IN 1960, Sooknandan was using his private car as a hire car on the West Coast of Demerara when he was caught red-handed as a result of a police trap.
He was prosecuted and convicted by a magistrate. Dissatisfied with the ruling, he appealed to the Full Court for redress.
The Full Court, constituted by Chief Justice J.A. Luckhoo and Justice H. B.S. Bollers, heard the Appeal, affirmed the magistrate’s conviction and sentence, and dismissed the matter.
The evidence about the payment at Windsor Forest was unchallenged, but it was contended, for the defendant, that it had not been established that the payment was for a place in the car, that the evidence did not therefore disclose that the vehicle had been used for conveying passengers at separate fares, stage by stage, or stopping to pick up or set down passengers along the line of route, and that as the magistrate did not advert to this aspect of the matter in his memorandum of reasons for decision it should not be assumed that he had not in fact directed his attention to it.
The Full Court held that:
(1) In the case of a police trap, there is no requirement that the evidence of the decoy should be corroborated. All that is necessary is that it should be acted upon with caution.
(2) As a Court of rehearing, the Full Court is entitled to look at the specific findings of fact made by the magistrate together with other unchallenged and unrebutted evidence not adverted to by him in his memorandum of reasons for decision to see if the decision reached by him could be supported (Gonsalves v- Chairman of the Poor Law Commissioners, 1939 L.R.B.G. 68. Applied).
Mr. J. O. F. Haynes, Q. C, appeared for the appellant, while Mr. E. A. Romao, Senior Crown Counsel, held for the respondent.
According to the judgment handed down by the Full Court, the appellant, ,Sooknandan, was convicted by the magistrate of the West Demerara Judicial District on a charge of using an unlicensed vehicle, contrary to Section 23 (1) of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance, Chapter 280, as provided by Section 20 (2) of the said Ordinance.
The case for the prosecution was to the effect that on June 4, 1960, on the Vreed-en-Hoop Public Road, in the West Demerara Judicial District, the appellant used motor car No. PJ 231, for which there was in force a licence as a private car, as a vehicle for carrying passengers for hire for reward at separate fares, stage by stage, or stopping to pick up or set down passengers along the line of route.
Such latter user was for a different purpose and different user from that for which the car was licensed. Under the schedule to the Ordinance, the licence fee for the latter user is substantially higher than the user of a private car.
The evidence on behalf of the prosecution disclosed that one Chapman was given a marked dollar note by the Police at Leonora. Chapman was given certain instructions by the Police in consequence of which he went to a spot on the Public Road at Leonora near to a gasoline station.
The defendant was driving the car east along the Public Road at Leonora, and was stopped by Chapman, who asked him how much he would charge to take him to Vreed-en-Hoop. The defendant replied, “50 cents,” and told Chapman to get into the car.
There were, at that time, three other persons in the car. At Windsor Forest, on the way to Vreed-en-Hoop, the car stopped, and one of the three persons left the car, after giving the defendant some money. The car was driven to Vreed-en-Hoop, and, at the junction of the West Coast and West Bank Public Roads, Chapman disembarked and paid the defendant with the marked dollar note, receiving back 50 cents from the defendant .
The two other persons remained in the car. As the Appellant (Sooknandan, the driver) was about to drive off, one Cpl Lewis and Police Constable Mc Lean, who were in ambush, came up, and at their behest, the Appellant produced the marked dollar note. In his defence, the appellant alleged that he had taken Chapman without charge, and did not accept any money as a fare or servant from him. He also denied proffering any money to the police.
But the magistrate did not buy the appellant’s story and found that Chapman’s evidence was corroborated in material particulars to his satisfaction. It is to be observed that in the case of a police trap, there is no requirement that the evidence of the decoy should be corroborated . All that is necessary is that it should be acted upon with caution.
After referring to other aspects of the case the judgment added, “ in the case before us we are of the opinion that the evidence does support the decision of the magistrate. The appeal is dismissed and the conviction and sentence affirmed with costs to the respondent.