THE respondent was sitting as a passenger in the front seat of a motorcar.

As the car approached a junction, he said to the driver: “This is the corner; turn here.”  He then struck the driver’s hands off the steering wheel, took hold of the wheel and turned it in the direction he had indicated.
The car, in consequence, ran into a traffic island and stopped.
The respondent was charged with dangerous driving and other related offences, but the charges were all dismissed by the magistrate without calling for a defence, on the grounds that the respondent could not be considered the driver.
On appeal, the Full Court, constituted by Justices J.A. Luckhoo and Guya Persaud, held that the respondent’s action in striking the driver’s hands off the steering wheel, and then turning it provided prima facie evidence that he’d intended to assume, and actually did assume, control of the vehicle.
Mr. Mohammed Shahabuddeen, Crown Counsel, appeared for the appellant, Leacock, while Mr. A. S. Manraj held for the respondent.
According to the judgment of the Court, the respondent was charged by the appellant, a police constable, with (1)driving a motor vehicle under  the influence of drink  to such an extent as to be incapable of having  a proper  control of the said vehicle; (2)dangerous driving; (3)driving a motor vehicle  when he was not the holder of a driver’s licence; and (4)using a motor vehicle, in respect of which a policy of insurance was not in force in relation to the user thereof.
The first three offences are branches of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Ordinance, Chapter  280, while the fourth is a breach of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Ordinance, Chapter 281. The charges all flow from the same incident, and were taken together, with the consent of the respondent.
At the close of the case for the prosecution, the learned magistrate took the view that there was not enough before him on which he could find that the respondent was the driver of the vehicle at the material time, and dismissed the charges. It is against the foregoing decision that the appeal was brought.
It followed that on June 12, 1961, the respondent engaged one Deonarine, the owner of a hire-car, to drive him from place to place in the city.  He spent  some three hours and 20 minutes drinking with friends at various places.  Then, at about 2a.m. the following day, this being June 13, 1961,  Deonarine drove  the car east along  Regent Street  at the request of the respondent.
According to Deonarine, having earlier observed that the respondent  was under the influence of alcohol, he asked that he sit at the  back of the vehicle; the respondent refused and took his seat  in front passenger seat, left of the driver.
As the car approached the junction of Regent and King Streets, some 15 feet west of King Street, the respondent said to Deonarine, “This is the corner; turn here!”   And, without warning, he struck the driver’s hands off the steering wheel, took hold of the steering wheel and turned it as if to turn right into King Street.  As a result of the respondent’s act, the car ran into a traffic island and stopped.
Deonarine’s evidence, which was unchallenged, was to the effect that he did not permit the respondent to turn the steering  wheel, nor did he expect  the respondent  to  strike his hands  off the wheel, even  though he was cautious because of the respondent’s  drunken condition.
From these facts, the four charges referred were laid against the respondent.
The sole question to be determined was whether the respondent was a driver within the meaning of the Ordinance.  In Section 2 of the Motor Vehicles  and Road Traffic Ordinance, 280, there appears  the following definition:-
“Driver”, where a separate person as steersman of a motor  vehicle, includes that person as well as any other person engaged in the driving of the vehicle  and the expression ‘drive” shall be construed accordingly.”
Counsel for the respondent conceded that while there can be  more than one driver of a vehicle, the true  test  was in whom was in control of the vehicle  at the material time.
In the matter of Wallace v. Major, [1946] 1 K.B. 473, where the question considered was whether the  steersman of a towed vehicle was a “driver” within the meaning of the Act.
Lord Goddard referred to s.  121 of the Road Traffic Act , 1930, in which is contained  the definition of the term “driver” in the same terms as our definition, and said.
“…But that Section is obviously  designed to cover the same point  as section 121 of the Act of 1930. In making a steersman  of a motor vehicle  which has someone else upon it, a driver.”