AGAIN, the predictable annual budget war is upon us in Guyana. The Opposition’s war-wearied wailing of having had no consultations to input budget 2014 has become the norm at this time of the year, even though budgetary consultations should begin the day after an existing budget is approved. This annual budget war and cry for consultations have probably graduated to becoming an annual festival, and perhaps, it is time to accord them a national holiday status.

However, for all intents and purposes, the sole player in this war is the one-seat majority Opposition. But in order to have a war, there must be at least two players, and only the Opposition is engaged. Therefore, the war is not real, possibly rhetorical.
Perhaps, the Opposition’s placement of itself on this hypothetical war footing is profoundly motivated by its majority of one in the National Assembly, where it feels it could win the day on almost anything in the parliamentary chambers through simple math. But this simple math does not favour the Opposition when it comes to the budgetary proceedings. You see even wars, real or unreal, have written rules of engagement.
Recently, Acting Chief Justice, Ian Chang ordered compliance with the rules governing the budgetary process in the National Assembly, and asserted that there were clear violations of constitutional rules in the budget cuts over the last two years. In making his ruling, the Acting Chief Justice invoked Article 171 (2) (a) (ii) and Article 218 of the Constitution.
Here is Article 171: “(2) Except on the recommendation or with the consent of the Cabinet signified by a Minister, the Assembly shall not –– (a) proceed upon any Bill (including any amendment to a Bill) which, in the opinion of the person presiding, makes provision for any of the following purposes –– (ii) for imposing any charge upon the Consolidated Fund or any other public fund of Guyana or for altering any such charge otherwise than by reducing it;…” (Guyana Act No. 2 of 1980 Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana Act 1980)
The Acting Chief Justice Chang explained that without the consent of the Cabinet, the National Assembly cannot pursue any bill that would constitute a charge on the Consolidated Fund.
Here is part of Article 218: “(1) The Prime Minister or any other Minister designated by the President shall cause to be prepared and laid before the National Assembly before or within ninety days after the commencement of each financial year estimates of the revenues and expenditure of Guyana for that year…” (Guyana Act No. 2 of 1980 Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana Act 1980).
In his interpretation of part of Article 218, Acting Chief Justice Chang noted that the proposed budget is really the Minister of Finance’s estimates that the National Assembly is empowered to approve, but not to amend; for if the National Assembly makes cuts to the estimates, then the estimates become the National Assembly ‘s estimates, and not the Minister’s estimates. Constitutionally, therefore, the National Assembly cannot cut the Minister’s estimates, but has the authority to approve or reject the estimates. Acting Chief Justice Chang further noted that any cut becomes a ‘done deal’, a fait accompli, and as such does not give the Minister the chance to address the National Assembly’s concerns through amending his own estimates.
Chang’s ruling implies that the savage ˜15% cuts to the Guyana Budget 2013 equivalent to $31 billion on the Cheddi Jagan Airport Modernisation Project, Ogle Aerodrome assistance, CJIA cooperation, Civil Aviation equipment and Hinterland/Coastal Airstrips, among others, were illegal. These cuts hurt the poor and vulnerable, especially as these public capital investments generally provide increased gains to ordinary people. The Budget 2013 illegal cuts did produce some economic slow-down when Guyana needed an expansionary policy to strengthen Government’s ongoing policies of unemployment mitigation and job creation.
The Guyana National Assembly as a Westminster-style model was never designed to provide scrutiny over things like budgetary matters. As the Chang ruling noted, the National Assembly has no arrangement that enables it to amend the government’s budget, but it can wholly approve or reject a budget in its totality.
The budget is the government’s plan of development for the next year, and any legislative amendments would dilute the form and content of the plan and agenda. And now so there seem to be three factors that may constrain a parliament’s influence and control over a government’s agenda (Schick, 2002): one, governments develop disciplined parties that formulate the legislative agenda, and then persuade their members to vote on party lines; two, there is a massive increase in public spending on entitlements and income support; and three, the increased influence of interest or lobbying groups on politicians. These three factors ensure that parliamentary influence is not strong enough to hurt a government’s legislative agenda, including the budget.
Evidently, the Guyana Constitution is not only the architect of but wields supreme status and power over the National Assembly or Parliament, for as in the case of budget matters, Article 171 (2) (a) (ii) and Article 218 of the Constitution do not authorise the National Assembly to cut, increase, or reallocate the budgetary estimates. Therefore, compliance with constitutional rules becomes the bedrock of all parliamentary proceedings in Guyana.
And for those who point to the USA as a possible legislative model for budget matters in Guyana, observe Democratic President Barack Obama’s impatience with the Republican-controlled House of Representatives’( part of Congress, the other part is the Senate) refusal to support his substantive legislative agenda. There certainly is an adversarial relationship between Obama and the House of Representatives. Obama is facing continuous legislative gridlock with Congress.

(By Dr. Prem Misir)