-claims magistrate’s ruling based on ‘unjudicial reasoning’
THE Full Court in 1968 set aside a magistrate’s award in a case of workman’s compensation after finding he had reached his conclusion of fact by a process of “unjudicial reasoning.” As a consequence, the workman, Kanhai Singh, who had been awarded compensation  for injury to his knee during a fall while working with the Demerara Company Ltd., had his award taken away after it was proved  that his illness was due to  osteo-arthritis and not a fall as alleged.
The Full Court rejected the magistrate’s decision and ordered the respondent, Singh, to pay costs to the appellant,  the Demerara Company Limited.
The circumstances of the case were of such as to justify an Appellate Court to disturb the findings of fact.
The facts of the case disclosed  that the respondent  had claimed  compensation in the Magistrate’s Court  under the Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance, Chapter III, for an injury which he alleged  was caused  on December 4,1964, when he fell and struck his right knee in an accident  which  arose out of the course  of his employment with the appellants.   The magistrate gave judgment in his favour, and the appellants appealed to the Full Court.
The respondent, Singh, had received periodic payments from the appellants for two weeks after the accident, during which time  he was being examined  by their doctor.  The doctor ordered an X-ray examination, and his ultimate diagnosis, some two weeks after the accident, was that the appellant was suffering from a pre-existing disease, namely,  osteo-arthritis. 
The respondent claimed that the pain continued,  and he consulted another doctor who diagnosed  traumatic  arthritis.   He arrived at this conclusion without the aid of any X-ray pictures, and, although asserting that he found  no evidence  of osteo-arthritis, said that even if his diagnosis was wrong and the respondent had been suffering from osteo-arthritis, it had been aggravated by the accident.
The magistrate found that the respondent had been suffering from a pre-existing disease as diagnosed by the appellants’ doctor,  but that the accident had materially contributed to his existing condition.
The Full Court however held that:
(i)    a magistrate, in arriving at his finding of fact, was entitled  to disbelieve portions of the evidence,  but there must be some logical basis for so doing;
(ii)    it is not the function of an Appellate Tribunal to substitute  its own finding of fact,  or to interfere with those of the Court  of Trial merely because it took the view that had it heard  the matter at first instance, it may have come  to a different conclusion;
(iii)    in the present case, however, the magistrate had arrived at his conclusion of fact by a process of unjudicial reasoning.

Solicitor General, Mr. G.M. Farnum, Q.C.,  represented the appellants, while Attorney-at-law, Mr. Derek Jagan appeared for the respondent. The Full Curt was constituted by Chief Justice Harold  Bollers and Justice Akbar Khan.    
According to the judgment of the Full Court, the evidence which was led in the magistrate’s court disclosed that the respondent,  on December 4, 1964,  while fetching a bundle of cane  and crossing a dam  on a plank, slipped and fell and hit his right knee.  It became swollen and pained him. He reported to the ‘driver’, who referred him to the dispensary at Pln. Farm. He was then referred to  Dr. Weinstein,  the Estate doctor, who examined him  on December 5, 1964 and ordered an X-ray.
On December 15, 1964, the respondent was again examined by Dr. Weinstein, who told him to report  to the manager  on the following day.                                                     

On December 16, the manager informed the respondent that the Estate Doctor had found him fit  for work  and discharged him, and therefore he must report for work. 
The respondent maintained that his knee was swollen and still pained him.   On December 23,  1964, the respondent was examined by Dr. Hugh, a private practitioner, who recommended  six weeks temporary  disability  and issued such a medical certificate .
This certificate the estate authority refused to accept, and the respondent was informed  that if he failed to work, he would no longer be employed.  
The respondent decided to go back to work, in which he did forking and planting of cane.   He was assisted in fetching the cane tops a distance of 18 to 24 rods  by his son,  but he found that he could not plant the cane tops as he used to, as his knee  was still paining him. He maintained that he could not fork and plant as well as he did formerly. 
According to the judgment of the Full Court,  it is apparent from the findings that the learned  magistrate accepted the diagnosis of Dr. Weinstein that the workman was suffering  from osteo-arthritis as being correct, and rejected the evidence  of Dr. Hugh  that he was suffering  from  traumatic arthritis as being incorrect,  but accepted Dr. Hugh’s evidence  that there was tearing of the ligament  of the right  knee, and arrived at the conclusion  that the pre-existing disease  of osteo-arthritis  had been aggravated  as a result of the accident.   The appellants (employers) now appeal to the court on the two grounds available to them, that is, that the decision was wrong  in law,  in that there was no evidence  to support the finding of the magistrate, and secondly,  that the decision was such  that the magistrate, viewing the evidence reasonably, could not properly have so decided.
On the second ground, counsel for the appellant argued that the magistrate’s acceptance of Dr. Hugh’s evidence that the respondent was suffering  from torn ligaments and experienced limitation of movement was unreasonable,  as it was based on false premise. That is to say, a faulty diagnosis, and therefore was not open to the magistrate to rely on Dr. Hugh’s evidence.
As the Full Court said in conclusion: “We are of the view that the magistrate in this case erred in his approach to the evidence when he accepted the evidence of Dr. Weinstein as to his diagnosis that the respondent was suffering from osteo-arthritis, and proceeded to reject the doctor’s evidence  that there was no tearing of ligament, but accepted the evidence of Dr. Hugh that there was a tearing of the ligament and limitation of movement. 
“There was no logical basis for the rejection of the evidence  of Dr. Weinstein that there was no torn ligament, when it was he who had diagnosed correctly the condition of the respondent,  and had first seen and treated  the respondent  over a period of time,  and had taken the trouble to order x-rays  which confirmed his diagnosis.
“In our view, we can safely say that the magistrate’s view was based on such disregard  of evidence  to which no reasonable man  could come when he disregarded the evidence  of Dr. Weinstein that there was no torn ligament, with the result that the inference he drew that the incident caused  the incapacity was so violent that we could properly interfere  with his decision.
“For these reasons, the appeal must be allowed, and the order of the magistrate set aside with costs to the appellants, fixed at $25.00, plus the cost of the record $7.20.  The appellants will also have  their costs in the court below fixed at $75.00