-Judge grants bail pending hearing of appeal
CHANCELLOR  J. O. F.  Haynes in 1977 granted bail to housewife Lynette Scantlebury, pending her appeal against a six -month prison sentence for causing death by dangerous driving.
The ailing accused had sought  bail on the grounds of her and her husband’s ill health, hardship for the family and lastly, the real likelihood that  her appeal would come up for hearing after she will have served her sentence.
Chancellor Haynes allowed the appeal on the last ground.
Sentence was handed down in the High Court on October 25, 1976, following which pronouncement she collapsed in the dock and was rushed in a delirious condition to hospital where she was admitted a patient.
The affidavit in support of her petition stated that she was is in great pain and in receipt of medical treatment although there was no affidavit evidence-in-support forthcoming from any medical practitioner.
At the trial, Chancellor Haynes held that: 
(i)    In matters of this kind,  applicants should consider the advisability of assisting  the judge by corroborative proof of allegations of ill health,  or at least a medical certificate  if that condition  is to be relied on as a material consideration  in deciding  whether or not a suppliant should be admitted to bail;
(ii)    If appellants are admitted to bail freely on appeals from  the verdict  of juries, a dangerous situation could arise inimical to the public interest;
(iii)    In certain particular circumstances, grounds of family health and hardship, taken cumulatively, might justify a grant of bail, but they do not do so in this case;
(iv)    The Assistant Registrar of the Court of Appeal had been consulted,  and [that]it had been accepted from him that in the ordinary course of affairs,  this appeal was not likely to come up for hearing until about four to six months hence;
(v)    Since normally bail should not be granted to an appellant or a prospective one after his conviction by a jury, an applicant would have to show that in his case, there were special circumstances  which made it the best thing to do to put him on bail pending the hearing of his appeal.  An appellant on a short sentence of six months should have his appeal heard promptly, but if this is impracticable, then this court might properly admit him or her to bail;
(vi)    This court being satisfied that if bail is refused to the petitioner, there is at least a real possibility of a danger of injustice being done to her, will admit her to bail in her own  recognizance in the sum of $2, 000,  with a surety in like sum acceptable to the Registrar of  the Court of Appeal.”

He was further quoted as saying: 
“I have not seen the record of evidence, and this court is not in a position to reach any sensible view as to whether or not this appeal has any prospect of success.  Further, this court is not in a position to say whether or not a sentence imposed was warranted by the facts presumably found by the jury. 
“But this court is aware that the offence for which the appellant has been convicted, not infrequently, is punished by fines of varying severity. While nothing that the court says in this ruling should be interpreted as accepting or suggesting that  the appeal has a fair  chance of success either as to the conviction  or as to the sentence  having  regard to the nature of the offence and the very short sentence  imposed, it is felt  that this is a fit case to admit her to bail. It must be wrong that she should be exposed to the almost certain consequence of, in effect serving her sentence before having her appeal determined.
“And it is certainly very likely, if not certain, that this will occur if bail is refused.
If it is and subsequently the appeal is dismissed both as to conviction and sentence, then retrospectively, no harm will have been done.
“On the other hand if bail is refused and subsequently the appeal succeeds to the extent that either her conviction is set aside or if not the sentence is varied to a monetary one, then she will have suffered imprisonment or detention pending her appeal unjustifiably.
Everyone will agree that justice would not appear to have been done in such event.   This court is satisfied that if bail is refused to the petitioner there is at least a real possibility of a danger of injustice being done to her.”
Said he in closing: “This court wishes to make it clear that the sex of the appellant  has nothing whatever to do with the decision to admit her to bail.”
Senior counsel, Mr. Donald Robinson appeared for the petitioner, while then Director of Public Prosecution (DPP), Mr. E.A. Romao, S.C., appeared for the State.