A FAMOUS adage says hindsight is 20/20. A simple translation would be in retrospect anyone could become an instant analyst while attempting to present all the right answers to every situation in chronology. Keeping this in mind, I will try to present an objective analysis of the bizarre events which unfolded on Middle Street on the afternoon of Tuesday last week

General assumption:
From indications, there seems to be limited public sympathy for the police following the death of two officers, even among foreign nationals. Given the high degree of emotional distress showed by several members of the Guyana Police Force(GPF) (which include senior officers whose chief function is to maintain professional composure at all times).
Many Guyanese and foreigners alike are of the view that members of the GPF have not received the necessary training which would allow them to launch a proper tactical response to such crimes, or to psychologically withstand, and cope with the stressful episodes that accompany police standoff operations
This author subscribes to this view, as many police officers were seen conducting themselves in an unprofessional manner during periods of intense gunfire as if they were involved in a game of “childhood cowboy” sometimes frisking, jumping and rolling aimlessly on the ground with a loaded firearm as if it were a cricket bat.
The encroachment of several hundred people who risked limb and life to zoom in for a closer look, compounded what should have been a “cordoned situation”. As such, it would not be unfair to conclude that the police’s approach to the incident was abysmal at best, devoid of a scientifically sound and well thought-out plan that clearly outlined which tactical manoeuvre held ascendance over others. In fact, many are of the view that the reason the police did not cordon the entire area was because they were unable to mobilise the human and material resources to do so.
Breakdown in intelligence management:
It was reported in the media that the shooter showed a propensity for violence, had previously shot himself with an unlicensed firearm, and was known to go on frequent firing tirades which caused public hysteria; by whatever means this sequence of activities missed the attention of the relevant authorities is indeed mind boggling, and does not bode well for intelligence and public safety.

Some police sources are blaming one of the now dead first responding officers for providing misleading information to the ranks that arrived later, which according to them, resulted in the bizarre outcome. The police are currently in possession of information which supports their assumption that at least one of the first responding officers maintained a very close relationship with the now dead miner.
At least two persons recalled seeing the particular officer receiving money from the miner in the past. One taxi driver recalled delivering a substantial sum of money to the now dead officer one Sunday evening while he was socialising with friends at the seawall in the vicinity of Camp Street. A jeweller who spoke under condition of anonymity, said that the miner once said that he felt the police were exploiting him especially at a time when he owed a person or persons $43M.
Tell signs:
Had information of the shooter’s grandiose and apparent” entrenched privilege mentality” been reported officially to “police authorities” in a timely manner, the outcome of this event could have been much different, since the acknowledgement of past violence, is the best predictor of future violent behaviour.
Mental health state:
Sometime back, then Minister of Health, the Hon. Dr. Leslie Ramsammy, while being interviewed by a reporter was asked if the incidence of mental health problems in Guyana was higher than the international average, to which the minister answered no. Sometime later senior officials in the Ministry of Health conceded that Guyana had a higher than usual incidence of mental health problems.
This case I believe should be viewed within the wider context of our failure as a nation to address mental health problems early enough. The paucity of public facilities for social intercourse and the absence of robust social crime prevention initiatives are but two other contributing factors. Today, significant sections of our youth population are swearing allegiance to gangs and a life of crime.
On a visit to the Fort Canje Mental Hospital about eight years ago, me and my students learnt that teachers constituted the largest single group of persons institutionalised or treated at the hospital. On that trip, there were eight trained teachers either institionalised or receiving treatment through the outpatient modality. It is to be remembered too, that this is the sixth case of an individual running amok and unleashing mass assault on the citizenry which resulted in multiple deaths.

Crisis intervention:
The average domestic crisis intervention team response takes about 45 minutes to one hour (Spaulding, 1987). Thus, the most crucial moments of the situation will rely on the skills of the first responding officer(s). One reliable witness said that one of the police officers who lost his life was one of the first responding officers( who according to the witness) did not follow police departmental protocol as he walked into the yard like the terminator, a conduct reminiscent of the ingrained mindset which affects many Guyanese police officers.
“There are generally four choices for police commanders responding to a barricade crisis situation. The first traditional confrontational response is to amass officers and massive firepower and assault. The second is to use selective sniper fire. The third is to use chemical agents. The fourth is to contain the area and negotiate with a specially trained negotiator. The first three will almost always result in injury and or death”.
Thus, during tactical operations, police snipers and other specialists cannot be expected to learn from error, except during training, since they are expected to demonstrate “professional conduct” which is predicated on precision, therefore tactical police training must be consistent and properly choreographed.
Sub- culture of miners:
Without a doubt, the peculiar sub-culture of the mining industry could have contributed significantly to the precipitating factors of this crime. Behind a façade of opulence, many miners face strident financial constraints. Miners, especially dredge owners and senior management personnel often lead highly mobile and stressful lives, the transient nature of their profession is often punctuated by the pursuit of unhealthy and unwholesome stress release outlets.
Fortified homes:
The building seemed to have withstood the test of time, if indeed it is as fortified as rumours make it out to be; then, there are several lessons to be learnt from this incident. For example, what might have been the likely outcome had an attack been launched, say on the President of Guyana, from a similar fortified edifice? Be that as it may, the presidential guards should examine whatever implication this case might hold for them.

CLAIRMONT FEATHERSTONE