By Dr. Prem Misir

THE prorogation or temporary suspension of parliamentary activity in Guyana is real and is a historical first. It is a done deal. But the view on whether or not prorogation is a good thing depends on who you are talking with. And, indeed, the feelings about the suspension of Parliament are strong, in that there are sections of the electorate who support it and other sections of the electorate who oppose.
In this case, one could argue that the electorate is divided on the matter. And so the logical option is to call a general election. Hypothetically, you have this election, results are out, and again you have a divided electorate where some sections vote for the winning party and other sections vote for the losing parties. Are the after-effects, that is, emotions and arguments for and against, of the prorogation and an election not fairly similar?

“Yet the winning party in an election proceeds to form a Government. In the end, given that the election is free and fair, sections of the electorate opposed to the winning party eventually adjust to living with the outcome. In addition, we should note that in a democracy, both the principles of prorogation and an election are grounded in constitutional provisions and constitutional conventions. If people on the whole live with the election results, notwithstanding their dissatisfaction with the results, why are the Opposition politicians spinning the prorogation as some kind of evil, or that the President has committed an unconstitutional act? The proclamation for proroguing parliament is constitutional.”

Yet the winning party in an election proceeds to form a Government. In the end, given that the election is free and fair, sections of the electorate opposed to the winning party eventually adjust to living with the outcome. In addition, we should note that in a democracy, both the principles of prorogation and an election are grounded in constitutional provisions and constitutional conventions. If people on the whole live with the election results, notwithstanding their dissatisfaction with the results, why are the Opposition politicians spinning the prorogation as some kind of evil, or that the President has committed an unconstitutional act? The proclamation for proroguing Parliament is constitutional.
But this recent prorogation has invoked the wrath of the combined Opposition Alliance For Change (AFC) and A Partnership for National Unity (APNU). There is this argument now that the President by proclaiming a prorogation has committed an undemocratic act, even though the act is constitutional.
In fact, what the AFC and APNU are saying is that Parliament represents the will of the people who have now become politically voiceless, and as such the act of prorogation itself is undemocratic. The Speaker of the National Assembly also shares this view. In pursuing this line of thinking, some opposed to the prorogation contend that the framers of the constitution inserted prorogation as a constitutional provision, but they did not intend for any President to use it; for its effect will make the elected representatives voiceless.
That is a strange argument, for if a provision is clearly articulated in a constitution, a good probability exists that it will be utilised if the circumstances warrant it. Without reliable and valid evidence, how would those who promote this view know about the intentions of these founding fathers? They have not presented any evidence of the framers’ intentions?
Well, those resisting prorogation have primarily focused on outcomes or effects; these include, among others, the following: the minority People’s Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) Government will spend outlandishly, or will engage in some kind of spending spree; the will of the people will not be advanced; the emergence of a dictatorship. But little attention is focused on the causes of prorogation. What brought about the prorogation in the first place?
On the face of it, it appears that prorogation occurred because of the no-confidence motion against the PPP/C Government; the combined Opposition would have won the no-confidence vote against the ruling party PPP/C, by virtue of the Opposition’s numeric majority of one in the National Assembly.
In three Canadian cases, two federal and one provincial, the Governments that prorogued parliament were all minority Governments (Horgan, 2014, p.465); suggesting that minority Governments may be more inclined toward invoking prorogation, in order to sustain its legislative agenda and capital programmes and projects.
However, in Westminster-style parliamentary systems, prorogation is used as a legitimate parliamentary device when a Government legislative programme ends, or when it wants to institute a new legislative programme (Horgan, 2014, p.457). The ruling party has a legislative agenda for the remaining two years or so of the 10th Parliament, and these include, among others, the following: Supplementary Appropriation (No.1 for 2014) Bill 2014; Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Bill 2013; Broadcasting (Amendment) Bill 2013; Procurement (Amendment) Bill 2013; Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2013; Telecommunications Bill 2012; Public Utilities Commission (Amendment) Bill 2012; Recording Of Court Proceedings Bill 2014. Any ruling party and the PPP/C is no exception, will want to execute its legislative agenda as part of its nation building mandate.
And with several bills not current and languishing in Parliament, and combined with a practically dysfunctional committee system, there is definitively parliamentary gridlock inimical to development and democratic growth. This prorogation period which could be six months or less, presents parliamentarians with an ample opportunity to find ways to break the parliamentary gridlock. Gridlock exists because people have conflicting ideological perspectives and power interests and have no proclivity to compromise. Conflict resolution requires, for starters, meaningful interaction through parliamentarians’ consciousness of their public role, their responsibility and accountability to the people.
Indeed, prorogation like so many things has many faces of what is good and what is bad; and given the constant parliamentary gridlock, an evil phenomenon, and the urgency for its resolution, why not seek out the goodness in prorogation as a possible means toward permanently ending the parliamentary congestion. And even if prorogation is as bad as the antagonists contend, beneath its pathology, there is goodness.

References:
HORGAN, G. W. 2014. Partisan-motivated prorogation and the Westminster model: a comparative perspective. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 52, 455-472.