Blairmont Estates Ltd. loses appeal against cane cutter’s claim
IN 1968, the Guyana Full Court of the High Court affirmed a decision of a magistrate, who held that cane cutter Ivan Jack, who fell from a bridge while on his way to work and was injured, was entitled to compensation for injuries received during the course of his employment. His employers, Blairmont Estates, Ltd., denied responsibility and appealed against the magistrate’s ruling; but the Full Court, constituted by Chief Justice Harold Bollers and Justice Horace Mitchell, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the magistrate’s decision.
The facts revealed that the respondent was a cane cutter employed by the appellants on their estate, and was on his way to work on the day in question.
The respondent, who was riding a bicycle, was crossing a bridge — the property of the appellants — when a board slipped off a beam of the bridge, causing the respondent to fall from his bicycle into a trench below the bridge and suffer injuries, as a result of which he filed an application for the payment of workmen’s compensation, based on temporary partial incapacity.
The appellants did not traverse or deny the allegation relating to the incapacity, even though it was argued in the court below; but contended that the accident did not arise out of, and in the course of, the respondent’s employment.
The Full Court, agreeing with the case of Bennett v. Etwarie, held (i): That the allegation as to the incapacity not having been specifically traversed and denied in the pleadings, it must be taken to have been admitted; and that the accident arose out of, and in the course of, the workman’s  employment, as at the time of the accident the workman was in a place which formed part of his employers’ premises, where he would not have been entitled to be but for his contract of employment.
The Full Court referred to 11 cases in coming to its decision.
Attorney-at-law Mr. M. Churaman appeared for the appellants, while Mr. S. Mohabir represented the respondent.
Chief Justice Bollers delivered the judgment of the court.
According to him, “On October 23, 1967, the respondent, a cane cutter employed by the appellant company, was riding  his bicycle on his way to work when he came to a bridge on the Bath Estate, the property of the company, which he had to cross in order to get to his place of work.
As he was cycling over the bridge, a board on the bridge slipped off the beam of the bridge and caused him to fall from the cycle into the trench.
“Unfortunately, there was a pile in the trench, and the respondent’s head struck the pile; and as a result, he sustained injuries. He received a cut on the chin, a blow on the face, and one of his teeth was knocked out.
“He bled from both ears. The respondent, on instructions from the overseer, was sent to the estate dispensary, where he received first aid treatment, and then later, (he was) sent to the New Amsterdam Hospital, where he was admitted as a patient for two days.
“After his discharge from hospital, the respondent was treated by the estate dispenser, and then referred to a Dr. Persaud, the estate doctor. After examination by Dr. Persaud, the respondent was served with a document purported to be signed by Dr. Persaud and dated December 1, 1967.
“This was a document issued in accordance with Form 16 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Chap. 111(G). On that same day, the respondent was served with another document by the appellant company, which purported to be a notice in accordance with Section 12 of the Ordinance: that as a result of the medical report received, as from December 2. 1967, compensation payments in respect of any injury sustained by him on October 28, 1967 in the course of his employment should cease.
“Also, on December 1, 1967, the respondent was handed a letter by the personnel manager of the company, addressed to the field manager of the estate where the respondent was employed by the company, stating that the bearer was fit to resume work as from December 2, 1967.
“It must be made clear that the spot where the accident took place was about 2½ miles from the respondent’s work place, and the dam on which the respondent rode on to the bridge, and the bridge were both the property of the company and under their control. The company provided a railway locomotive to convey workers to their workplace, but the respondent and other estate workers assigned to a particular section were permitted to use the dam and the bridge to go to their place of work; and indeed, the respondent was informed by the field foreman of the gang in which he worked that he could use the dam for the purpose of getting to his workplace.
“In his application for compensation, brought under the Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance, the respondent claimed compensation for temporary partial incapacity for the period from October 28, 1967, (when the accident occurred) up to December 1, 1967, when he was served with the letter signed by the personnel manager, which stated that he was fit to resume work,” Chief Justice Bollers declared.
The Chief Justice added, “In the present appeal, the workman was riding his cycle on his way to his workplace along a permissible route provided by his employers, and which was used by many workmen assigned to that particular section of work; and was in a place which formed part of his employers’ premises, where he would not have been entitled to be but for his contract of employment, when he met with the accident in which he sustained injuries on the premises of his employers.
“He was therefore about his master’s business.  Following the authorities of Stewart (John) & Son, Ltd. v. Longhurst (7); Weaver v. Tredegar Iron Co. Ltd (8); and Hill v. Butterley Co., Ltd (11), we are of the view that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment.
“His claim for compensation under the Ordinance, Chap. 111, must therefore succeed. The appeal is dismissed and the order of the magistrate affirmed with costs to the respondent.”