FOLLOWING a ruling by Speaker Rahaman Gajraj of the 1963 House of Assembly, that Premier Dr. Cheddi Berret Jagan and three other members of the House be suspended for misconduct, the members took Speaker Gajraj to court in a move to challenge the power of the Assembly to suspend members. Chief Justice J.A. Luckhoo, in Chambers, held, among other things, that:  Without statutory authority, the Legislative Assembly has no power to punish a member for misconduct by way of  committal; but has the power, without statutory  authority, to order his removal or suspension for a time, or to expel him.

The application by the members of the House of Assembly against the Speaker was refused.
The facts disclosed that the four plaintiffs were duly elected members of the Legislative Assembly of British Guiana. The first-named plaintiff was also the Premier of the colony, and the second-named plaintiff was Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Lands.

According to an affidavit filed by the plaintiff, at a meeting of the Legislative Assembly on May 28, 1963, the defendant, in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, purported to  adjudged the plaintiffs guilty of acts, conduct and behaviour disgraceful and shameful, and alleged  that breaches of privileges and acts of contempt of the  House had been committed by them on May 21, 1963.

In what was stated to be a verbatim report of the proceedings of May 28,  1963, filed with the  plaintiffs’ affidavit, it was recorded that the defendant called upon the plaintiffs to each make an   unqualified apology to the Assembly.
This they declined to do.
Thereafter, the defendant (Speaker) directed the plaintiffs “to withdraw for the balance of the day’s sittings. They all declined to do so.

After referring to that fact, and observing that his substantive mace bearer was absent, the defendant proceeded under Standing Order 41 (2) to name the plaintiffs.

In accordance with Standing Order 41 (3), he called upon the Senior Minister of the House to move a motion for the suspension of the members named.

The Minister declined to do as requested by the defendant, who then left it to the House to say whether there were any members prepared to move and second a motion.

A motion was moved, seconded and carried by a majority of two, the plaintiffs not being permitted to vote thereon.

The motion put to the House was that the four members named be suspended from the services of the House. When the motion was passed, the defendant called upon the plaintiffs to vacate their chairs and withdraw from the House.

They did not comply with the Speaker’s direction.

The defendant observed that he did not have the members of his staff who could assist in having the plaintiffs vacate their chairs. He declared that grave disorder existed in the House because of the plaintiffs’ refusal to carry out the instructions of the Chair.

He thereafter adjourned the House to a date to be notified.

On May 31, 1963, the plaintiffs filed an action for certain declarations and orders, as well as damages.  That same day, this ex-parte application, by way of affidavit, was filed, claiming an interim  injunction restraining the defendant, his servants or agents, from in any way interfering with, preventing, or obstructing the plaintiffs from sitting  and participating in the proceedings and activities of the Legislative Assembly; or from exercising any of their rights as members thereof.

The Chief Justice in Chambers held that:
(i) The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to enquire into the existence and extent of any privilege or power claimed by the Legislative Assembly;

(ii) The Legislative Assembly, having the power  under the Standing Orders  to regulate its internal procedure relating to orderly conduct, is the sole judge of the occasion; and the mode of the exercise of its privileges and powers in that regard;

(iii) Without statutory authority, the Legislative Assembly has no power to punish a member for misconduct by way of committal, but has the power without statutory authority to order his removal or suspension for a time, or to expel him;
(iv) What was complained of by the Speaker, if held to be well founded, clearly necessitated the use of protective and self-defensive powers;

(v) The Legislative Assembly has power to enquire into the question of breach of privilege, brought to its attention by the Speaker; and to exercise its powers in connection therewith;

(vi) The Assembly has power to suspend the plaintiffs for a limited period, and the Supreme Court cannot interfere in or inquire into the mode of its exercise of that power.

Application refused, the C.J. had ruled.

Twelve (12) cases were referred to during the arguments in Chambers, at which the plaintiffs,
(Premier Jagan and the three MPs) were represented by Mr. J.O.F. Haynes, Q.C.

