Alfred Kellman, who was convicted by the jury for having carnal knowledge with his two stepdaughters, (aged 9 and 11 respectively) in 1972, was freed by The Guyana Court of Appeal.

This happened because the Appellate Court found the trial Judge erred in not telling the jury that it was dangerous or unsafe to convict on uncorroborated evidence of children of tender years.
The conviction was set aside, but in the interest of justice, a new trial was ordered.
The Appellate Court was constituted by Chancellor E.V. Luckhoo, and Justices of Appeal Guya Persaud and J. O. F. Haynes.
The facts of the case disclosed that the appellant was charged and found guilty on a two-count indictment with having unlawful carnal knowledge of his two step-children , A and B, 9 and 11 years respectively.
The children’s mother was not home at the time, but on her return, some four hours later, she observed that A was in a distressed condition and related this to the jury. Each child was an eye witness to the offence involving the other and at the Assizes both gave sworn testimonies implicating the appellant.
The medical evidence was of no help and there were no external signs of injury whatever to the children. The trial judge did not however warn the jury that it is dangerous or unsafe to convict on either count on the uncorroborated evidence of children of tender years ; he never used the word ‘warn’ or ‘caution’ or told them of any danger of risk in convicting if they did not find corroboration, although he did explain that corroboration is always looked for as a matter of practice , even though it is not required as a matter of law in sexual cases.
The jury was however told that the independent eye-witness evidence of each child , if believed , was capable of amounting to corroboration, and that they could consider the offences as proved if they believed what the children said about the appellant.
On appeal, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the cumulative effect of the judge’s directions did not amount to a sufficient warning to the jury, that it was unsafe to convict on either count on the uncorroborative evidence of children of tender years.
Justice of Appeal Haynes, as he then was,
held: (1) That the jury were not in terms or effect warned, as they ought to have been in a sexual offence on children of tender years ,that they should be cautious before convicting the appellant on uncorroborated evidence. This prima facie would be fatal to the conviction unless there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice
(2) That the crucial question is whether the State has in relation to each count , such substantive corroboration apart from the evidence of the other child , that the Court feels sure that if a proper warning had been given , a reasonable jury would inevitably have convicted the appellant.
(3) That the only other bit of evidence which could possibly be corroborative is that of the children’s mother , about A’s distressed condition; but it was not entitled to much weight as it was not observed until some four hours after the alleged assault.
(4) That the conviction and sentence must be set aside and a new trial ordered.
Mr. Haynes, delivering the first judgment at the request of Chancellor Luckhoo, said, “The case for the prosecution was that on Saturday 15th January, 1972, between 12 noon and 1 pm., the appellant had unlawful carnal knowledge first with A , then 9 years old, and after this with B, her sister, then 11. Their mother, the lawful wife of the appellant was out. According to the evidence. each child was an eye-witness to the offence involving the other. The medical evidence was neutral. There were no external signs of injury whatever. The appellant admitted that he was at home with these two step-children between noon and 12.40 p.m. , but he swore he did nothing to either of them during this time or at all. Consequently, the State had to prove; (i) that the sexual acts occurred; and (ii) that the appellant was the man involved.
He was unrepresented by counsel and the jury found him guilty on both counts of the indictments.
At the time of the trial, one girl was 13 and the other was 11. Both gave sworn evidence.
So corroboration was not required as a matter of strict law, but it was obligatory on the trial judge as a matter of law, to warn the jury in terms or effect , that in the eyes of the law, it was dangerous or unsafe to convict on either count on the uncorroborated evidence of the children for two reasons: firstly, because the charges were sexual offences; and, secondly, as each girl was regarded by the common law as a child ‘of tender years’.