IN 1961, the Federal Supreme Court, in its Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction, held that a person is capable of standing trial if he is able to comprehend the course of proceedings at the trial and the details of the evidence.

The Court also ruled that he must be able to exercise the right to give evidence himself, and not merely if he understands the indictment and can plead to it.
That Court, constituted by Chief Justice Hallinan and Justices Lewis and Marnan, went on to allow the appeal of murder accused, James Reid, who was convicted and sentenced to death.
The Federal Court found that the trial judge’s directions on the preliminary issues were insufficient.
The Court thought it was a proper case to send back to the Supreme Court for retrial and they so ordered.
Delivering the judgment, Chief Justice Hallinan said:
“In this case, there can be no  doubt  that the appellant killed the boy, Geoffrey Dover, aged seven, on October 10,  1960.
“The child went for a walk with the appellant, who strangled him, cut off the scalp with a trowel, and buried the body.
“Two preliminary issues were tried before the general issue: First, the appellant was tried on the issue whether he was sane and fit to take his trial.  When that was decided in the affirmative, the accused remained mute, and the issue as to whether he was mute of malice was then tried.  The jury decided he was.
          “It was never seriously in issue whether the appellant was deaf or dumb; if  he did not talk, this was due either to malice, or to a disordered  or deficient mind.   The first preliminary issue, therefore, was the most important.
“The leading case on the trial of such an issue as this is R. v. Pritchard (1).  The case is important  in the determination  of the present appeal, and it is  necessary to cite from the report at some length. The jury found that Pritchard was mute by the visitation of God.
“Anderson B.,  the trial judge  in Pritchard’s  case (1) told the jury (ibid):
‘The question is  whether the prisoner  has sufficient understanding to comprehend the nature of this trial, so as to make a proper defence  to  the charge… whether  he is of sufficient intellect  to comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial, so as to make a proper defence — to know  that he might  challenge  any of you  to whom he may object — and  to comprehend the details of the evidence, which,  in a case of this nature, must constitute a minute investigation.
        ‘Upon this issue, therefore,  if you think that  there is no certain  mode of communicating  the details  of the trial to the prisoner, so that he can clearly understand them, and be able properly to make his defence to the charge , you ought  to find that he is not of sane mind.  It is not enough that  he may have a  general capacity  of communicating on ordinary matters.’
“In the present case, the preliminary issue was correctly stated thus: ‘Whether the appellant  is or is not insane  and unfit to take his  trial.’ The issue is very different  from  the issue of insanity, when the  general   issued is being tried. The question  is not whether the appellant knew  at  the time of the killing what he was doing or whether he was  doing wrong, but whether  he is fit  to take  his trial – that is not merely to comprehend ; the indictment but also the course  of the proceedings in the trial.
“The evidence called by the defence and by the prosecution was short.
The appellant’s mother gave evidence of the appellant being sickly from childhood, having fits, given to staring blankly.   Some of the collateral relatives had been insane. When she and her other son, Achibald Anderson, visited the appellant in prison, he just stand and did not say anything.”
After touching on other points in the case, Chief Justice Hallinan added:
“It is  not correct to say that because a person can plead to the indictment, therefore, he is capable of standing his trial.”
According to him, “The killing of the small boy in this case was a shocking act, likely to rouse the anger and indignation of the public.   It was therefore  of especial importance that the case for the appellant should be properly presented ; that such medical evidence  as was available should be called and the  doctors asked the right questions, and that the summing up should include all aspects of the evidence favourable to the appellant and a clear and correct direction on the question which the jury had to determine.
“The doctor, in answer to the appellant’s counsel, had said: ‘You asked him a question, and he would stand there and not answer, and stare vacantly; and then, if you insisted on it, and were willing to spend a lot of time, he would answer you…’
“The only question put to the doctor as to whether the appellant could understand the proceedings was put by the trial judge himself.  The verbatim report is as follows:
“Judge: ‘Do you think the text  of an indictment such as you heard read in court would make sense to the accused?’
 “A: ‘If he would understand it, Sir?’
“Judge: ‘Yes.’
“A: ‘Yes, I think he would.’
“Apparently, no one thought of asking the doctor whether the appellant’s mental process was so slow and limited that he might not be able to follow the course of the trial.  Indeed, it would appear that the judge did not consider this was part of the question to be determined.
“It is, moreover, regrettable that Dr. Grandsoult, who was in charge of the Mental Hospital, and who gave evidence favourable to the appellant at the trial of general issue, was not called at the hearing of the preliminary issue.
“The learned judge’s summary of the evidence was not as favourable, as it might have been, to the appellant.  Not only did he over-emphasise the doctor’s evidence that the appellant understood the indictment (which he repeated twice, and referred to as ‘very important evidence in helping  you to come to your conclusion’), but he omitted to mention some evidence of insanity  in the family of the appellant’s mother; and the judge quoted the  prison officers  as stating that the appellant did not speak much, whereas their evidence was that he did not speak at all.
“Looking at both  the evidence  and the summing up in the trial of the first  preliminary  issue as a whole,  this Court has reached  the conclusion that the question to be determined  was not clearly explained to the jury, and may even have been misunderstood by the learned judge himself.
“The verdict on the preliminary issue must, therefore, be set aside. This conclusion necessarily vitiates the subsequent proceedings, so that the findings and sentence on the second  preliminary issue and on the general issue must also be set aside.
“Since the appeal has been decided on a matter affecting a preliminary issue only, this  is a proper case to send back to the Supreme Court for retrial, and we so order.  Appeal allowed; new trial ordered.”