IN 1987, Cecil Levine was accused of killing Pabem Benn of Stanleytown, New Amsterdam, who was openly associating with the accused wife.

At the close of the prosecution’s case, defence counsel submitted that there was no case for his client to answer. The judge agreed and freed the accused on a no-case submission.
The State appealed, and the Appellate Court, made up of Chancellor Keith Massiah, and Justices Rudolph Harper and Aubrey Bishop, allowed it and quashed the conclusions of the trial judge.
According to the facts at hand, Levine was accused of killing Benn, as eyewitnesses placed him at the scene of the crime, with his hand on the deceased’s abdomen, as the deceased held his (Levine’s) shoulders.
Immediately thereafter, it was alleged, the deceased was seen to fall to the ground, with a fatal wound on the abdomen. It however transpired that the evidence of the State was entirely circumstantial, because there was no direct evidence to substantiate that Levine did stab the deceased, or was otherwise liable for his death.
As such, the trial judge ruled that seeing that a prima facie case had not been established, there was no need for a defence. The issue facing the Appellate Court, therefore, was whether the trial judge had erred in entering a ruling of ‘no case to answer’.
After deliberating on the matter, the Appellate Court held:
(1) That the case presented by the State was sufficient for the jury to determine whether the guilt of the accused could be inferred of the circumstantial evidence; and
(2) that the trial judge had erred in not putting the case to the jury, with appropriate guidance as to the legal principles applicable.
In arriving at its decision on July 20, 1987, the Appellate Court referred to ten cases, including that of R.v. Hookoomchand and Sagar [1897] LRBG 12.
Senior State Counsel, W. Henry, appeared for the State, while Mr. Murcelene Bacchus represented the Respondent.
As Chancellor Massiah observed as he delivered the main judgment:
“I confess to disquietude over the fact that the judicial approach to be taken for the determination of a submission of ‘no case to answer’ appears to be still misunderstood.
“This question was addressed and definitively settled by the Court three years ago in Alvin Mitchell, although the old Court of Crown Cases Reserved had chartered the proper juristic course nearly a century ago in R. v. Hookoomchand and Sagar [1897] LRBG 12, on a case stated by Mr. Justice Sheriff.
“In the instant matter, the learned trial judge did not give attention to the principles enunciated in those Guyanese cases and others of a kindred nature; nor was regard paid to their English counterparts, which culminate with R. v. Galbrath [1981] 2 ALL E.R. 1060.
“In the result, the trial judge fell into fundamental error, and sought to determine issues of fact, which clearly fell within the realm of the jury.
“What eventuated was a manifest miscarriage of justice in a situation where the evidence for the prosecution was crystalline, comprehensive, and compulsively cogent.
“I have had the advantage of reading in advance the opinion prepared by my learned brother, Bishop J.A., and I agree with the conclusions at which he has arrived. In my considered judgment, the submission, ‘no case’, ought to have been rejected.
“In the present case, the facts proved by the State at the trial were many and relevant: Levine had been openly associating with the deceased’s wife, and had, only minutes before the deceased suffered his fatal injury, been escorting her on the public way. The deceased had seen when the two separated, and, as Levine came within earshot, indicated that he wished to have dialogue with him. Levine declined the invitation, but soon after, the men were seen facing each other, Levine’s hands on the abdomen of the deceased; the deceased’s bare hands on the shoulders of the accused.
“Immediately before the encounter, the deceased had been physically well, and without any injury; yet, ‘in the twinkling of an eye,’ he was seen to disengage himself from Levine, say something, stagger across the road, and fell there. His intestines were protruding through a wound in his abdomen. That was one version.
“No one saw any cutting instrument in the hands of Levine. Equally, there was no evidence that where the deceased fell, there were objects on the roadway that could have disemboweled him, or even cut him. I mention that, because Levine , in his statement to the police, represented that it was the deceased who accosted, grabbed and assaulted him, whereupon he pushed his assailant, who fell. In that statement, Levine did not explain how the deceased sustained his injuries; but according to Sgt. No. 704, David Jeenarine, to whom Levine voluntarily surrendered at Central Police Station, New Amsterdam, his prisoner reported that when the deceased fell, he suffered injuries.”
At the conclusion of the judgment, the Chancellor added: “It would appear that instead of examining the evidence, with a view to ascertaining whether a sufficient case had been established, the trial judge embarked on an exercise while employing a higher standard of proof than was necessary at that stage, and which, in any event, was not lawfully within the province of the judge to pursue.
“The result is that the point of law raised here, under Section 32A of the Court of Appeal Act, Chapter 3:01, as to whether the trial judge was correct in ruling that a prima facie case had not been established, thereby requiring a defence not to be led, is meritorious. In fact, there could hardly be many cases, based on circumstantial evidence, whose attributes congeal to produce such an irresistible presumption of guilt as in the case presented against Cecil Levine.
“There was no mystery here; the narrative of events was too plain to titillate the mind. I too agree that the no-case submission should not have been upheld by the trial judge.”