THE matter had to do with convicted appellants, Oswald Gobin and Boniface Griffith versus the State, who were convicted but freed on appeal, after it was found that their convictions were based on wrongly admitted confession statements. The Appellate Court was constituted by Chancellor J.O. F. Haynes, Chief Justice Harold Bollers, and Justices of appeal , Victor Crane, R. H. Lukhoo abd Dhan Jhappan.

The hearing of the appeals, which began on February 27, 1976, lasted 13 days.
The facts of the case disclosed that these two appeals containing, as they do, related questions of law on the admission of confession statements were, by consent, consolidated and heard together.
In Oswald Gobin’s case, the accused and his uncle, Harry Samsair, were drinking bush rum together when there arose an altercation between them over the lighting of a lamp, whereupon the accused threw kerosene oil on Samsair and set him alight. Samsair died as a consequence of the burns received and the accused was charged with murder.
He made a statement confessing his misdeed and at his trial , objected to its admissibility on the groundd that it was not made by him nor on his instructions. He alleged that the signature was elicited from him by threats of violence , and by actual violence, he was forced to sign and write on the statement.
The trial judge admitted the statement without holding a voir dire telling the jury that as the accused was saying it was not his own statement, its admissibility was a matter of fact for them (the jury) to decide.
In Boniface Griffith’s appeal, the accused objected to the admissibility of a confession statement to the effect that he had stolen two typewriters on the ground that force and violence were used in order to obtain it from him.
He alleged that he had been pushed about, cuffed in the abdomen and as a result was induced to sign the confession.
At the voir dire, it turned out that he was complaining that the statement had been prepared beforehand by the investigating officer and he was ill-treated in the manner described to sign it.
Whereupon, the trial judge halted the trial within a trial and ruled that as the accused was not saying he was beaten to sign a statement of which he was the author, but a statement concerning which another person in fact was the author, it became a question of fact for the jury whether or not the statement was that of the accused. He thereupon refrained from ruling on voluntariness, although he admitted the statement and caused it to be read to the jury.
Chancellor Haynes with Justice of
Appeal Jhappan concurring Held:
(1) In each case (abovementioned), the trial judge erred in ruling that the objection did not raise the issue of voluntariness; and in not ruling on all the evidence upon the voir dire, including the defence evidence of inducement , whether the statement was voluntary or not.
(2) In each case, reliance was misguidedly placed on Williams v-Ramdeo and Ramdeo and Herrera and Dookeran v. R which laid down law contrary to well-established common law rules.
(3) In each case the majority opinion in Harper v. The State was erroneously distinguished or disregarded.
(4) In each case the objection raised challenged the voluntariness of the written statement and a ruling after a trial within a trial was essential upon all the evidence including the evidence of the accused (if any) of any compulsion exercised by any police officer to induce him to sign it.
(5) In each case the omission to rule was a fatal irregularity.
(6) In each case, as a result ,the confession was received in evidence although not duly shown to be voluntary. In Gobin’s case it was legally impermissible to leave it to the jury to determine whether or not it was voluntary.
(7) The court deprived itself of the opportunity to learn facts relevant to determining whether or not to exclude the evidence on discretion, even if voluntary.
(8) (per CRANE and LUCKHOO, JJ.A.) In Gobin’s case the trial judge was wrong in ruling that the admissibility of a confession statement was a matter of fact for the jury to decide, because admissibility of evidence is always a question of law for the trial judge and not for the jury to decide on.
(9) In most cases, if not in all cases, a trial within a trial, should be held to decide and rule on the admissibility, i.e., the voluntariness of confession statements.
(10) It is not the law that the accused must raise by way of challenge objection to voluntariness by alleging there was an inducement to him to confess , so as to entitle him to a voir dir and ruling thereon, because no matter what the ground of challenge , the accused is entitled to a ruling on voluntariness vel non.. Voluntariness of a confession statement automatically arises whenever admissibiity is in issue.
(11) The judgment of Harper v.The State, on the one hand, conflicts with those of The State v. Fowler and the State v. Dhannie Ramsingh, on the other. The ratio in both the latter cases is harmful to the spirit of a fair trial and repugnant to the proper administration of justice, and must be overruled.
(12) (per HAYNES , C.,CRANE, R.H.LUCKHOO and JHAPPAN,JJ.A) The principle underlying stare decisis in the Guyana Court of Appeal is not the same for criminal as for civil cases. In criminal cases it is less rigid. Jurisdiction of the court to overrule previously decided cases is a continuing one . Our court will exercise judicial review whenever there is to be determined “some broad issue of justice, public policy or question of legal principle”; and in a criminal cause or matter which is plainly wrong and manifestly unjust will overrule it without hesitation.
(13) (per BOLLERS,C.J. dissenting): The decisions of the majority in Dhannie Ramsingh and Fowler were correctly made and ought not to be disturbed. The doctrine of stare decisis must prevail. Alternatively, even if those decisions are wrong, it is better that the law is certain rather than perfect.
(14) The trial judge’s direction in Gobin’s case was clearly wrong as admissibility of evidence is never a question for the jury, but always for the judge. The trial judge erred when he took no preliminary evidence on voluntariness in the presence of the jury and gave no ruling on the matter..
(15) The trial judge’s procedure was wrong in bringing the voir dire prematurely to an end in Boniface Griffith’s case for the objection was based on the ground that force and violence were used to obtain the confession. All evidence should have been heard on the issue and then a ruling made on the voluntariness of the statement.
The Appeals were allowed. The decisions of the High Court were set aside. The five member Court of Appeal had referred to 118 cases.
Mr. R.H. Mc.Kay, S.C. with Mr. B. Prasad S.C.and Mr.Stanley Moore , appeared for Oswald Gobin.
McKay S.C. with Robert Hanoman and Mr. Stanley Moore represented Boniface.
Mr. G.H. R. Jackman¸Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions, with Mr. L. R. Ganpatsingh, Senior State Counsel (ag.) represented the State.