TO objectively understand what we are dealing with, it would be good to establish the magnitude of the issue at hand. A parallel situation will suffice, which though not ideal, still serves to bring home the point. Former Head of EU NAVFOR (European Union Naval Force) General Buster Howes pointed out, to police, the Indian Ocean and have a response capacity within what he called the “first golden hours,” it would require 85 helicopter carrying warships! A proposal balked at by wealthy European nations including Norway and Cyprus.

Instead alternative approaches were looked at which included putting in place legislation that will allow armed guards aboard ships together with existing defensive mechanism, most of which are impractical for use in our context of piracy. In some instances crews are trained in the use of firearm (shotgun) to repel pirate attacks while plying their business in the Strait of Malacca.

These are countries with immense resources, firepower and wealth. They recognize the magnitude of the financial cost and its impact on their economies. The alternatives being sought is a clear indication of their preferential approach to fighting piracy. Proposition here is therefore based on the assumption that Guyana is assailed by economic demons multiple times greater than those of the European Union and that no one Government has the resources to successfully eradicate piracy. The area is just too vast, and the resources are too limited. The shore line and the vast expanse of water present unlimited possibilities for camouflage, hiding and escape.

Implicit in the approach taken by the EU is the recognition that piracy cannot be effectively tackled from land.

Similarly, in our case, a land based response would be time consuming and therefore ineffective in preventing acts of piracy. Any such mission will fall in the realm of rescue, rather than serve as a deterrent. Yes, they may be able to chase after the pirates. The fact is the damage would have already been done and a major decision will still have to be made – chase after pirates or rescue victims?

The EU recognise whatever measures are effected, they must be primarily focused at sea, hence the need to have a flotilla of patrol boats which they appear not to afford economically. The search for alternatives led to the involvement of ocean going vessels taking the lead in their own defence which is more cost effective and offers an on the spot response “within the golden hours.” Instead of being sitting ducks at the mercy of pirates, the crew itself is trained to deter pirate attacks as first responders until such time that whatever patrols may be in the area can respond.

Operationally, it makes perfect sense and establishes the case locally for our fishermen to be a part of the solution which involves direct participation in confronting the scourge of piracy in their own sphere of operation – the high seas.

Least it be misconstrued, I wish to reiterate that the approach elaborated here is not to have the fishermen being made the Sheriffs of the high seas. Rather, it is envisaged that since they are the targets of attacks and given the other security variables, they are best placed to initiate their own defence and deterrence strategies until help arrives from the Joint Services/patrol from whichever point they may be stationed on land or positioned at sea. The overall strategy therefore, is based on a multi-pronged approach of deterrence, defence, capture or destroy, which will involve the Joint Services (Police & Army) and fishermen on land as well as on the high seas.

What are the implications if any?
– A lack of political will and fear of criticism from certain quarters with pronouncements that the government is arming its supporters, the main intention of which is to lure the government into inaction.
– The perception of a deliberate miniaturization of the role of the Joint Services, in particular the Marine section of the Guyana Defence Force. And like everything else in Guyana, can be given a racial slant – arming Indian fishermen, starving Black Maritime officers of resources.
– Possible escalation of the death/injury rate at sea in confrontation with pirates. Knowing fishermen are armed, pirates will be operating with a predetermined disposition – its either them or me – therefore they will be prepared to use greater force and more sophisticated firepower in their illegal quest.
– Fishermen can turn weapon against themselves in drunken spree or family disputes.
– Weapons can be stolen and used in committing crime on land or sold to pirates thereby increasing their firepower capacity at sea.
– What is the policy of engagement, first use of force and its adherence at sea given the nature of the would-be encounter?
– How to manage such a crime scene and the investigative capacity of the police in the event of an armed encounter at sea leading to death of pirates or fishermen or destruction of boats?
– Obligation of boat Captains to file full reports on incidents of armed encounters.

On the converse side, arming the fishermen can be one of the most effective deterrents since pirates will now have to consider whether the benefits are worth the risks. Once this mental state is reached, uncertainty, reluctance and fear become major psychological factors that can lead to diminished enthusiasm for easy pickings at high sea. It ceases to be “easy pickings”. Now it enters into the realm of “deadly pickings.” They know fishermen will not play dead and lie down now that they are armed.

A mechanism will have to be sought to speed up the firearm application process after determining how to proceed and on what basis firearm licence will be issued. Would it be as per Committee or individual owners? How to determine who from the crew can be issued with a firearm licence?  Would the licence allow any other person to use the weapon at sea other than the captain or whoever name the license is in? If for instance, the persons authorised to use the firearm are not available to go on a particular fishing trip, can anyone else use the weapon or would it automatically be illegal for them to do so? Where would the weapons be stored whenever boat is docked for repairs or any other reason? If weapons are stored at police stations for safe keeping, what mechanism would be established for uplifting them whenever fishermen are ready to go to sea? As additional protection, fishermen can pursue the possibility of making bullet proof a certain part of their boats which will give added protection for crew members in the event of a fire fight.

Once these hurdles are passed, the next step is training in the handling, storing and usage of firearm – in both theory and practice. It should be mandatory for them to train at least once per month or maybe every quarter (after initial training in the use of firearm) in live firing exercises out at sea. This is in recognition of the fact that land based shooting is totally different from sea based training in unstable fishing boats. Focus should be on:-

– How to manoeuver their boat so as to offer the smallest possible target?
– What can be done to detect or distinguish a pirate boat or a friendly boat captured by pirates from a friendly boat as it approaches?
– What gauge of ammunition may be used and the sequencing of shots so as to make maximum impact?
– At what point will the first (and only) warning shot be fired, at what stage is fire concentrated on the oncoming boat and where?
– Who will be identified to make simultaneous communication with patrol (if any) in nearby waters or land based rescue teams, notifying them they are under attack?
– Apart from the point man or men (shooters) where would the rest of the crew secrete themselves or what should they be doing to assist in fighting off pirates? Should they all arm themselves with other weapons such as cutlass, spear hooks, etc? If so, what are the legal implications and consequences?
– What safety items should be made mandatory for each fishing vessel to have on board? Here reference is being made to distress flare, searchlights, life jackets which should be worn at all times, dry ration, water, etc.
– Means of communication on board – satellite phones or cell phones. None of these would have the impact or (defensive) use value as that of portable communication sets, mobile and or hand held radios which I’ll deal with as a component of the Workable Long Term Solutions (WLTS).

Of course there is the other option of having police or Maritime personnel imbedded with fishing crews while at sea if they will be able to withstand the rigours of the sea in small fishing vessels. Naturally, this brings a host of considerations to the fore, most of which will be centred around the availability of personnel. How this is to be worked out in proportion to fishing vessels, geography of the fishing grounds and cluster, and proximity of boats to each other, will determine its effectiveness in responding to distress calls at sea.