Ethnic groups sought agreement to exchange houses in safe areas
ONE such agreement related to ethnic groups from B4 Uitvlugt and 122 Zeeburg, neighbouring villages on the West Coast of Demerara, but unfortunately, the agreement  referred only to the exchange of houses to safe  areas; among other things it failed to mention was the land on which the houses stood.
After the Central Board of Health had rejected a plan of the project, the plaintiff Khelowitie Persaud brought an action against the defendant, Beatrice Walks, for a declaration of prescriptive title.
After considering all the aspects, Justice Victor Crane dismissed the action and advised the parties to try and arrive at an amicable settlement. 
A stay of execution of six weeks was granted.

‘Equity’

Justice Crane took into account the following:

Equity: Mutual agreement to exchange ‘properties’; receipts issued spoke only of ‘houses’.  Whether ‘lands’ were included in the exchange; and what was the true intention of the parties. He also considered whether specific performance of the agreement was possible.

Land, Prescriptive title: Land surveyed and divided into sub-lots. Inadequacy of the width of sub-lots –  Plan rejected by Central Board of Health   –  Whether the purported transfer was void for illegality  – Whether declaration  of  prescriptive  title was possible  –  S. 135 of the Public Health  Ordinance , Chapter 145 (omitted from the 1973 current Laws of Guyana).
According to Justice Crane, the plaintiff was the owner of two houses on Sub-lot ‘C’ of Lot B4 Uitvlugt, valued at $6,000, while the defendant, Walks, was the owner of a house at Lot 127 Zeeburg valued at $4,000.
“During the civil disturbances of 1964, when there were serious  racial and political conflicts  between East Indian and African descendants,” he said, “the plaintiff and Walks met at the plaintiff’s house on April 22, 1964, where a retired estate bookkeeper named Olie Mohamed made out three documents – two national receipts  and a promissory note in favour of the plaintiff for $1,998,  which represented  six years’ rental of the back house at Uitvlugt which was rented to tenants for $337 per annum.   No money had exchanged hands.
“After the documents, Walks left with her receipt; but shortly afterwards, Mohamed realized that the two receipts spoke only about ‘houses’ and made no mention of the ‘lands’ upon which the houses stood.

“He there and then amended the plaintiff’s receipt in her presence, by inserting the words, ‘I  agree to go to management to transfer the said Lot 127’, writing  between  the  text and Walks’s  signature.
“A similar insertion was intended to be done by Mohamed in Walks’s receipt, but he forgot to do so, and this was, in fact, never done.
“These words had important consequences, since the first defendant, Walks, was in a position  to have transport passed  for Lot 127 Zeeburg  as the owners (management’), the former Booker’s Sugar Estates,  had  made  a written  offer  of sale to Walks for the said lot.
“The plaintiff,  however,  was not in a position to pass title because, after  the B4  had been surveyed by Mr. J. Rutherford, Sworn Land Surveyor,  and a plan (had been)  prepared  by him  dividing the said lot into  3 sub-lots ‘A’, ‘B’, & ‘C’, that plan had been  rejected by the Central Board of Health for the reason that the width of the sub-lots was  inadequate.
“It was for this reason, therefore, that the plaintiff, in the action against Walks for specific performance  of the agreement, sought a declaration of  prescriptive title on the ground that she had been in occupation of sub-lot ‘C’ for a period of over 12 years,  nec vi, ned clam, nec pre cario  since 1950 when her father, Mangal Maraj, the second defendant, had  given her  the said sub-lot.
“The defendant, Walks, alleged that the agreement between herself and the plaintiff was only in relation to ‘houses’ and not to ‘houses and land’.”

Justice Crane held that:
“ (i)  Although the receipts specifically  referred  to ‘houses’  only, and made no mention about ‘lands’, from all the circumstances  of the case and the tenor of the agreement  itself, it was quite clear that the parties, placed in  the envious position  in which each found itself  at the time, must have contemplated  and stipulated for reciprocity  of exchange of both houses and respective lots  of land on which the houses stood as a term of their agreement, since  they must have considered that each was leaving her respective locality for all time;
(ii)   despite this finding in favour of the plaintiff, the court was still unable to grant her a declaration of prescriptive  title  to Sub-lot “C” of Lot B4  Uitvlugt,  and to direct  registration thereof  in the Deeds Registry, since to do so  would be in the  teeth of  section  135 (1) of the Public Health Ordinance, Chapter 145; and consequently, the contract or agreement  to transfer title to the said sub-lot by the plaintiff to the defendant Walks was void for illegality.
(iii)  Accordingly, there was never any enforceable contract or agreement between the parties, since it was made in breach of section 136 (1) of Chapter 145, and all three documents were illegal, void, and of no effect, and regrettably, the parties must be ordered to revert immediately to their former situation.
Finally, Justice Crane said: “If I may be permitted to remark by way of postscript, it seems to me that this matter was, from the beginning, obviously one for a settlement out of court.  It will be recalled that both before and during the trial, I made this suggestion to both parties, but to no avail; each was apparently bent on taking the court’s verdict in the matter.
“I hope reason will still prevail; even now it is not too late.  My order is that the parties must return (to their former residences),  but both parties obviously do not wish to do so; both appear to be reasonably satisfied with their new  localities being among peoples of their own ethnic origin, where no doubt, they have established new friends and relationships, and where it is hoped they  have relegated to the dim memory of the past the  bitterness of those fateful days of 1964.
“Surely a solution to the problem may lie in total or partial abatement   
of any difference between the respective values of  the two properties owing to the fact that the plaintiff is unable to give transport for Sub-lot  C,  whereas the defendant is in a position to give such for her Zeeburg  property.”