THE “concept of early warning” according to Keyserlingk and Kopfmuller (2006) was first developed during the Cold War in the field of National Military Intelligence (NMI) to enhance the capacity to predict potential (ballistic) attacks.
At the level of the United Nations system, early warning was introduced as an instrument to forecast natural disasters such as droughts and earth- quakes among others. Today, early warning is employed by both state and non-state security actors to predict or respond to natural disasters and violent conflicts.
At 12:45 on the Friday prior to the last general elections, which we recall was held on a Monday, I received a telephone call from a well modulated caller at Freedom House, who enquired whether I would vote for the People’s progressive Party( PPP). I informed him that I had received lots of calls to that effect lately. He quickly pointed out that his call was different. I told him that I felt so myself, and provided the following synopsis.
For starters, I intoned, you are not a regular at Freedom House;I immediately sensed that from your telephone protocol, diction etc. I suppose you are college-educated, with an approximate height and body weight etc. He laughed heartily. I told him that unlike most others, he did not secure the contact telephone number out of the telephone directory and proceeded to tell him exactly how he obtained the contact telephone number.
We spoke for about 30 minutes about the possible outcome of the upcoming general elections and its implications for the country as a whole. I told him that there were several “early warnings” that the following things were well within the bounds of possibility. That given the “groupthink invincibility” (Jennings 1972) which has since overtaken the president (now former president) and a part of the PPP administration, I did not visualize an outright victory for the People’s Progressive Party.
I explained that this could not be easily achieved as Mr. Donald Ramotar was too closely aligned with the postures and utterances of the current president and could in my estimation, emerge a casualty of his perceived misdeeds. I felt that given these circumstances, even if the PPP won the general elections by a landslide victory – they could have won the elections and yet lose the country.
I explained that the AFC was the party to watch, and told him that any amount of seats beyond seven for that party would spell disaster for the People’ Progressive Party, since I expected the AFC to make inroads into the PPP’s support base, which could be advantageous to the APNU.
At this point, the caller offered to arrange a meeting between me and Mr. Ramotar before the elections, so I could have a chat with him. I declined on the basis that Mr. Ramotar was hot on the elections trail and needed to keep focused.
He enquired what else could be expected,and I told him that while many in Guyana have not considered the possibility of a minority government, I saw that as a distinct possibility. I took the opportunity to sympathise with Mr. Ramotar should he be sworn in as the country’s first minority president. The caller said that he would be in sympathy with Mr. Ramotar too should any of this occur.
We concurred that in order for any new government to succeed, they must be prepared to tackle head on, the unconscious attitudes and entrenched mindset problems which affect major sections of the country’s population. We both subscribed to the notion that after these elections the political landscape could change forever, not in the way that it has turned out, but I strongly felt that there will soon come a time when none of the major political parties will be able to win general elections without the critical support of the smaller ones.
I stated then, and am much more convinced now, that given the peculiar personality profile of then president Bharrat Jagdeo, his threat level was more likely to increase out of office, as was the case with former Indian president Rajiv Gandhi; quite unlike all other former Guyanese presidents to date.
A point I made to the head of an overseas-based security consultancy, which is associated with the former president, while visiting the country where that company is based during 2009. The head of the company assured me then, that all steps were being taken to secure the president both in and out of office.
We spoke about the politicisation of developmental projects (in general) and its implications for civil strife and development. I stated then that I had a serious concern for the phenomenon of urbanization and its current effects on both urban and rural life. I shared with the caller a previous experience, having seen during the unrest following the 1992 general elections, two foreign staff members of the CARICOM Secretariat searching for food to purchase at the back of North/ South Ruimveldt.
This experience has reinforced my belief that the food security safety system of Georgetown is very weak. The same condition is to be found in most Afro-Guyanese communities. I felt that any political stalemate would see food insecurity metamorphose into a full-blown political crisis. I felt then, as I do now, that a way to fix that deficiency was the strengthening of the cooperative movement; especially agriculture and those with the capacity to provide and warehouse food supplies within communities.
When I told a close friend of mine who works for the Elections Commission, what I told the caller from Freedom House, he remarked: “Boy you told Freedom House what? Boy you’re a dead man walking! I work for the Elections Commission and we do not see any possibility of the PPP coming out of these elections as a minority government”.
When people ask me if I am not afraid I tell them no! For I have no interest in politics beyond having it serve as a tool of my profession. Some people estimable in their ways, are given to make doomsday predictions, and could not make their discrepancies known without the use of profanity, vitriolic swearing or contumely, I am not one of them.
During last year, an interesting observation was made by one of my adult learners in the Industrial Security Management course I teach; he said “Guyana is interconnected by four bridges, three of which were compromised or rendered inoperable at about the same time, which does not bode well for national security in Guyana”. He was referring to the Demerara Harbour Bridge, the Berbice Bridge and the Mackenzie-Wismar Bridge.
In response to the above, I submit, that a thorough understanding of ‘early warning mechanisms’ can prevent many of our current conflicts from escalating.