TROUBLE came the appellant’s way when he extended one side of a building on his premises, thereby increasing the authorized area.

The Respondent, the Town Clerk of Georgetown, acting for the Town Council of Georgetown, claimed in a declaration that the appellant, by altering and adding to the building, committed acts of nuisance, and was in breach of the Public Health  Ordinance, Cap. 145 [B.G.], and of Bye Laws made under the Georgetown Town Council Ordinance, Cap. 152 [B.G.].
The respondent also claimed a mandatory injunction requiring the appellant to pull down the unauthorized building, and an injunction against further alterations and additions.
The court granted the declaration and an injunction restraining the  appellant from making further  alterations or additions..
The appellant appealed.
However, the Federal Supreme Court in its Appellate Jurisdiction, held that:   (1) There was no evidence of nuisance and a declaration that the appellant had committed a criminal offence was a wrong exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction; and
(ii)  the respondent had no locus standi in proceedings  for an injunction, the Attorney-General being the proper plaintiff.
The appeal was allowed, and seven cases were referred to by the Federal Supreme Court in its judgment.
The appeal was from a decision of the Supreme Court of British Guiana (Trial Division ….Miller,  J.), dated  November 10, 1960. The facts appeared in the judgment of Chief Justice Hallinan.
The Federal Court was  constituted by Chief Justice  Hallinan and Justices Lewis and Marnan.
Dr. Fenton Ramsahoye and Mr. Clarence Hughes appeared for the appellant, while Mr. C. Lloyd Luckhoo, Q. C.  and  Mr. S.  Rahaman represented the respondent.
In his judgment, Chief Justice Hallinan  said:  “The Georgetown Town  Council, on September 1st  1959,  issued a summons in the magistrate ‘s court against the appellant   under s. 136  of the  Public Health Ordinance, Cap. 145 [B.G.], for breach of that Ordinance.
“The  Building  Inspector  had visited the  appellant’s premises at Lot 9 Camp Street, Newburg, and found that he had extended  the building on the northern side by a structure,  8 feet  6 inches  x 47 feet  6 inches , so that  a building,  whose authorized  area  was 767 square-feet, had been increased  by 408 square-feet.
“After numerous  adjournments  in the  Magistrate’s Court, the appellant, during the absence  of the Town Council’s  lawyer,  succeeded (in circumstances  which reflect  little  credit on the Court,  and still less on the  appellant) in amending the summons, so that  the area, the subject-matter of the offence, was reduced  from 408  square-feet  to a mere area of some   67 square-feet;  whereupon, the appellant quickly  pleaded  guilty, and the Magistrate  fined him $10.
“Even after the case in the Magistrate’s Court had ended, the appellant continued to extend the building, and by February 17, 1960, the area of unauthorized building had reached  496 square-feet. The Town Council then launched the  present  proceeding in the  name of the  Town Clerk, claiming a  declaration  that the appellant had, by altering  and adding to the  building, done acts of nuisance, and was in breach of the  Public Health  Ordinance,  and of the Bye-laws made under the Georgetown Town Council Ordinance,  Cap.  152 [B.G.]; also, the Town Council  claimed  a mandatory  injunction  that the appellant should  pull down the unauthorized building, and an injunction to restrain him from doing  further alterations or additions.
“The Court granted the Town Council the Declaration, and  also granted  an injunction to restrain the appellant from doing and making further additions  or alterations.
“It can be said at once that the Declaration granted by the Court cannot stand; there is no evidence of nuisance, and no authority has been sighted to us  where  a Declaration was made in civil proceedings  that the defendant had  committed a criminal offence. On principle, I am of the opinion that it is a wrong exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction to give a declaratory judgment of that kind.
“However, had this action been properly constituted, an injunction might  have been an  appropriate remedy.”
The judge added: “There is at least one exception to the general rule.   There may co-exist  a  remedy by injunction to protect a right.   It cannot be disputed  after Cooper v. Whitingham  (3) that if a  plaintiff  is suing  in a  personal right to himself  he  may be  protected by injunction ;  the Attorney-General , suing in respect, of the invasion  of the public rights has  at  least  as  large  a right to invoke the   protection  of the court.
“But the main ground of appeal is that the  respondent  had no  locus standi except at the relation of the Attorney General who should have been the plaintiff in these proceedings.
“It was submitted  that the acts alleged against  the appellant  did not infringe any right  vested in the Town Council  either under Cap. 145 or under  Bye-law 15, made under Cap. 152.       The case of Davenport Corpn. V. Tozer (4) is clear  authority in support  of this ground of appeal, and I am unable to distinguish  it from the  present case..
“In the present case, what counsel for the respondent called the “right” which the Bye-Law created  is really a power and not a right.    Even if the  present action is regarded as brought to prevent  the infringement of laws  relating to public health, the right  to enforce these laws  is not limited to the inhabitants of Georgetown; such laws are made  for the  protection of the public in general
“Obedience to bye-laws even as to the  construction of a dwelling house, is, I think, a pulic duty, and disobedience to their instructions  is prima facie a public wrong.
“I think the judgment in this case should be set aside, and judgment entered for the appellant with costs here and below.”
Both Lewis and Marnan having agreed, the appeal was allowed.