Delivering the ruling, Chief Justice J.A. Luckhoo said, among other things: “The plaintiffs are duly elected members of the Legislative Assembly. The first-named plaintiff, Cheddi Berret Jagan, is the Premier of British Guiana; the second-named plaintiff, Sheik M.  Saffie, is Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Lands; the third-named plaintiff, Victor Downer, and the fourth-named  plaintiff, Derek Jagan, are members for Berbice East  and for Suddie respectively.

“According to the affidavit filed in support of this application, at a meeting of the Assembly held on May 28, 1963, the defendant, in his capacity as Speaker, purported to adjudge the  plaintiffs guilty of acts, conduct and behaviour disgraceful and shameful,  and alleged that a breach  of privilege of the  Assembly had been committed  by the second-named  plaintiff when, on May 21,  1963, he left his seat in an allegedly discourteous manner and continued in the lobby of the House; and that  breaches of privilege and acts of contempt of the House were committed by the  other plaintiffs in the lobby of the House on May 21, 1963.
“In what is stated to be a verbatim report of the  proceedings of May 28, 1963, filed with the plaintiffs’  affidavit, it is recorded  to the effect that the defendant called upon the first-named  plaintiff to make an unqualified apology  in the Assembly in relation to those matters.

“This the first-named plaintiff declined to do; and the same request being made of the other plaintiffs by the defendant, they all declined to do so.

“The defendant once more appealed to the plaintiffs to make the apology requested, but they did not comply.

“The defendant then declared  the plaintiffs guilty of gross disorderly conduct; and said that in accordance with parliamentary procedure  and also in accordance with  their own Standing Orders, he (was directing) the  plaintiffs “to withdraw for the balance of the day’s sittings”.
“
The plaintiffs did not withdraw, as directed.

“The defendant, after referring to that fact and observing that the substantive mace bearer was absent, proceeded under Standing Order 41 (2) to name the plaintiffs, and in accordance with S.O. 41 (3), called upon the Senior Minister of the House to move a motion for the suspension of the members named.

“The Minister declined to do as requested by the defendant, who then stated  that it was not compulsory  that the Senior Minister  should move the motion, and  that he left it to the  House to say whether there were any members prepared  to move a motion and have it seconded.

“One of the members, P.S. D’Aguiar (not a Minister), then moved that the members be suspended “from the sittings of this House”.

“In written submissions which have today been recorded as part of the arguments of counsel, it was stated that a replay of the tape recording of the proceedings disclosed that  P.S. D’Aguiar, in moving  the motion, used the words, “from the services of this  House”, and not “from the sittings of this House”, as appears in the verbatim report of the proceedings filed with the plaintiffs’ affidavit.

“The Motion was seconded by another member, R.E. Cheeks. The defendant then stated that it had been moved that the four members named be suspended “from the services of the House,” and put that motion to the House.

“The plaintiffs were not permitted to vote on the motion, and the fourth-named plaintiff challenged the count on the ground that his vote had not been taken.

“The Motion was carried by a majority of two,

“The defendant called upon the plaintiffs to vacate their chairs and withdraw from the House.

“The plaintiffs did not comply with this direction.

“The defendant observed that he did not have the members of his staff who could assist in having the plaintiffs vacate their chairs; and (he) declared   that grave disorder existed in the House, because a certain number of members – a considerable portion of the House – refused to carry out the instructions of the Chair.

“He thereupon adjourned the House to a date to be notified, after stating that it did not seem to him that good sense would prevail within a short time on that day.
“Subsequent to this, the plaintiffs filed the writ of summons, claiming certain declarations, damages and an order which do not concern the present application; and an injunction in terms similar to the present application.

“The plaintiffs contend that, in respect of their suspension, the defendant and the House purported to exercise powers which neither the defendant nor the House possessed, or at least in a manner not provided for by law or by  the Standing  Orders of the Legislative Assembly; and that by reason thereof, the  purportive suspension of the plaintiffs is a nullity.

“The application by the plaintiffs was refused.