to read and write, he having been taught in the deaf and dumb asylum in London. The indictment was given to him, which he read, and he made a sign that he was not guilty.

“The jury then found that he was able to plead. They were then sworn to determine whether the prisoner was now sane or not. Evidence was given with a view to shewing that, on the examination before the magistrates, he had understood the charge and had answered in writing. It was, however, sworn by several witnesses that the prisoner was merely an idiot, and had no proper understanding; and that though he might be able to be made to comprehend some matters, he could not understand the proceedings on the trial”.

Alderson, B., the trial judge in Pritchard’s case, told the jury:
“The question is whether the prisoner has sufficient understanding to comprehend the nature of this trial so as to make a proper defence to the charge… whether he is of sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial so as to make a proper defence — to know that he might challenge any of you to whom he may object, and to comprehend the details of the evidence which, in a case of this nature, must constitute a minute investigation.

“Upon this issue, therefore, if you think that there is no certain mode of communicating the details of the trial to the prisoner so that he can clearly understand them and be properly able to make his defence to the charge, you ought to find that he is not of sane mind. It is not enough that he may have a general capacity of communicating on ordinary matters”.
Continuing, Sir Eric added: “In the present case, the preliminary issue was correctly stated thus: “whether the appellant is or is not insane and unfit to take his trial.” The issue is very different from the issue of insanity when the general issue is being tried. The question is not whether the appellant knew at the time of the killing what he was doing or whether he was doing wrong, but whether he is fit to take his trial. That is not merely to comprehend the indictment, but also the course of proceedings in the trial”.

Sir Eric Hallinan noted that the killing of the small boy in this case was a shocking act that was likely to rouse the anger and indignation of the public. It was therefore of especial importance that the case for the appellant be properly presented; that such medical evidence as was available should be called, and the doctors asked the right questions; and that the summing up should include all aspects of the evidence that were favourable to the appellant, and that there was a clear and correct direction on the question which the jury had to determine.

The Federal Supreme Court allowed the appeal and returned the matter to the Supreme Court for re-trial.