IN 1961, Bookers Demerara Sugar Estates Ltd opposed an order of a magistrate to pay workmen’s compensation to the dependant of Durga Ramnarine, a mule boy who was run over and killed by a tractor while sleeping on a dam. But the Full Court of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the Sugar Estates after finding that the accident had stemmed from and occurred in the course of his employment with the appellant.
The facts of the case disclosed that Ramnarine was employed by the appellants, Bookers, as a mule boy to lead mules to places on their plantation where punts were to be loaded with canes. On reaching those places, the mule boys had to wait until the punts were loaded.
During the intervals, the mules would be unharnessed and sent out to graze and the mule boys would wait on the dam alongside while the punts were being loaded.
It was usual for the mule boys to sit or sleep on the dam while awaiting the completion of the loading of the punts. There was no regulation or rule forbidding them to do so. While lying on the dam awaiting the completion of the loading of his punts, Durga Ramnaraine was run over by a tractor and subsequently died from the injuries he received.
The Full Court held that: (i) If a workman sustains an accident while he is doing an act which is within his sphere of employment, the mere fact that he has acted negligently or failed to adopt the safest method of working will not deprive him of compensation;
(ii) The question is not one of degree, but of kind; not of degree of carelessness or rashness which the workman exhibits in doing his work, but whether he is doing his work at all;
(iii) The onus of proving that the workman has placed himself within the principle of “added peril” is upon the employer;
(iv) In the present case, a mule boy is still doing his work if he rests on the dam while awaiting the completion of the loading of his punts. He may stand, he may sit, he may recline, he may take a nap, but so long as he remains on the dam, he is still in the course of his employment and does not place himself within the principle of “added peril”; and
(v) The accident to Durga Ramnarine arose out of and in the course of his employment with the appellants.
The appeal was dismissed.
The Full Court was constituted by Chief Justice J A Luckhoo and Justice Sydney Miller.
Senior Counsel, Mr SDS Hardyal represented the appellants, while Mr DC Jagan and Mr R Marques appeared for the respondent.
Delivering the judgment of the court, Justice Luckhoo noted that this was an appeal by the appellant company against the decision of a magistrate of the Berbice Judicial District awarding the respondent, Jhondia, the sum of $900 compensation in respect of the death of her grandson, Durga Ramnaraine, on October 12, 1959, as a result of an accident to the said Durga Ramnaraine arising out of and in the course of his employment as a mule boy at Plantation Rose Hall, Canje, Berbice.
According to the CJ, the deceased was employed by the company to lead mules to places on their plantation where punts were to be loaded with canes. While the canes are being put on the punts, the harness is taken off the mules which are then sent out to graze. The mule boys have to wait until the punts are loaded, and during the interval, they wait on the dam alongside which the punts are being loaded;
After the punts are loaded, the mules are rounded up and taken to the loaded punts to which they are then hitched. The mules then pull the punts to the factory.
On October12, 1959, the deceased was working as a mule boy under orders from mule boss, Nabbie. He took his mule aback, and at about midday, it was allowed to graze, awaiting the loading of he punts. The decease was required to wait about the dam until the punts were loaded. The deceased was last seen alive by Nabbie at about 2pm. At about 3pm, while still waiting for the punts to be loaded, a motor tractor, driven along the dam by one Dapanna, came up to where Nabbie was sitting with one Seenauth. Seenauth got on to the tractor, which was then driven off for a distance of about 16 to 18 rods. It was then, he said, that it was discovered that the tractor had run over the deceased who, apparently, had been lying on the dam. The deceased’s right foot was bleeding and appeared to be broken. He was conveyed to the public Hospital, Berbice, where he later died from the injuries he had received.
The unrebutted evidence of Nabbie disclosed that it was usual for mule boys to sit or sleep on the dam while awaiting the completion of the loading of the punts. There was no regulation or rule forbidding them to do so. According to Nabbie, the deceased, when injured, was lying on a clear spot on the dam near to some bushes.
Justice Luckhoo noted that the grounds of appeal filed and argued by counsel for the appellant company were as follows:
(i) The decision was erroneous in point of law because: (a) There was no evidence of cause of death; (b) There was no evidence that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment; and (c) The respondent was not a dependant on her own admission.
(ii) The decision was unreasonable and could not be supported, having regard to the evidence.
Continuing with his summation, Justice Luckhoo said that apart from the fact that the answer filed by the appellant company setting out the grounds on which they intended to oppose the respondent’s application for compensation did not specify as one of those grounds that the death of the deceased had not resulted from the injuries sustained in the accident, there was sufficient evidence on the record from which the cause of death may be inferred.
As he observed: “A mule boy is still doing his job if he rests on the dam while awaiting the completion of the loading of his punts. He may stand, he nay sit, he may recline, he may take a nap, but so long as he remains on the dam, he is still in the course of his employment.”
In applying those principles to the facts of the present case, he said, “it seems clear that the accident to the deceased arose out of in the course of his employment with the appellant company as a mule boy,” and as such, “the grounds of appeal argued are, in our opinion, all without merit.”
The appeal was dismissed and the order of the magistrate affirmed.