THE trouble started in 1970, when the Board of Review dismissed an appeal to it by Appellant Isahack, because the Notice of Appeal was signed by a Barrister-at-Law and not a Solicitor.The learned judge in his judgment examined the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance Chapter 299 and of the Legal Practitioner’s Ordinance (which provisions are set out in the judgment) and Held:

(i) When the barrister-at-law signed the appellant’s notice of appeal he was not in breach of subsection 2 of s. 56 (D) of the Income Tax Ordinance when read in conjunction with s. 44 of the Legal Practitioners Ordinance.
(ii) The appeal would be allowed, the Board’s order of dismissal be set aside and the matter be remitted to the Board of Review with directions that the appeal be heard on its merits. Appeal allowed.
Attorney-at-law L.T. Persaud for the appellant.
Mr.S. Rahaman for the respondent.
Justice Kenneth George in Chambers who delivered the judgment said: “The short point in this matter , which is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Review, is whether a Barrister-at-law is empowered to sign the notice of appeal required by Section 56 (D) (1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, Chapter 299. Subsection 2 of this section reads as follows:-
“Every such notice shall be signed by the appellant personally or by a Solicitor on his behalf, and such notice shall contain the appellant’s address and, if the notice is signed by a solicitor ,the business Address of the solicitor.”
It is the submission of solicitor for the appellant that the barrister who signed the notice of appeal was acting in his capacity as a solicitor as provided for under Secs. 42 and 44 the Legal Practitioners’ Ordinance,Sub-section 1 of section 42 provides inter alia:-
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any Ordinance or rule, a barrister or a solicitor shall be entitled to act alone and have audiences….”
A In any cause or matter in a magistrate’s court or other inferior court or tribunal.”
Sec. 44 reads as follows:-
“Nothwithstanding anything to the contrary in any Ordinance or rule , a barrister shall be entitled to practice as a solicitor in respect of all proceedings including the issue or writs of summons or other processes , in any of the matter specified in Section 42 hereof…”
It is common ground that the Board is an inferior tribunal within the contemplation of these provisions. The parties are also agreed that the word “proceedings” in Sec. 44 would include the notice of appeal required by Sec. 56 D.
If therefore, these sections are applicable then the barrister was entitled to sign the notice of appeal. Sections 42 and 44 were enacted in the year 1931 and came into operation on the 20th July, 1931, while Sec. 56D first appeared in the Income Tax Ordinance in the year 1956.
The issue to be resolved , therefore, is whether the words “any Ordinance or rule” in sections 42 and 44 should be construed to mean any Ordinance or rule whether passed before or after the year 1931.
In an attempt to resolve this issue I thought it would be useful to examine the provisions of the Interpretation Ordinance Chapter 5. Except for Sections 9, 9A, 12, 14, 17, 23, 24, 36, 39 and 40 of this Ordinance all its provisions specifically indicate the extent of their applicability to Ordinances, whether enacted before or after the commencement of that Ordinance. The sections which do not contain such provisions deal with the following matters.
Sections 9 -The meaning of service by post.
9A – The time for performance of an act in relation to Sunday or public holiday.
12 – The effect of each section contained in any Ordinance.
14 – The amendment or repeal of an Ordinance in the same session of Parliament.
17 – The effect of the preamble and schedule to an Ordinance.
23 – The saving the rights of the State.
24 – The form a suspending clause in an Ordinance should take.
36 – Evidence of the fiat of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
39 & 40 – Delegation of power.
But, as far as I am aware, from the time these sections have come into operation, they have been construed as applying not only to Ordinance then in existence, but also those which have come into operation since. It follows that no clear guide to a solution of the present issue can be had from an examination of the Interpretation Ordinance.
After delving into the law as it related to the subject, Justice George added “In my opinion, therefore, when the barrister signed the appellant’s notice of appeal he was not in breach of sub-section 2 of Sec. 56 (D) when read in conjunction with Sec. 44 of the Legal Practitioners Ordinance.
“I would therefre allow the appeal, set aside the Board’s order of dismissal and remit the matter with directions that the appeal be heard on
its merits. I award costs to the appellant.”