A FULL Court ruling in 1961 held that the magistrate had ruled correctly when he found that evidence about the construction of a ‘chicken pen’ falls within the definition of the word ‘building’.

As a consequence, that Court found that the appellant, one Graham, who constructed a chicken pen on land owned by the respondent without the approval of the Local Sanitary Authority, was rightly convicted and therefore dismissed his appeal.
Senior Counsel Mr Ashton Chase appeared for the appellant, while the then Crown Counsel, Mr Mohamed Shahabuddeen (who later became Attorney General), appeared Amicus curiae (as a friend of the court) for the respondent.
At the end of the trial, the Full Court, constituted  by Chief Justice Joseph Alexander Luckhoo and Justice Guya Persaud, refused costs to the respondent, De Rusche, **because he did not appear at the hearing, nor did he make any arrangement to brief counsel.
The appellant, on the other hand, was convicted for erecting a ‘building’, namely, a chicken pen, without the approval of the local sanitary authority, which is a contravention of Section 136  of the Public Health Ordinance, Cap. 145.
On appealing the matter, it was argued on his behalf that Part XII of the Ordinance — of which Sections 136 and 141 are a part — was devoted to housing and district planning, and did not make provision for such structures as chicken pens, or chicken runs as is the more familiar term here in Guyana.
Section 141 provides that:
“The Board may make regulations with respect to the erection and sanitary control of buildings, and in particular with regard to . . . .  the keeping  of domestic animals, and the distance of any stable, pen, byre or manure heap from the building . . . . “

Section 2 defines ‘building’ as:
“…any house, kitchen, storeroom, garage or other outhouse, or part thereof being part of any premises, whether permanent or temporary.”
The Full Court held that since such a structure falls within the definition of the word ‘building’ in Section 2 of the Ordinance, they had no alternative but to dismiss the matter.
In his delivery of the judgment, Justice Luckhoo noted that the facts as found by the presiding magistrate in this matter were that the appellant had erected a new structure, measuring 22 feet  by 13 feet 6 inches, with a roof sloping from 7 feet  to 6 feet 6 inches at lot 630 East Ruimveldt, and that he used that structure as a chicken pen.
The evidence, he said, was that the structure was erected over a new concrete floor, and stood on new uprights.  Noting that it was accepted that permission for its erection was not obtained from the local sanitary authority, he said the appellant was prosecuted as a result, given that what he did was contrary to Section 136 of the Public Health Ordinance, Cap. 145. He was convicted, and an order was made for the structure to be dismantled.    It was against the conviction and order that the appeal was brought before the courts, the Chief Justice said.
In expanding on the subject, he noted that “the short point to be decided is whether the structure falls within the definition of the  term ‘building’ as set out in Section 2 of Chapter 145. There, ‘building’ is defined to include ‘any house, kitchen, storeroom, garage, or other outhouse, or part thereof being part of any premises, whether permanent or temporary.’”
Contending that counsel for the appellant had argued that Part XII of the Ordinance, of which Sections 136 and 141 formed a part, was devoted to housing and district planning, and therefore did not contemplate structures such as a chicken pen, Justice Luckhoo further quoted him as saying “…that although the appellant might have committed some other offence, there was no contravention of Section 136.”
Noting that by so doing that counsel had “prayed in aid of the interpretation of Section 136, the provision of Section 141,” Justice Luckhoo, in an attempt to explain what he meant, said: “He contends that Section 141 authorises the making of regulations relating to buildings intended for human habitation only, and that this is to be gathered from the scheme of Part XII  as a whole.”
He said that for the purpose of this case, reference may be made to para. (d)  of Section  141, which states:
“The Board may make regulations with respect to the erection and sanitary control of buildings and in particular  with regard to . . . .  the keeping of domestic animals, and the distance of any stable, pen, byre, sty or manure heap from any building…..”

Noting in passing that it was the general opinion that para. (d)  of Section 141 contemplates a structure such as the one which is the subject matter of this appeal, and that such  a structure  falls within the definition of the word “building” in section 2 of the Ordinance, Justice Luckhoo said: “The Public Health Ordinance is an ordinance to make provision for promoting the public health of the Colony, and we feel, as was said in  Super Sites Ltd. V. Keen, {1938} 2 All E.R. 471, that in making his decision  the magistrate  is entitled to take into consideration the mischief against which the section in which  the word was used was directed.”
After referring to a number of cases supporting the point the magistrate had made in coming to his conclusion, the Chief Justice noted that the matter at hand was comparable with the decision  in the  Mayor of South  Shields v  Wilson Bros. Ltd. (1901),  84 L/T.R/ (N.S.) 267, where it was held  that a wooden structure being under 20 feet each way, and with a slanting roof of 12 feet high intended to be used as a stable, and erected in the centre of an enclosed private ground  was a  “new building” within the meaning of the by-law.

Going into a bit more detail, he said: “The defendants occupied an open shed in the centre of the ground which was boarded on all sides.  Against the open shed, they put up the wooden structure complained of.  There was no definition of the term “new building”, but it is instructive to note that the by-law which prescribed the conditions to be complied with where someone intends to erect a new building  required the submission of plans which must show, among other things ,  the dimension of rooms, the situation of fireplaces, stoves, chimneys and flues, of water closets,  privy, gully,  drain, etc. Notwithstanding that these conveniences did not form part of the shed, the Court (in which Channel J sat) held that the by-law applied to the shed.”
It was at this point that he wrapped up his argument, saying: “As indicated above, we are of the view that the decision of the magistrate should stand undisturbed. The appeal is dismissed and the conviction and order affirmed.”